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Abstract 
This thesis conducts a robust and granular examination of the concept of ‘object’ 
under Article 101(1) TFEU and its resulting legal and practical implications.  To that 
end, a methodology focusing on the case law of the European Courts and other 
primary sources is adopted.  This enables a legal analysis of the meaning, 
application and role of restrictions of competition by object to be undertaken.  The 
case law reveals three key approaches adopted by the European Courts to 
restrictions by object: the ‘orthodox approach’, the ‘more analytical approach’ and 
an amalgamation of these two approaches, the ‘hybrid approach’.  This finding 
immediately questions the dominance of the orthodox approach within legal 
discourse over the years.  The orthodox approach contends that a limited category 
of agreements are considered by law to automatically restrict competition by virtue 
of their object.  This is reflected in the European Commission’s Article 81(3) 
Guidelines and is encapsulated by the widely recognised ‘object box’.  This thesis 
poses a direct challenge to such narrow interpretation of the law.  It argues that 
this depiction of the law does not fully reflect the jurisprudence of the European 
Courts.  Rather the case law reveals an alternative interpretation of the concept of 
object based on the seminal case of Société Technique Minière concerned more 
with determining the aim of the agreement within its legal and economic context as 
opposed to its categorisation.  Moreover, the ‘more analytical approach’ benefits 
from greater judicial support.  Having established the three key approaches and 
their application under Article 101(1) TFEU, the question of what is the best 
interpretation of the law on restrictions of competition by ‘object’ is reflected on.  
Based on the case law of the European Courts, it is argued the more analytical 
approach provides the best interpretation of the law.  This is assessed in relation to 
the framework of Article 101 TFEU as a whole.  Finally, this thesis briefly explores 
whether such conclusion is then consistent with the optimum function of the object 
criterion from an enforcement perspective. 
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Introduction 
1. Introduction 
Historically, one of the most neglected aspects of Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), indeed of EU competition law more 
generally, has been the concept of agreements whose ‘object’ is to restrict 
competition.  Many commentators were in the past willing to accept Professor 
Whish’s infamous depiction: the ‘object box’.1  In his terms, the object box 
comprises a limited class of ‘particularly pernicious’ agreements, which are 
considered by law to have as their object the restriction of competition.2  By 
implication, restrictions of competition by object are akin to a form of per se 
offence as understood within the context of section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890.3  
Although an agreement restricting competition by object could be exempted under 
Article 101(3) TFEU, this was seen as highly unlikely.  Particular restrictions that fall 
within the impugned category are therefore automatically seen as having the 
object of restricting competition under Article 101(1) TFEU.4  As such, they involve 
an ‘obvious’ infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU.5  Restrictions by object do not 
require their anti-competitive effects to be proven; hence they immediately fall foul 
of Article 101(1) TFEU.6   
This perception and presentation of the law has been challenged only recently.7  
This was due in large part to the clear embrace of the object box concept by the 
                                                     
1
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p124.  See (Bellamy & Child, 2008).  The object box reflects what is referred 
to as the “orthodox approach” within this thesis.  See Chapter 1. 
2
 (Whish, 2009), pp115, 118 and (Whish & Bailey, 2012), pp117, 121.  Whish admits his presentation 
of the object box “slightly oversimplifies” the law (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p124.  Whish is used as an 
authoritative benchmark as he pioneered the vision of the ‘object box’, which has been followed, 
not just by scholars, but cited by Advocate Generals (see AG Trstenjak in BIDS infra n14 and 41) and 
courts such as the Competition Appeals Tribunal. 
3
 See eg (Jones, 2010), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation?’, pp658-660; also Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v 
Commission (Welded Steel Mesh) [1995] ECR II-1063. 
4
 (Whish, 2009), pp115-117.   
5
 (Whish, 2009), p119 and (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p121: citing the General Court’s judgment in ENS 
infra n19.  
6
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p118.  The contents of the object box are found at p124. 
7
 Since 2010 a number of articles on the object criterion emerged, for instance supra n3 (Jones), ‘Left 
Behind by Modernisation?’; (King, 2011); (Andreangeli, 2011); (Bailey, 2012). 
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European Commission (Commission) through its categorisation of restrictions by 
object designated as ‘hardcore’ restrictions, evident in its guidelines and Block 
Exemption Regulations (BERs).8  This meant that most focus of debate concerning 
the object concept centred on whether the Commission correctly categorised 
various types of agreement under the object heading and whether the object box 
should be ‘thin’ or ‘fat’.9  The associated benefits such categorisation may bring in 
terms of legal certainty or ease of administrative burden were also reflected 
upon.10  The more pertinent question of whether categorising different types of 
agreements as ‘object’ or ‘effect’ was legally correct was rarely considered.  
Instead, that the law operated in the terms of an object box was simply and 
unreservedly assumed.11 
Due to the implementation of modernisation, however, particularly the acceptance 
by the Commission of an ‘effects-based approach’ to determining restrictions of 
competition by effect under Article 101(1) TFEU, the ‘effect’ criterion had for many 
years taken centre stage within legal discourse.12  The object concept was therefore 
                                                     
8
 See eg, Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/97 (the Article 
81(3) Guidelines), paras 20-23; Commission Regulation 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and 
concerted practices [2010] OJ L102 1-7; Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2000] OJ C291 1-44; 
Guidelines on the application of Article 81 of the EC Treaty to technology transfer agreements [2004] 
OJ C101 2-42, para 14; Horizontal Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements [2011] OJ C11/1, para 74 
(the Horizontal Co-operation Guidelines).  
9
 This was evident at the conference on ‘Object/Effect and Information Sharing – the good, the bad 
and the ugly’ 6 October 2010 at the British Institute of International and Comparative Law.  Here 
delegates pressed the panel on precisely which types of agreement fall within the object category 
and whether the Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines correctly delineated that category.    
10
 (Bennett & Collins, 2010), pp311, 312-314. See also supra Jones n3, ‘Left Behind by 
Modernisation?’, p656 and AG Kokott, infra n41 T-Mobile, para 43. 
11
 Ibid Bennett and Collins pp311, 312-314: “The most difficult thing to do is to determine exactly 
what kinds of agreement, arrangement or practice should fall within the object category, and hence 
carry the presumption of harm”. The authors provided no authority or case law supporting the basis 
on which they stated their view of the law.   
12
 2004 marked a significant chapter in the Commission’s role as the central enforcer of the EU’s 
antitrust regime.  The ‘modernisation’ of EU competition law under Council Regulation (EC) No 
1/2003 [2003] OJ L1/1 (Regulation 1/2003) meant the notification system was abolished and the 
application of Article 101 TFEU was decentralised. This meant businesses no longer needed to notify 
their agreements to the Commission and National Competition Authorities (NCA’s) and National 
Courts (NC’s) now had the power to grant exemptions to the prohibition, thus ending the 
Commission’s monopoly over Article 101(3) TFEU.  See eg (Marquis, 2007), (Nazzini, 2006), 
(Wesseling, 2000) and for an in-depth examination of the effects-based approach see (Bourgeois & 
Waelbroeck, 2013). 
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not high on the academic or, seemingly, the political agenda.  This position no 
longer stands: Gerard confirmed that the meaning of the object criterion has 
resurfaced as one of the “fundamental legal questions of the day”.13   
The shift in the debate from ‘effect’ to ‘object’ can be attributed to a variety of 
factors.  For instance, a number of important judgments were handed down by 
both the General Court (GC) and Court of Justice (CJEU), which firmly drew 
attention back to the object concept.14  Additionally, the process of modernisation 
meant that the Commission was able to free up its resources to investigating and 
uncovering cartels, typically forms of agreement that are restrictive by object.15  A 
consequence of this enforcement priority adjustment and the absence of the 
notification system has been that nearly every Decision issued by the Commission 
under Article 101 TFEU in the past ten years has been framed in object terms.16   
In parallel with this development, the application of an ‘effects-based’ approach to 
agreements under Article 101(1) TFEU is seen as complex.17  Competition 
authorities find it harder to win cases on an effects-based analysis given the level of 
economic assessment demanded by the Community Courts.  For instance, in O2 the 
GC reminded the Commission of the importance of the counterfactual.18  In 
Delimitis and ENS, the Courts also asked for more evidence of effects than in 
previous effect cases.19  Hence, competition authorities would rather resort to 
applying the object criterion, which carries a burden of proof that is easier to 
satisfy.20  As the concrete effects of the agreement do not need to be proven under 
the object criterion, a rational competition authority will therefore look to stretch 
                                                     
13
 (Gerard, 2013), p39.  
14
 See Chapter 2: Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969 and infra 
n41: C-501/06 P GSK, C-209/07 BIDS and C-8/08 T-Mobile.  Note that previously the General Court 
was known as the Court of First Instance. 
15
 White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty 
Commission Programme No 99/027 [1999] OJ C132/1.   
16
 (Gerard, 2013), p38. 
17
 See eg Gerard, supra n13: “The term ‘economic’ approach is often used as a synonym for ‘effects-
based’”, p20. 
18
 Case T-328/03 O2 (Germany) GmbH & Co, OHG v Commission [2006] 5 CMLR 258, 65-117.  See 
(Robertson, 2007), p262; (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p127. 
19
 C-234/89 Delimitis v Henninger Bräu [1992] 5 CMLR 210; Joined Cases T371, 375, 384 &388/94 
European Night Services v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141 (ENS).   
20
 (Goyder, 2011), III. 
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the meaning of the object criterion - usually in the guise of expanding the contents 
of the object box - as a mechanism for ensuring it is successful in finding an 
agreement anticompetitive.21  As a result, there is a growing reliance on the object 
criterion by competition authorities within their decision-making.  This refocus on 
the object criterion has given rise to a concern amongst some commentators that 
the economic rationale behind the impetus of the effects-based approach is now 
meaningless; because all economic analysis is reserved for restrictions by ‘effect’ as 
opposed to those by object.22  This proposition needs testing.   
What is certain is that the relevance of the object criterion continues to increase 
within the current legal landscape.  The debate, that had long been so absent over 
its meaning and application, now shows no signs of abating.23   
2. Background to the thesis 
In September 2006 the GC handed down a controversial judgment, which departed 
dramatically from the concept of object as traditionally perceived.24  In GSK, the 
Court found on the facts that an intended restriction of parallel trade, a known 
‘hardcore’ restriction, did not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object.  Rather, it held 
that the agreement was restrictive by effect.  In doing so, it deviated from the 
standards employed by the Commission in its Article 81(3) Guidelines.  The 
prevalent reaction to the judgment at the time was that the GC was wrong: that its 
application of the object criterion to the agreement blurred the line between the 
concepts of object and effect.25  The GC’s interpretation of the law was, therefore, 
                                                     
21
 Arguably the Commission did this in Lundbeck (Case No. 39226) and in its Horizontal Co-operation 
Guidelines. 
22
 (Gerard, 2013), pp38-39.  Also noted by (Jones, 2010), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation?’, p650.  
23
 Numerous conferences on the subject continue to take place, eg, ERA conference “Restrictions of 
Competition by object after Cartes Bancaires and the Commission’s Initiatives” on 11 December 
2014; of many blog posts on this topic see also (Lawrence, 2014), Object Restrictions on the Menu; 
and, more generally, www.chillingcompetition.com; Lovdahl Gormsen highlights the “considerable 
debate” over whether the presumption of effects under the object criterion is rebuttable under 
Article 101(1) TFEU as opposed to being exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU, (Lovdahl Gormsen, 
2013), ft23.      
24
 Supra n14, Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission.  See (Goyder & Albors-Llorens, 
2009), p120. 
25
 See eg (Whish, 2009), p121.   
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regarded as an anomaly.26  Such reaction demonstrated how entrenched the 
position, that the law operated in terms of an object box, was within the legal 
community.  The notion that the law may, in fact, operate in a way not wholly 
reflected in the Commission’s guidelines, was largely absent.  Hence, an initial 
enquiry was to test whether the judgment was, indeed, “surprising”.27   
Testing the hypothesis revealed a number of significant findings.  Even on a 
preliminary reading of the case law of the CJEU, the judgment should not have been 
especially surprising.28  In particular, much of the careful application and recounting 
of the law on the object criterion by the GC was, in fact, more rather than less, 
indicative of the jurisprudence.  The GC’s judgment highlighted an alternative, more 
analytical means of applying the object criterion, far removed from the deployment 
of the object box analogy by the Commission in its decision.29  It was evident from 
this early research, that the meaning and application of the object criterion was 
considerably more nuanced than the Article 81(3) Guidelines would suggest.30  The 
very real prospect was thus raised, that the Article 81(3) Guidelines did not 
accurately reflect the law.  Moreover, the dearth of in-depth academic research 
into the object concept was exposed.31     
Many of the leading texts and academic papers published prior to 2010 revealed 
the common acceptance of the Commission’s interpretation of the object 
criterion.32  Indeed, the object concept was of so little interest that some 
commentators ignored it entirely in their critiques of Article 101(1) TFEU.33  For 
                                                     
26
 (Whish, 2009), p121.  See also (Bennett & Collins, 2010), pp312-314.  Many comments voiced at 
conferences confirmed this perception, eg, at the PhD conference held by QMW at Goodenough 
College in November 2007. 
27
 Ibid, Whish, p121.   
28
 This initial research was undertaken between 2008-2010. 
29
 Commission Decision, GlaxoSmithKline, 2001/791/EC.   
30
 For instance, at least 6 different definitions of ‘object’ were found.     
31
 Cf two papers on the object concept authored by Odudu in 2001, ‘Object as Subjective Intention’ 
and ‘The Object Requirement Revisited’; (Jones, 2006); a paper written for the Swedish competition 
authority (Kolstad, 2009) and a short article written on the rule of reason by Lasok QC (Lasok QC, 
2008).   
32
 See eg (Whish, 2009), (Bellamy & Child, 2008), (Faull & Nikpay, 2007), (Chalmers, et al., 2006) who 
rely heavily on the judgment in ENS; (Goyder & Albors-Llorens, 2009), pp118-122, particularly p119-
120.  Cf (Odudu, 2006) and (Black, 2005), pp115-127.   
33
 See eg (Slot & Johnston, 2006). 
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others, the object criterion was clear and straightforward.34  On the whole, the 
texts provided limited explanation of the meaning or application of the object 
criterion to agreements, or to the case law underpinning it.35  Instead, the 
modernisation process meant most commentary focused on the role and 
assessment of the effect criterion.  Nevertheless, it was acknowledged on occasion, 
paradoxically by Whish, that the object concept did present some inconsistencies 
and therefore was “confused and confusing”.36  Few at this juncture, however, 
chose to unravel and respond to the problems.37   
In view of the nature of the object criterion as a substantive element of Article 
101(1) TFEU these initial findings were illuminating and unexpected.  The 
assumption was that the object concept would have been subject to careful 
examination, as the importance of the object criterion within Article 101(1) TFEU 
was always clear.38  This was underlined by Odudu who opined that: 
“economic effects need not be considered when the object is to 
restrict competition; when an economic effect must be shown is 
                                                     
34
 See eg, (Chalmers, et al., 2006) p1000: “object cases are simple: a cartel…has as its object the 
elimination of competition because the parties monopolise the market and raise prices, as such it is 
prohibited.  The object of an agreement is not determined by the intention of the parties, rather an 
agreement has its anti-competitive object when the restriction of competition is obvious.  If the 
object is to harm competition, then there is no need to enquire about the effects.”  See also 
(Bourgeois & Bocken, 2005). 
35
 Arguably many commentators were guilty of this: see eg, (Nicolaides, 2005), pp129-130; also 
(Bellamy & Child, 2008), para 2/097 who viewed object as a “per se” restriction, which “of their 
nature” restricted competition, which they claimed was the same approach adopted by the 
Commission; (Korah, 2006), pp74-84 and (Dabbah, 2004), pp73-76. 
36
 (Whish, 2003), pp108-115. The statement was made in reference to the amount of market 
analysis required under the object heading when assessing whether the agreement is appreciable.   
37
 At the PhD conference at Goodenough College in 2007, David Gerber made an observation that 
resonated with the impetus behind this thesis.  He stated that, despite over 50 years of EU 
competition law, there was a need for a “back to basics” approach, as the Courts and commentators 
were still struggling to understand the fundamental elements of Article 101 TFEU, despite the 
advancement of competition law in terms of economic considerations, policy developments and 
other deviations.  Marquis also acknowledged Article 101(1) TFEU and its “exotic mysteries” 
(Marquis, 2007).  Notably Odudu did advance an alternative view of the object criterion: (Odudu, 
2001) “Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intention” and “Interpreting Article 81(1): the 
Object Requirement Revisited”.     
38
 Goyder agrees, “...the concept of an ‘object’ restriction has not yet been firmly nailed down, and 
still gives rise to confusion.  It seems even more surprising when one considers that object 
infringements represent the most serious anticompetitive conduct, and so tend to be enforcement 
priorities for competition authorities, and to attract significant fines...it is hard to discern clear 
outlines of the concept of ‘object restriction’ [despite the volume of case law].” (Goyder, 2011), I 
(Introduction).    
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determined by the scope and content of the object category.  Article 
[101 TFEU] remains uncertain to the extent that the meaning and 
functioning of the ‘object’ element is unspecified.”39   
The lack of historical research was all the more startling in view of the 
acknowledgment, by several prominent scholars such as Marquis and Whish, that 
Article 101(1) TFEU lacked clarity as a whole, despite the Commission’s claim that 
EU competition law had “clearly established basic principles and well-defined 
details”.40  The need for detailed research into the object criterion was further 
underscored by three seminal judgments handed down by the CJEU that dealt 
specifically with the law relating to the object criterion: GSK, BIDS and T-Mobile.41  
These judgments significantly raised the profile of the object concept and 
highlighted a more contextual approach to determining an agreement’s object.     
The increase in interest surrounding the object criterion has coincided with a 
palpable shift in the perception of it in a number of the current editions of leading 
texts.  Certainly, in contrast with earlier editions, the object concept has been 
subject to a more full and balanced appraisal.  This, in conjunction with the recent 
spate of CJEU judgments, is due to the influence of a number of prominent 
academic papers published between 2010 and 2012, which highlighted the 
limitations of the orthodoxy.42  Whish & Bailey’s description of the object criterion, 
for example, is now more expansive than in previous editions insofar as the authors 
recognise that the object concept is more complex than was previously stated.43  
The premise of their interpretation of the law still rests on the understanding that 
certain agreements can be “classified as having as their object the restriction of 
competition since in such cases it is not necessary to prove that anti-competitive 
                                                     
39
 (Odudu, 2006), p3.   
40
 (Odudu, 2006), p97; (Marquis, 2007), p29; White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules 
Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty Commission Programme No 99/027 [1999] OJ 
C132/1, introduction, para 3.  See generally (Monti, 2007) and (Gerber, 2008).   
41
 Joined cases C-501/06P, C-513/06P, C-515/06P, C-519/06P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission and Others, [2009] ECR I-9291 (GSK); Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef 
Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) Meats Ltd [2008] ECR I-8637 
(BIDS); Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529 (T-Mobile).   
42
 (Jones, 2010), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation?’, (King, 2011), (Andreangeli, 2011), (Bailey, 2012). 
43
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p122, ft 367 citing Jones and King.  They acknowledge the object box is not 
an exhaustive list, p122.  
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effects would follow”.44  Hence, the categorisation of agreements falling into the 
“object box” remains at the heart of their argument.45  They also continue to assert 
that any quantitative component to the object analysis lies primarily in the fact that 
any restriction of competition must be appreciable.46  How the object criterion is, in 
fact, applied to agreements is not elaborated on.47   
The shift in the perception of the object concept is most palpable in Bellamy & 
Child.48  In contrast to its previous account of the object criterion, though notably 
relying on much of the same case law as in its previous edition, Bellamy & Child 
provides one of the most comprehensive text-book accounts of the object 
criterion.49  Having previously advanced a position sympathetic to the object box 
approach and analogous with US-style per se infringements, the 7th edition places 
more reliance on determining the precise purpose of the agreement within its legal 
and economic context.50  What the text lacks is greater detail and a more granular 
account of the various elements that play a role under the object criterion, such as 
legitimate objectives and restrictive effects.   
What emerges, therefore, from the proliferation of judgments, new guidelines and 
commentary in recent years is that the object criterion is currently in a state of flux.  
This status is evidenced by the Commission.  In September 2013 Alexander 
Italianer, the Director General of DG COMP, gave an insightful speech on the object 
                                                     
44
 Ibid, p120. 
45
 Ibid, p120.  ENS is cited as authority for this contention, pp121-123. 
46
 Ibid, p120.  Following the judgment in Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc v Autorité de la concurrence, 13 
December 2012, nyr (Expedia) this understanding is contentious (see Chapter 5).  Bellamy & Child 
also find that the function of an effects-based analysis under the object heading is limited to (i) the 
determination of appreciableness, (ii) the level of fine, (iii) the application of Article 101(3) TFEU and 
(iv) the affect on trade, (Bellamy & Child, 2013), 2.117.  This thesis argues that the quantitative 
component is not only due to these factors.  See Chapters 2-4.      
47
 For instance, there is no examination of the role of the legal and economic context, which is 
shown in later chapters of this thesis to form a fundamental part of the application of the law under 
Article 101(1) TFEU. 
48
 (Bellamy & Child, 2013), 2.111-2.123. 
49
 (Bellamy & Child, 2013), 2.111-2.123.  (Jones & Sufrin, 2014) also provides a comprehensive 
account, though describes the object concept in terms of the identification of a category of object 
restraints automatically assumed to restrict competition, p205.  However, the exceptions to this 
general rule are noted: pp212-226, 232. 
50
 (Bellamy & Child, 2013), 2.111. 
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criterion.51  He advocated a more contextual approach to ascertaining an 
agreement’s object, operating along the lines of a continuum or sliding scale: the 
complexity of such assessment being dependent on the circumstances of the case.52  
Conversely, in its Guidance on restrictions by object published in June 2014, the 
Commission seemingly distances itself from a more in-depth contextual analysis by 
re-enforcing its perception of the relationship between the object concept and 
hardcore restrictions.53  The judgment in Expedia ostensibly exacerbated this 
understanding, which the Commission interpreted to mean that anticompetitive 
agreements by object “have by definition an appreciable impact on competition”.54  
The truth of this assertion requires careful attention.   
Having flirted with the notion that the object criterion is not straitjacketed by an 
object box, it would appear in some quarters that the Commission, and indeed 
certain commentators, are again favouring a return to formalism.55  It is perhaps no 
coincidence that the complexity of analysis involved in determining restrictions by 
effect (under the effects-based approach), has reignited the call for ‘bright lines’ 
under the object condition.56  
3. The research question and methodology 
In view of these insights the need for comprehensive research into the concept of 
object, not just the issue of what constitutes a restriction by object, is long overdue.  
Set against the backdrop of modernisation, this thesis casts a probing light on this 
substantive element of Article 101(1) TFEU.  It asks what the object concept means 
if the case law is interpreted carefully and recounted accurately.  The thesis is 
therefore designed to advance our knowledge and enhance our legal understanding 
                                                     
51
 (Italianer, 2013) ‘Competitor Agreements under EU Competition law’, Fordham. 
52
 Ibid, p5.  Even though this thesis does not support all of the proposals made in the speech, it is a 
notable departure from the Article 81(3) Guidelines.     
53
 Commission Staff Working Document, Guidance on restrictions of competition ‘by object’ for the 
purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice’, 2014. 
54
 Commission Press release, 25 June 2014; Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc v Autorité de la concurrence.   
55
 See generally (Nagy, 2013), p542 and AG Kokott in T-Mobile and Expedia; (Jones & Sufrin, 2014), 
p205.  However, the judgment in Case C-67/13 P Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission (11 
September 2014) (Cartes Bancaires) has re-ignited the debate regarding the object criterion and its 
relationship with the effects-based approach. 
56
 See (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013).   
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of this provision by focusing on its legal meaning, application and role within Article 
101(1) TFEU as determined by the European Courts.  The outcome of this 
examination will then be considered in the wider context of Article 101 TFEU as a 
whole, in terms of the object concept’s relationship with Article 101 TFEU.  
Additionally, the Article 81(3) Guidelines, which the Commission issued as part of its 
package of guidelines intended to ensure the coherent enforcement of Article 101 
TFEU across the EU as well as to clarify its application, are significant in this 
research.57  They represent the official account of the Commission’s interpretation 
of the object concept and embody the traditional perception of the concept of 
object.  Consequently, they provide a useful comparative component, which 
exemplifies the complexity and nuances of the case law that becomes evident 
throughout the body of this thesis.   
This thesis is doctrinal in nature and utilises doctrinal restatement techniques.58  
Given its focus on undertaking a legal examination of the concept of object under 
Article 101(1) TFEU, the key methodological approach employed in this thesis is to 
conduct a detailed examination of the jurisprudence emanating from the 
Community Courts and to present the evidence.  As the ultimate interpreter of the 
TFEU the emphasis on the case law of the European Courts is fundamental to this 
research.59  Other primary sources and academic research are also considered.60  
This methodology not only highlights the questionable origin of the interpretation 
of the object concept provided in the Article 81(3) Guidelines and other 
commentary, but more importantly provides legal justification for the conclusions 
reached in this research. 
                                                     
57
 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/97 (Article 81(3) 
Guidelines).  Article 81 is now Article 101 under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU).   
58
 (Minow, 2006), pp34–5. 
59
 See (Goyder, 2011), III.  
60
 Including Advocate General opinions, Commission Guidelines, Regulations, Notices, Decisions, 
guidance, white and green papers, Commission newsletters, speeches and press releases.  Also the 
case law, decisions, guidelines and other primary sources emanating from the NCA’s and NC’s are 
examined as appropriate.   
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The benefit and rationale behind focusing on black letter law is well documented.61  
Separating the ‘is’ from the ‘ought’ question is an important component of this 
thesis.62  To determine the law on object is an interpretative task and, to this end, 
the meaning, application and function of the object concept is examined to reveal 
the characteristics, structure, concepts and principles ascribed by the European 
Courts.  This approach could be criticised as one-dimensional,63 but given the 
overwhelming influence of the orthodox approach on legal discourse a return to a 
basic premise relying on the jurisprudence of the European Courts is warranted.  
This thesis therefore also explores the limits of the application of the law and its 
potential application in the future.  Once the interpretative task is completed, then 
soft law, policy, economic and normative considerations can be re-incorporated to 
those findings.   
To provide an accurate legal account of the object concept, economic 
considerations will be provisionally set to one side.  The text of Article 101 TFEU is 
enshrined in law and interpreted by judges, not economists, in the European 
Courts.  The economics of Article 101(1) TFEU has, rightly, been a dominant feature 
in legal scholarship over the past 10 years, but this has come at a cost: the legal 
interpretation of the law concerning the object concept has been neglected, 
particularly as emphasis was generally placed on deciphering restrictions by effect 
in accordance with the ‘effects-based’ approach.64  Such focus on economic 
considerations and values resulted in questionable assumptions as to the state of 
the law being advanced with respect to the object criterion.65  This has been greatly 
aided by the general acceptance of the Commission’s legal interpretation of 
restrictions by object despite the under-acknowledged existence of a contradictory 
                                                     
61
 See (Kelsen, 1934); (Smith, 2004) ‘Contract Theory’, p5.   
62
 See (Austin, 1832).  See also other legal positivists such as Bentham, Kelsen and subsequent 
criticisms by Hart regards precisely how the ‘is’ question is determined: (Davies & Holdcroft, 1991).    
63
 Hart argues that identifying what the law is, is not just attributable to what the Courts say: (Hart, 
1997).  Dworkin takes this proposition further claiming that the law is made up of rules, standards 
(such as policies) and principles and as such there cannot be a strict separation between law and 
morality: (Dworkin, 1977), (Dworkin, 1986). 
64
 See eg (Gerard, 2013). 
65
 Economists often recount the basic premise of law, as interpreted by the Commission, as being 
accurate.  This is evidenced in papers, texts and at conferences.  See eg (Bennett & Collins, 2010).   
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array of case law.66  Revealing the true legal nature of the object criterion and 
reclaiming it for legal discourse ensures that policy and economic considerations 
can then be countenanced appropriately as tools to help determine agreements 
within a legal framework.  
This thesis will therefore develop the conclusions reached from such investigation 
into the positive law and engage in a form of legal interpretation.67  The case law 
will be reorganised by calibrating it as reflecting an ‘orthodox approach’, a ‘more 
analytical approach’ (the MAAP), and a ‘hybrid approach’.68  Ultimately, this thesis 
seeks to determine what is the best interpretation of ‘restriction of competition by 
object’ based on the case law of the European Courts.  The advantages and flaws of 
the three approaches will therefore be documented and highlight how the 
inconsistent application of a narrow category of agreements seen to be restrictive 
by object renders the legal value of any so-called ‘object box’ meaningless.   
More fundamentally, this thesis contributes to the literature by advocating an 
approach to the object concept that moves away from the notion of categorisation 
and from any analogy with the US per se system.  Instead, it promotes a return to 
the contextual understanding of the law first set out in the seminal case of STM.69  
In that case, the Court looked to the “precise purpose” of an agreement 
determined within its legal and economic context as opposed to identifying a 
category of restraints automatically presumed as being restrictive by object.70  
Consequently, such an understanding of the law can be seen as being, in a sense, 
neither new nor transformative.71  Having answered the key research question of 
                                                     
66
 See NCA’s submissions in cases before the CJEU supporting the orthodox understanding of the 
law, eg: supra n41, BIDS.  NCA’s, particularly those with less sophisticated and newer competition 
regimes will often support the Article 81(3) Guidelines in their submissions, despite not being 
obliged to follow the Guidelines (see supra n46 Expedia).  AG’s have also used the Article 81(3) 
Guidelines to justify their interpretation of the law: see AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-32/11 Allianz 
Hungária, 25 October 2012, nyr, para 65 (infra Chapter 4, section 3.1).  
67
 (Smith, 2004), p5.   
68
 See generally (King, 2011). 
69
 Case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm Gmbh [1966] ECR 249 (STM). 
70
 Ibid, STM, 249. 
71
 Cf ‘The Object/Effect Distinction in Competition Law Article 101, categorical distinctions and 
Predictable Enforcement’, New Challenges in Competition Law Enforcement conference, Istanbul, 6 
June 2014: (Rodger, 2014). 
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what is the best interpretation of law on the object criterion, the implications of 
adopting the MAAP for Article 101 TFEU are then explored.72   
This thesis therefore addresses the gap in the historical literature by presenting a 
comprehensive legal account of the object criterion within Article 101(1) TFEU, and 
investigating the repercussions of that research on Article 101 TFEU as a whole.  As 
less attention is paid to the perspectives of the Commission, and greater emphasis 
is placed on the jurisprudence of the European Courts, the questionable origins of 
the orthodox approach are revealed. 
4. Chapter organisation 
This thesis is organised as follows: Chapter 1: Establishing the orthodox approach, 
sets out the conventional understanding of the law on the object criterion as set 
out by the Commission in its Article 81(3) Guidelines and the ‘object box’ proposed 
by Professor Whish.  This perception of the law is referred to in this thesis as the 
‘orthodox approach’.  The essence of the orthodox approach in terms of its 
meaning, application and role will be examined with the aid of the Commission’s 
policy documents and decisional practice, literature and a summary of the case law 
supporting such interpretation.  The US per se system under the Sherman Act is 
drawn on as an appropriate analogy.  Hence the significance of the orthodox 
approach as the leading interpretation of the law will be underlined whilst noting it 
still attracts many followers.  Thereafter, the chapter will identify the problems with 
the orthodox approach as highlighted, most prominently, by the seminal judgment 
of the GC in GSK.73  This encompasses the inconsistent and contradictory 
application of the Article 81(3) Guidelines to cases by the Commission, the 
expansion of the ‘object box’, the evolution of approach adopted by the 
Commission evidenced in its new guidelines by the clearer adoption of the ‘legal 
and economic context’ to cases and hence a more ‘analytical’ application of the 
object concept.    
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 For instance, in terms of object’s relationship with restrictions by effect, Article 101(3) TFEU and as 
a tool of enforcement. 
73
 Supra n14, GSK. 
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Having mapped out the orthodox approach to the object criterion, established its 
significance within legal discourse, in particular to the Commission, and then 
identified its anomalies, Chapter 2: The meaning and application of restrictions by 
object according to the European Courts tests the accuracy of the orthodox 
approach vis-a-vis the case law of the European Courts.74  As such it sets out the 
legal foundations underpinning the law relating to the object criterion.  Such 
analysis thereby provides the authority upon which to critique the object criterion 
and the Article 81(3) Guidelines.  The purpose of the chapter is to: (i) set out the 
development of the case law thereby determining that the Courts have used a 
variety of approaches when assessing the object of an agreement, namely, the 
more analytical approach (the MAAP) and the hybrid approach in addition to the 
orthodox approach, (ii) assess the meaning and application of the object criterion 
adopted by the Courts, thereby finding the case law in fact provides greater support 
for a more analytical approach; and (iii) prove the orthodox approach lacks judicial 
support commensurate with its prominence within EU competition law.  Overall, 
the chapter demonstrates how the contextual analysis promulgated by the more 
analytical approach is not ‘new’, and that the judgment in STM holds the most 
influence throughout the case law.     
Having identified the three key approaches to the object criterion drawn on by the 
Courts, the reconstruction of the case law undertaken in chapter 2 is further 
fleshed out in chapters 3 and 4, which probe the features of the object criterion 
established by the case law review in more depth.   This enables the primary 
research question, what is the best interpretation of restrictions of competition by 
object based on the case law of the European Courts, to be answered.  To this end, 
Chapter 3: Identifying the concept of object has two main tasks.  First, it sets out the 
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 This involved a comprehensive examination of the jurisprudence of the CJEU (including opinions) 
and GC relating to Article 101(1) TFEU for both object and effect since the 1960’s.  Therefore, not 
only were those cases which were identified as relating to the object criterion in the various texts, 
articles and Commission’s guidelines scrutinised, but also cases usually considered relevant to 
‘effect’ (such as STM).  It was noted that ‘effect’ cases often included a general pronouncement by 
the Court regarding the application of Article 101(1) TFEU to agreements as a whole.  Hence, the 
cases reported in the text of this thesis are those that provide more helpful illustrative examples of 
such pronouncements.  
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so-called ‘universal principles’ of the object criterion.  These principles are 
consistently applied to agreements or upheld by the Courts, regardless of the 
approach adopted by the European Courts to the object concept.  Secondly, it 
establishes the definition of ‘object’ under Article 101(1) TFEU, critiquing the 
object/effect distinction advocated in BIDS, and assessing the definitions of the 
object concept proposed under each approach.   
Chapter 4: Applying the object concept to agreements in accordance with the MAAP 
then investigates the application of the object criterion to agreements by focusing 
on the MAAP and contrasting this with the hybrid approach.  The abundance of 
recent case law helps depict how the object criterion is applied to agreements.  The 
chapter turns, first, to a comprehensive assessment of the application of the legal 
and economic context to agreements.  Next, it examines how restrictive effects 
impact the application of the legal and economic context to agreements that are 
prima facie restrictive by object.  It then draws on more recent commentary to 
ascertain how others have rationalised developments in the case law in this regard.  
Finally, the main research question is answered: it is proposed that the MAAP is the 
better interpretation of the law in view of its greater and less conflicting judicial 
support.75  The MAAP reveals the object concept to be a multi-faceted, complex yet 
flexible element of Article 101(1) TFEU that seeks to uncover the ‘primary purpose’ 
of an agreement.  It is able to explain, therefore, why the so-called anomalies 
identified in the case law have not followed the orthodox approach.  It is noted that 
interpreting the law in accordance with the MAAP has garnered increasing support 
and recognition in the past few years, though is not without its critics.    
Following the detailed examination of the mechanics of the object concept 
conducted in chapters 3 and 4 and having chosen the MAAP as the preferred 
approach, Chapter 5: The implications of the MAAP on Article 101 TFEU as a whole 
explores the wider implications of the MAAP on Article 101 TFEU.  It seeks to 
explain why the MAAP is a better approach.  Given the sheer breadth of such a task, 
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 Though it is still acknowledged that the jurisprudence remains confusing, however the application 
of the MAAP to agreements makes better and more rational sense of it. 
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this chapter is selective in its scope.  It thus tackles what the implications of the 
MAAP are for specific aspects of Article 101 TFEU.  Given the nature of the MAAP it 
will focus on those aspects usually associated with restrictions by ‘effect’, such as 
the relationship between the object criterion and the de minimis doctrine (and the 
concept of market power) and the ‘effect on trade’ criterion.  It also addresses the 
relationship between restrictions by object and by effect.  This involves a general 
consideration of the objectives of Article 101 TFEU and the impact the more 
analytical approach has on such objectives.  More particularly, it will look at how 
the more analytical approach, with its emphasis on the legal and economic context, 
slots in with the ‘effects-based’ approach adopted by the Commission post-
modernisation.  Finally, the chapter investigates what MAAP means for the 
availability of an Article 101(3) TFEU exemption and its relationship with Article 
101(3) TFEU.    
Having interpreted the case law on the object concept under Article 101(1) TTFEU, 
promoted the application of the MAAP and then examined the implications of the 
MAAP on Article 101 TFEU as a whole, the final chapter, Conclusion: The function of 
the object criterion under Article 101(1) TFEU concludes the thesis.  It considers 
what this research means for the normative function of the object concept.  To this 
end, it briefly explores how best the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU is tackled 
through the use of the object criterion.  The experience gleaned from the US will 
aide this discussion.  It proposes that a practical solution would be for the 
Commission to better articulate its policy in respect of the object criterion and 
clearly differentiate its policy approach from the law.  Contrary to the Commission’s 
assertions, the Article 81(3) Guidelines do not wholeheartedly reflect the 
jurisprudence of the European Courts or indeed its own practice.  Hence, the 
Commission should recast its Article 81(3) Guidelines. 
This thesis is intended to provide an authoritative legal account of what constitutes 
the concept of object under Article 101(1) TFEU in all its guises.  By presenting the 
case law in this manner and assessing the impact of that research on Article 101 
TFEU as a whole, this thesis makes a substantial contribution to the literature by 
promoting an alternative way of perceiving the object criterion based on a faithful 
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reflection of the jurisprudence of the European Courts.  The object concept is 
currently one of the most debated and pivotal aspects of Article 101 TFEU.  This 
thesis reinforces that status by addressing the gap in the literature, providing 
detailed analysis and interpretation of the case law, then advocating an approach 
removed from the orthodoxy.  Ultimately, this thesis maps out the past and 
present, with a view to ensuring this body of work will continue to be relevant 
(regardless of how the European Courts or Commission go on to interpret the 
object criterion) in the future. 
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Some preliminary matters should be addressed here.  In order to provide a focused 
account of the object criterion, there are a number of issues that this thesis is 
unable to address, though that does not denote they are not significant.  For 
instance, this thesis does not seek to determine if the outcome of particular 
judgments and decisions are necessarily correct.  Nor does this thesis aim to 
address every aspect of Article 101 TFEU that may be affected by the object 
criterion in the wider arena.  Rich sources for future research that stem from this 
study would therefore include the impact of the MAAP on National Competition 
Authorities (NCAs) in light of their obligations under Regulation 1/2003 and the 
judgment in Expedia, as well as an examination into any links in terminology and 
concepts between Articles 101 and Article 102 TFEU.  
This thesis takes account of developments to August 2014.76  Several acronyms are 
also used throughout this thesis, which are referenced in the glossary at page 276.  
Finally, the focus of this thesis is on the law of the EU contained within the TFEU, 
though some comparative work has been done with other jurisdictions such as the 
US and UK. 
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 Given its importance, the judgment in C-67/13 Cartes Bancaires rendered on 11 September 2014 
is referenced.  Hence, conferences or blogs reviewing this judgment have also been referenced 
where appropriate.  
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Chapter 1: Establishing the ‘orthodox approach’ 
1. Introduction 
A longstanding orthodoxy has informed the general appreciation of the object 
criterion in Article 101(1) TFEU.  This orthodoxy has been described by leading 
scholars of competition law and adopted by the Commission in its guidelines.  A 
first task of this chapter is to sketch out this traditional or ‘orthodox’ view of the 
object criterion under Article 101(1) TFEU by reference to commentators’ views, to 
the case law of the European Courts, and to policy statements made by the 
Commission. 
The orthodox approach continues to provide the bedrock of the Commission’s 
interpretation of the object criterion in its Article 81(3) Guidelines.  Hence, it carries 
great significance under EU competition law, and must be taken seriously.1  
Notably, however, the orthodox understanding is not always followed by the 
European Courts or, indeed, the Commission.  As a result, its value immediately 
becomes questionable.  While the orthodox understanding of the meaning, 
application and role of the object criterion has had many followers, a second aim of 
this chapter is to explain that it is unpersuasive.  The chapter therefore documents 
provisionally a confusion surrounding the application of the object concept.   
This exercise provides an appropriate backdrop to the review of case law that is 
presented in chapter 2, and which exposes how far the jurisprudence of the 
European Courts fails to support the orthodox interpretation of the law.  The 
depiction offered of the orthodox approach also acts as a useful comparative 
benchmark in chapters 3 and 4 when this thesis seeks to ascertain what truly 
constitutes the object criterion and its various facets under Article 101(1) TFEU.   
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 In view also of how many NCAs and businesses explain the application of the object concept under 
Article 101(1) TFEU in terms of the orthodox approach, in cases that go on appeal to the GC or as 
preliminary references to the CJEU. 
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1.1. The object criterion: an overview 
As is clear from the text of Article 101(1) TFEU, the provision prohibits agreements 
or concerted practices that have either as their ‘object’ or their ‘effect’ the 
‘restriction of competition’.2  A close association between object and effect can 
therefore be assumed.  They are distinct legal terms, however, and the significance 
and the consequences of this distinction have not always been clearly or accurately 
portrayed.  This is due, in part, to the tendency in the past for ‘object’ and ‘effect’ 
to be referred to collectively not separately in both legal texts and court 
judgments.3  The importance of the distinction regained prominence following the 
General Court’s (GC) judgment in GSK.  The court was widely criticised for blurring 
the line between the object and effect analysis and misinterpreting the distinction 
between the concepts.4   
When determining whether an agreement restricts competition under Article 
101(1) TFEU, ‘object’ expresses a true alternative to ‘effect’ and as such requires 
separate consideration.5  This principle was established in Société Technique 
Minière v Maschinenbau Ulm (STM).6  The European Court of Justice (CJEU) held 
that the object of an agreement should be assessed first.  Where it is not clear that 
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 For the purposes of this thesis, reference to ‘agreement’ is in its widest sense, including concerted 
practices and gentlemen’s agreements.  
3
 See, for example, (Slot & Johnston, 2006), p59; (Bellamy & Child, 2008), 2.096.  The CJEU has often 
referred to both concepts together in its judgments when deciding whether or not there has been a 
‘restriction of competition’, see for example Case C-5/69 Franz Völk v SPRL Ets J Vervaecke [1969] 
ECR 295; Case C-28/77 Tepea BV v Commission [1978] ECR 1391; Case C-31/80 L’Oréal NV and 
L’Oréal SV v De Nieuwe AMCK PVBA [1980] ECR 3775; Case C-61/80 Cöoperatieve Stremsell-en 
Kleurselfabriek v Commission [1981] ECR 811; Case C-107/82 AEG-Telefunken v Commission [1983] 
ECR 3151.  The distinction between ‘object’ and ‘effect’ is considered in greater detail in the 
following chapters. 
4
 Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v Commission [2006] ECR II-2969 (GSK).  There the GC held 
that the object of the agreement was not to restrict competition despite the involvement of an 
admitted restriction of parallel trade, usually seen as a ‘hardcore’ restriction and thus automatically 
anticompetitive by object. 
5
 (Bellamy & Child, 2008), para 2.096.  In the Italian version of the text of the Treaty it referred to 
object and effect being cumulative by stating the “object and effect”.  The Court of Justice in Case C-
219/95P Ferrière Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I-4411 rejected this interpretation and confirmed 
the text ‘object or effect’ was disjunctive.  Both elements do not need to be proved in order to 
establish a restriction of competition.  Goyder says that only if the purpose of the agreement does 
not appear to restrict competition is it necessary to consider the effects: (Goyder & Albors-Llorens, 
2009), p118.   
6
 C-56/65 Société Technique Minière V Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235. 
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the object of an agreement is to restrict competition, then the effect of an 
agreement should be considered.7  Moreover, the courts have repeatedly held that 
once it has been shown that the object of an agreement is to restrict competition, 
‘there is no need to take account of the concrete effects of an agreement’.8  This 
distinction is crucial.  Having found that the object is to restrict competition, the 
assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU can end there.  The object criterion clearly 
has the scope to be an incredibly useful tool, as to determine the actual effects of 
an agreement on competition demands a higher, and thus more intensive and 
costly, level of economic and market analysis.  The rationale behind this principle is 
contentious, as the court, having established the principle in Consten & Grundig, 
never clarified the reasoning that underpinned its statement.9  However the 
principle has arguably led to the rationalisation of the orthodox approach described 
below.        
2. The orthodox approach 
2.1. Restrictions that ‘by their very nature’ distort competition 
The orthodox approach to the object criterion contends that a narrow category of 
“serious” agreements, “by their very nature” restrict competition by object due to 
their known ‘necessary effect’.10  Such agreements involve an “obvious” restriction 
of competition.11  They automatically restrict competition as the case law dictates 
that satisfying the object criterion does not require actual restrictive effects on 
competition to be determined and, according to the Commission, experience tells 
us particular restrictions will harm competition (that is, an agreement’s ‘necessary 
                                                     
7
 Ibid, 249. 
8
 Joined Cases 56 and 58/64 Consten and Grundig v Commission [1966] ECR 299 (Consten & 
Grundig). 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Necessary effect also known as ‘necessary consequence’ or ‘prior belief’ refers to the known 
anticompetitive effects of particular agreements in view of their “nature”: (Goyder, 2011), II. See 
also Article 81(3) Guidelines paras 20-23; (Whish, 2009), pp116-122 citing the General Court’s 
judgment in ENS to support the contention that object restrictions are “particularly pernicious” and 
infra section 2.1.1.   
11
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p121 referencing ENS.  
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effect’) regardless of the subjective intention of the parties.12  The main premise of 
the orthodox approach therefore rests on the categorisation or classification of 
particular restrictions of competition, which can then be automatically condemned 
as restrictions of competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU.13  That particular 
restrictions of competition are presumed anticompetitive by object under Article 
101(1) TFEU is an important element of this perception of the law.14  Evidently this 
interpretation elicits parallels with the US per se offence.15  There is one obvious 
distinction however.16  Unlike US antitrust law, an infringement of Article 101(1) 
TFEU by object can potentially be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU.17   
Under the orthodox approach, the identification of those types of restriction falling 
within the impugned category is of crucial significance.18  Whish & Bailey identify a 
number of such restrictions within their so-called ‘object box’.  This includes, price 
fixing, market sharing, output limitation, collective exclusive dealing, imposing 
minimum or fixed resale prices and the imposition of export bans.19  These 
restrictions of competition are synonymous with what the Commission refers to 
“hardcore restrictions” in its Guidelines and Regulations.20  As such, the application 
of the orthodox approach is apparently straightforward: merely proving the 
existence of the agreement is all that is required.  A competition authority is “not 
required to prove any economic (or other) evidence of likely anticompetitive harm.  
It is sufficient to demonstrate that the agreement fits into the object category and 
hence breaches Article 101(1) TFEU”.21  Determining the contents of the object 
                                                     
12
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, paras 20-23.     
13
 (King, 2011), p269; (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p117. 
14
 See eg (Bennett & Collins, 2010), p313. 
15
 Section 1 of the Sherman Act 1890.  See (Jones, 2010), pp658-660.  Also, Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion 
v Commission (Welded Steel Mesh) [1995] ECR II-1063. 
16
 As designated under s.1 Sherman Act; Standard Oil Co (NJ) v United States (1911) 221 US 1.  
17
 See generally (Jones, 2006).   
18
 (Bennett & Collins, 2010), pp312-314. 
19
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p124. 
20
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 23. 
21
 (Bennett & Collins, 2010), p314. 
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category is of vital importance as such agreements carry the presumption of 
harm.22 
2.1.1. Necessary effect 
The concept of necessary effect is important as it is intrinsically linked to the idea of 
legal presumptions of harmful effects under the object heading.23  Necessary effect 
is based on the assertion that under the object heading the concrete effects of an 
agreement do not need to be considered, as certain restrictions of competition 
automatically infringe Article 101(1) TFEU due to their known negative effects on 
competition.24  This is derived from experience.  As such, there is a presumption of 
anti-competitiveness as agreements have the inevitable consequence of restricting 
competition.25  Presumptions of harm play a key role within the orthodox approach 
and the desire to make comparisons with the US is therefore understandable. 
2.1.2. US per se offence 
Under the Sherman Act 1890, the American antitrust law system makes 
unequivocal use of presumptions in its set of ‘per se rules’.  These rules allow the 
US courts to rule on the illegality of certain practices, which prima facie satisfy the 
conditions required by such rules without recourse to a detailed examination of all 
the relevant facts.26  Kolstad submits that the per se rules are developed on the 
basis of experience the Supreme Court has gleaned from its case law and that 
covered practices are presumed illegal because of their pernicious effect on 
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 Ibid, p314. 
23
 Also referred to as ‘necessary consequence’ or ‘prior belief’. 
24
 (Odudu, 2001), ‘Interpreting Article 81(1): the Object Requirement Revisited’, p384.  See also 
(Black, 2005), p118; AG Trstenjak’s Opinions in BIDS and GSK and (Goyder, 2011), I-II.  Such 
restrictions include, price fixing, market sharing etc.  See also (Odudu, 2001), ‘Interpreting Article 
81(1): Object as Subjective Intention’, pp60-75 (though Odudu does not support this proposition in 
his paper, he defines the orthodox approach in terms that ‘object’ means ‘necessary effect’); (Jones, 
2006), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation?’, p691; (King, 2011), p270.  Necessary effect is based on the 
idea of past experience: AG Mazák’s opinion, Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v 
Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence [2011] ECR I-9419, para 27; Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 
21.  Justifications for necessary effect are also found in (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013), paras 4.12-4.17.  
Though much of their analysis is erroneously based on the Commission’s Article 81(3) Guidelines. 
25
 (Odudu, 2009); AG Kokott, T-Mobile, para 43. 
26
 (Svetlicinii, 2008), p122(C). 
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competition.27  Moreover, where there is a per se infringement the parties cannot 
then argue that their agreement does not restrict competition.28  This is because, 
US law has determined that, by law, a small, limited category of agreements 
automatically restrict competition and the parties cannot argue the contrary.29  As 
such all that the claimant need prove is that the prohibited practice occurred.    
Alongside numerous other commentators, Whish & Bailey find that there is “clearly 
an analogy” between the object concept and s.1 of the Sherman Act.30  They also 
note, however, the important distinction between the US and EU legal systems, 
namely that even if “[an agreement] infringes Article 101(1) TFEU per se, the parties 
can still argue that the agreement satisfies the terms of Article 101(3) TFEU”.31  This 
possibility is not available under US law. 
2.2. Case law 
Many commentators continue to subscribe to the understanding of the law on the 
object criterion described here as the orthodox approach.32  Chapter 2 subjects the 
case law to a detailed critical legal analysis in order to determine more precisely the 
law on the object criterion.  For the purposes of this chapter, however, this section 
provides a brief description of the case law that supports the orthodox approach in 
order to illustrate the European Courts’ contribution to the development of the 
orthodox approach.33     
The clearest embodiment of the orthodox approach is found in European Night 
Services (ENS).34  The influence of the GC’s judgment in ENS on the legal 
interpretation of the object concept under Article 101(1) TFEU is profound and is 
consistently cited as authority for the proposition that the object concept operates 
                                                     
27
 (Kolstad, 2009), p5. 
28
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p121. 
29
 (Bailey, 2010), p364, II, 2.   
30
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p121.   
31
 Ibid. 
32
 See Introduction, section 2. 
33
 Chapter 2 will therefore highlight those cases that not only support the orthodox approach, but 
also embody aspects that are pertinent to the other approaches to the object criterion identified in 
this thesis. 
34
 Case T-374/94, European Night Services and Others v Commission, [1998] ECR II-3141. 
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in terms of an object box.35  Even though the case concerned the establishment of a 
joint venture and proof of its effects on competition, the GC’s observation on the 
object criterion has had lasting implications.  The GC found that where an 
agreement contained “obvious” restrictions of competition such as price fixing, 
market-sharing or the control of outlets, then no economic analysis is required in 
terms of assessing the legal and economic context, the structure of the market or 
the actual conditions in which the agreement functions.36  This followed similar 
judgments in Tréfilunion v Commission and Montedipe SpA v Commission.37  In 
Tréfilunion, the GC held that as the case involved a “clear” infringement of Article 
101(1) TFEU in particular involving subparagraphs (a) to (c) it “...it must be regarded 
as an infringement per se of the competition rules”.38  The GC cited Montepide v 
Commission in support of its statement, which articulated the same sentiment.39  
Consequently the GC’s approach in Tréfilunion and ENS creates a clear analytical 
distinction between object and effect analyses: the former relies solely on whether 
the restriction of competition is ‘obvious’; all economic analysis is reserved for the 
effects analysis.  It is not difficult to see why these cases have been so persuasive 
given the attraction of legal bright lines and the associated lowering of the 
administrative burden on competition authorities.40 
The judgment of the CJEU in Sumitomo v Commission helped confirm the sentiment 
that certain types of agreement “in themselves pursue an object restrictive of 
competition and fall within a category of agreements expressly prohibited by Article 
[101(1) TFEU]”.41  Furthermore “that object cannot be justified by an analysis of the 
economic context of the anti-competitive conduct concerned”.42  Hence, the 
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 Most prominently in (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p120-121.  Though interestingly it is not cited in the 
Article 81(3) Guidelines. 
36
 ENS, para 136.  See chapter 2 for a more in-depth critique. 
37
 Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v Commission [1995] ECR II-1063, para 109; T-14/89 Montepide SpA v 
Commission [1992] ECR II-1155, para 265. 
38
 Ibid, Tréfilunion para 109. 
39
 T-14/89 Montepide, para 265. 
40
 See generally, (Bennett & Collins, 2010). 
41
 C-403 & 405/04P Sumitomo v Commission, [2007] ECR I-00729, paras 42-45, 43.   
42
 Ibid, para 43. 
Page 34 
absence of effects of an agreement is of no consequence for a finding by object.43  
This builds on the understanding that the actual effects of an agreement do not 
require proof in order to determine whether it restricts competition by object.  
Finally, in BIDS, the description attributed by the CJEU to the distinction between 
object and effect was said to arise “from the fact that certain forms of collusion 
between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to 
the proper functioning of normal competition”.44  This statement was then 
replicated in T-Mobile.45  This proclamation tallies with the orthodox approach as it 
suggests that there is a category of agreements that automatically restrict 
competition by object.   
These cases seemingly endorse the understanding advocated under the orthodox 
approach; that a particular category of agreements, nominally those contained 
within Article 101(1) (a) to (c) TFEU, automatically restrict competition by virtue of 
their object regardless of their effects.  To determine the object merely requires the 
identification of such a restriction within the agreement or concerted practice.   
2.3. The Commission  
Perhaps the clearest endorsement of the orthodox approach comes from the 
Commission.46  The Commission’s interpretation and application of the object 
concept to agreements can be discerned through its Guidelines, its Block Exemption 
Regulations (BERs) and its decisions.  This section involves a particular focus on the 
Article 81(3) Guidelines, which following modernisation set out the Commission’s 
primary interpretation of Article 101 TFEU.47  The following paragraphs will also 
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 Ibid, para 43. 
44
 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers 
(Carrigmore) Meats Ltd (BIDS) [2008] All ER (D) 235, para 17.   
45
 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529 (T-Mobile), para 29.   
46
 See (Jones, 2010) ‘Left Behind by Modernisation?’, p654. 
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 Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty, OJ [2004] C101/9, paras 20-23 (Article 
81(3) Guidelines).  These were issued in conjunction with the Commission’s modernisation package. 
For a contemporaneous critique see (Lugard & Hancher, 2004). 
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reflect on the question of whether the Commission has deviated from the position 
set out in its Article 81(3) Guidelines.   
2.3.1. Guidelines and BER’s: soft law and policy 
Technically, the Commission’s guidelines are not law, nor are they binding on 
Member States.  There is a legitimate expectation, however, that the Commission 
will follow its own guidance.48  Goyder agrees that the guidelines should be viewed 
as guidance only as they bind no one except the Commission.49  That the guidelines 
in fact take on a more meaningful and significant role is highlighted by the 
Commission itself.  In the Article 81(3) Guidelines, it is stated that the purpose of 
the guidelines is to “set out the Commission’s view of the substantive assessment 
criteria applied to the various types of agreements and practices”.50  It is stated 
further that they provide “guidance to the courts and authorities of the Member 
States in their application of Article 101(1) and (3)”.51  Additionally it is asserted that 
“the...guidelines outline the current state of the case law of the Court of Justice’ 
and set out the Commission’s policy with regard to issues that have not been dealt 
with in the case law”.52   
Given the Commission’s primary role as enforcer of the competition rules, the fact 
that the various Guidelines it issues are not law in its truest sense is irrelevant on a 
practical level: the Guidelines demand to be taken seriously.53  What is more, the 
guidelines tend to blur the line between law and policy.  It is submitted that the 
division between policy initiatives and the law (as determined by the European 
Courts) has become almost indeterminate for practical purposes within the context 
of such guidelines.  Therefore the presentation of the law set out in the guidelines is 
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 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 4; noted in Case C-226/11 Expedia Inc v Autorité de la concurrence, 
nyr. 
49
 (Goyder, 2011), p12 VI. 
50
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 3. 
51
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 4. 
52
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 7. 
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 See generally (Stefan, 2008); (Cosma & Whish, 2003).  NCA’s and businesses rely on the Article 
81(3) Guidelines as demonstrated in numerous NCA decisions and submissions to the European 
Courts, such as in BIDS, (supra n44).  Furthermore there is a legitimate expectation the Commission 
will follow their guidelines, see Article 81(3) Guidelines, paras 4-7.  See also AG Kokott’s Opinion of 6 
September 2012 in Expedia, supra n48. 
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often seen to be an accurate reflection of the law, rather than as a combination of 
the Commission’s policies together with its subjective interpretation of the case 
law.   
The premise of the Commission’s approach to the object criterion, as set out in the 
Article 81(3) Guidelines, is straightforward: certain restrictions are “by their very 
nature” presumed to have the potential to restrict competition by virtue of their 
object regardless of their actual or potential effects.54  The  Commission claims, as it 
provides no judicial support for its reasoning, that this is because of the serious 
nature of such restrictions, and the high potential of negative effects on 
competition arising from such restrictions based on experience, which allows the 
Commission to predict which restrictions will, or are likely to, harm competition.55  
As discussed, this “experience” or knowledge that certain agreements harm, or 
have the potential to restrict, competition is known as the ‘necessary effect’ of an 
agreement.56  According to the Commission, ‘hardcore restrictions’ are synonymous 
with restrictions by object.57   
The Article 81(3) Guidelines confirm that actual or concrete effects do not need to 
be demonstrated where an agreement has a restriction of competition as its 
object.58  The Commission references its BERs, guidelines and notices as providing 
non-exhaustive guidance on what constitutes restrictions by object.59  These are 
typically those restrictions that are black-listed in BER’s or identified as “hardcore” 
                                                     
54
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 21.  How this is reconciled with the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
[2010] paras 60-64 is questionable.  See also Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines, para 24. 
55
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, paras 20-23; (Whish & Bailey, 2012), pp116-122 and cf (Odudu, 2001), 
‘Interpreting Article 81(1): Object as Subjective Intention’.     
56
 (Black, 2005), p119.   
57
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 23.  See also Guidelines on Vertical Restraints [2010], paras 47-64.  
Note that the Commission allows for some hardcore restraints to fall outside of Article 101(1) TFEU 
in exceptional circumstances if they are “objectively necessary”, para 60.  For instance, if such a 
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reference to paragraph 18 of the Article 81(3) Guidelines in support of this is curious as upon its 
reading it appears to only be relevant to restrictions by effect.  See commentary on the revised De 
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 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 20. 
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 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 23. 
Page 37 
in guidelines and notices.60  Such restrictions are therefore presumed to restrict 
competition by object.61  It is notable that the Commission reserves to itself the 
ability to expand upon the types of restrictions that constitute restrictions by 
object.62   
The question of how the object of an agreement is in fact determined is recounted 
in paragraph 22.  According to the Commission whether an agreement has as its 
object the restriction of competition rests on a “number of factors”.63  These 
“include” the content of the agreement and objective aims pursued by it.  It “may 
also be necessary to consider the context in which it is (to be) applied and the 
actual conduct and behaviour of the parties on the market”.64  It could be deduced 
from a reading of the Article 81(3) Guidelines that it is merely optional that the 
context of the agreement is considered when determining the object of an 
agreement.  Additionally, that the context referred to is the ‘legal and economic’ 
context is not specifically revealed.65   
Furthermore, the Commission provides that an examination of the facts underlying 
the agreement “may” be required, and that the implementation of the agreement 
is more persuasive than the formal agreement, which may not even contain an 
express restriction of competition.66  The ease with which the object of an 
agreement is found is confirmed by the fact that identifying a ‘hardcore’ restriction 
in an agreement labels it automatically as a restriction by object.67  All efforts are 
therefore seemingly directed towards identifying restrictions by object in an 
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 Ibid. 
61
 Ibid. 
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 Ibid, para 21.  The Commission has not been reticent in expanding the category of hardcore 
restrictions, see for instance its decision in Lundbeck Case No. 39226. 
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 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 22. 
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agreement, not assessing the agreement itself to determine its object.  It can be 
readily inferred that an economic analysis of an agreement is not a requirement.  
Moreover there is no hint of a suggestion that the presumption that a particular 
agreement restricts competition by object is rebuttable within the context of Article 
101(1) TFEU.   
This understanding of the law has been extremely pervasive throughout the EU.68  
Intriguingly the Article 81(3) Guidelines do not reference ENS, though they clearly 
draw heavily from it.  It can be surmised, therefore, that the Article 81(3) Guidelines 
follow the orthodox approach or indeed that the orthodox approach follows the 
Commission’s perception of the object criterion.     
Other Guidelines and BER’s tend to uphold how the Commission recounts the law 
and its policy on the object concept within its Article 81(3) Guidelines.69  As such 
the focus is on the categorisation of restrictions whether labelled as hardcore or 
blacklisted in BER’s.  Consequently, the presumption is that such restrictions fall 
foul of Article 101(1) TFEU by virtue of their object and are unlikely to benefit from 
an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.70  Perhaps importantly, there has been a 
subtle shift in some of the Guidelines published subsequent to the Article 81(3) 
Guidelines in relation to the necessity of the application of the ‘context’ of an 
agreement when determining an agreement’s object.71   
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 It is submitted that there has been an over-reliance on cases such as ENS, which arguably form the 
backbone of the Article 81(3) Guidelines.   
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 See eg Commission Regulation 330/2010 on the application of Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the 
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 See eg Horizontal Guidelines, paras 25 and 72-74.  Though an agreement’s ‘context’ was ignored 
in the Technology Transfer Guidelines.  See also Guidance on restrictions of competition by object 
for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit from the De Minimis Notice, July 2014.  
The de minimis doctrine will be examined in subsequent chapters. 
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2.3.2. Decisions, submissions and speeches 
It is clearly also important to assess how far the Commission follows its own Article 
81(3) Guidelines in its decision-making.  Despite the straightforward nature of the 
Article 81(3) Guidelines, a cursory review of the Commission’s decisional practice 
reveals a diverse approach to its practical application of the object criterion.   
Certainly, the Commission has generally employed a formalistic or ‘forms-based’ 
approach to the object criterion.  Indeed, it has often been criticised on precisely 
this ground.72  The orthodox approach is formalistic as it does not demand an 
economic or market analysis of the agreement to determine if the impugned course 
of conduct generates actual or potential anticompetitive effects.  Rather, the formal 
features of the agreement are given a cursory review and the Commission would 
then infer that the agreement, by its nature, is restrictive of competition by object.  
The Article 81(3) Guidelines promote a forms-based approach by linking the 
identification of hardcore restrictions with restrictions by object.73    
An example of the Commission applying its Article 81(3) Guidelines in this manner is 
shown in the GlaxoSmithKline decision.74  It considered that as the Community 
Courts have consistently found that agreements containing dual pricing systems or 
other limitations of parallel trade, which are identified by the Commission as 
hardcore restraints, as restrictions by object it was justified in coming to the same 
conclusion.75  A more interesting aspect of the decision is that despite 
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 (Jones, 2010), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation?’, p649.  Though it is notable that in many of its 
decisions the Commission usually provides a detailed account of the parties, the market, market 
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 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 23. 
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 GlaxoSmithKline 2001/791/EC (GlaxoSmithKline) subsequently appealed to the CJEU.  Similarly in 
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acknowledging the fact an assessment of the actual effects of the agreements was 
not then required, “for the sake of completeness” it conducted such an analysis.76   
There are also, however, a number of notable deviations from this standard mode 
of applying the Article 81(3) Guidelines.  Examples can be seen in the Visa and 
Mastercard multilateral interchange fee (MIF) decisions.77  The agreements fixed 
the MIF paid by acquiring banks on each cross-border Visa/Mastercard transaction.  
On their face, the agreements arguably did not involve a clear and obvious 
‘hardcore’ restriction of competition by object, despite the potential nature of the 
restriction concerned, namely horizontal price fixing.  Additionally, the cases 
demonstrate identical situations of fact, but the Commission uses two diametrically 
opposed approaches to the object criterion.78  On the basis of the Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, however, the agreements should automatically be seen as having the 
object of restricting competition as they concerned what is, in essence, a hardcore 
restriction.  In Visa, which admittedly was decided prior to publication of the Article 
81(3) Guidelines, the Commission concluded that the MIF in the Visa system did not 
have the object of restricting competition under Article 101(1) TFEU by virtue of its 
pro-competitive attributes.79  Instead, the MIF amounted to an appreciable 
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and, having found the object of the agreement was to restrict competition, specifically stated it 
made no finding as to the agreement’s effect (para 1388).   
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 2002/914/EC Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee, [2002] OJ L318/17 (Visa) and 
COMP/34.579 Europay (Eurocard-MasterCard) [2009] OJ C264/8, 19 December 2007 (Mastercard).  
Both decisions were appealed. 
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 Also noted by (Jones, 2010), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation?’, p665. 
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 The Article 81(3) Guidelines were based on already established principles, as demonstrated in the 
previous version of the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C291, 13.10.2000.  See to that effect the 
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restriction of competition by effect, but fulfilled the conditions for an exemption 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.  Such an exemption was granted despite the Commission 
finding that the MIF restricted the freedom of the banks individually to decide their 
own pricing policies thereby distorting the conditions of competition on the Visa 
issuing and acquiring markets.80  In its reasoning the Commission found that the 
MIF was not a restriction of competition by object as the “objective” of the MIF 
was: 
“To increase the stability and efficiency of operation of that system 
and indirectly to strengthen competition between payment systems 
by thus allowing four-party systems to compete more effectively 
with three-party systems.”81 
Regrettably the Commission did not expand further in its analysis of the object of 
the agreement.  Nonetheless, what is clear is that in this case the pro-competitive 
nature of the agreement trumped the fact that the banks were unable freely to 
determine their own pricing policies.  Even if the Commission was only focusing on 
the objective aim of the agreement it would not be irrational to assume that in line 
with the Article 81(3) Guidelines it should have found the object of the agreement 
was to restrict competition.82  Therefore, the question of the Commission’s 
discretion is of relevance as is the impact of such decision-making on legal 
certainty. 
Conversely in the case of Mastercard the Commission was far more detailed in its 
assessment of the object of the agreement, but took a different approach 
ostensibly more in-keeping with the Article 81(3) Guidelines.83  Despite 
acknowledging its finding in Visa, the Commission added that the concept of a 
restriction by object: 
                                                                                                                                                      
accompanying Commission press release of 24 May 2000, which advocated a more economic policy 
approach as part of the Commission’s modernisation review. 
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 Visa 2002/914/EC, para 64. 
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 Ibid, para 69. 
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 Particularly as the Commission also recognises that restrictions by object can also be achieved by 
indirect means: see the Vertical Guidelines (1999 and 2010).   
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 Supra n77, Mastercard, paras 403-407.  Note that the decision was handed down post the GC’s 
judgment in Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline. 
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“does not presuppose that the parties to an agreement have the 
subjective intention of restricting competition.  Agreements can be 
restrictive by object even if the parties to it are able to show that 
restricting competition was not their (primary) aim, or that they had 
other laudable motives.”84 
Notably, it also rejected the idea of taking the positive attributes of an agreement 
into account in such assessment.85  Instead, the Commission argued that such pro-
competitive aims and effects should be considered under Article 101(3) TFEU.86  
The Commission seemingly reinforced its position in the Article 81(3) Guidelines by 
finding that for an agreement to fall into the category of restrictions by object it 
“suffices that an agreement has by its very nature the potential for restricting 
competition, for instance, that it has the obvious consequence of fixing prices”.87  
Yet, despite these pronouncements the Commission still goes on to determine the 
actual effects of the MIF in order to ascertain if it “by its very nature” had the 
potential of fixing prices.88  Even though it concluded that the MIF has the 
consequence of fixing the fees charged by acquirers to merchants and thus acts like 
a minimum price recommendation for transactions on a domestic level, the 
Commission decided it was “not necessary to reach a definite conclusion as to 
whether the MasterCard MIF is a restriction of object” as it had been established 
that the MIF had the effect of appreciably restricting competition.89  This conclusion 
is baffling as the logical path would have been to find a restriction by object, 
particularly given the wide discretion that the Commission allows itself in its Article 
81(3) Guidelines to expand the category of hardcore restrictions if necessary.  
Moreover the Article 81(3) Guidelines specifically underline how the effects of an 
agreement do not need to be proven if the object is to restrict competition.90   
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 Ibid, Mastercard, para 402, citing Joined Cases C-96/82 and others IAZ/ANSEAU, ECR 3369. 
85
 Supra n77, Mastercard, para 402: citing Cases T-374/94 etc European Night Services v Commission 
[1998] ECR II-3141, para 136 and Case C-19/77 Miller International Schallplatten v Commission 
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 Supra n77, Mastercard, para 402. 
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 Supra n77, Mastercard, para 403, citing its Article 81(3) Guidelines and supra n85 C-19/77 Miller 
International. 
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 Supra n77, Mastercard, para 405, see also paras 408-665.  See also (Bailey, 2012), p584-585. 
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 Supra n77, Mastercard, para 407.  
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 Article 81(3) Guidelines, paras 20 and 21.  
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A further example of a decision by the Commission, where it does not specifically 
follow the application of the object criterion set out in the Article 81(3) Guidelines, 
is that of Lundbeck.91  The decision reflects a careful, more analytical application of 
the object criterion by the Commission, which is in direct contrast to the formalistic 
position advocated by the orthodox approach.92  The Commission found that 
reverse payment settlements (also known as ‘pay-for-delay’ patent settlement 
agreements) that Lundbeck entered into with generic manufacturers to prevent 
them from competing with it, whilst certain of its manufacturing processes 
remained patent protected, infringed Article 101(1) TFEU by object.  Lundbeck was 
heavily fined as a result.   
This development has caused much surprise within the legal community as such 
arrangements had never been found in the past to contravene Article 101(1) TFEU 
by object.  Furthermore, the decision caused alarm as it indicated that the 
Commission had expanded the object box as a means to ensure it could condemn 
practices using a lower standard of proof.  This has also created legal uncertainty.93  
As the object concept does not require the actual effects of an agreement to be 
proven, the Commission has a far less burdensome task in proving an infringement.  
It has therefore been accused of widening the object category in order to condemn 
particular agreements rather than risk undertaking an ‘effects’ analysis.94  Many 
commentators have not yet seen the text of the decision, however, and therefore 
are not aware that in order to condemn the reverse payment settlements the 
Commission in fact applied the object concept in a way that supports both the 
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 Lundbeck IP/13/563, nyr; http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-563_en.htm?locale=en.  A 
confidential version of the decision was seen in order to advise on routes of appeal.  The decision is 
on appeal: Case T-472/13. 
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‘hybrid’ and ‘more analytical’ approaches described in this thesis.95  Certainly, the 
assessment of the object criterion was far removed from the application advocated 
in the Article 81(3) Guidelines.  For the purposes of this thesis, it is the application 
of the law rather than the outcome of the decision that is of interest.   
These decisions therefore raise the question as to the continued relevance of the 
Article 81(3) Guidelines.  This is despite the Commission’s subsequent attempts to 
rationalise its divergent application of the object criterion in its guidance and new 
Guidelines.96  This divergence is also evident in some of its submissions to the CJEU 
in preliminary references.  For instance, the Commission accepts in the case of BIDS 
that regard must be had to the content of the agreement and the legal and 
economic context.97  Furthermore, in paragraph 33 of the judgment it concedes 
that the concept of object does also apply to restrictions that fall outside the classic 
hardcore restrictions.  It even recognises that agreements with a legitimate 
objective, crisis cartels and restrictions that are not ‘obvious’ can all be regarded as 
restrictions of competition by object.98  These aspects of its approach to litigation 
are not reflected clearly within the Article 81(3) Guidelines.   
Such disconnect between its Article 81(3) Guidelines and the practical application of 
the object criterion is also evident in the speech given by Alexander Italianer, 
Director General for competition, in 2013, which advocated a more contextual 
approach.99  This can be set alongside the revised De Minimis Notice and 
accompanying guidance, which at first glance appears to return to a more orthodox 
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 However not every aspect of the decision reflects the understanding of the object criterion 
proposed in the following chapters.  For instance, the Commission’s understanding of the relevance 
of ‘necessary consequence’ bears reflection.  The Commission relied heavily on the interpretation of 
the law by the CJEU in BIDS, whereby each economic operator must be free to independently 
determine its own commercial policy. 
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path,100 but in fact the guidance reveals a number of key changes.101  These changes 
pertain to the requirement that the legal and economic context “must” be 
considered when determining the object of an agreement, and that there are 
“exceptional circumstances” where prima facie restrictions by object may come 
outside Article 101(1) TFEU if they are objectively necessary or pursue a legitimate 
goal.102  Though, the De Minimis Guidance goes further than the Article 81(3) 
Guidelines in another respect by stating that when determining if an agreement is 
restrictive by object it is unnecessary to demonstrate any actual or potential effects 
on the market.103  These aspects are not reflected in the Article 81(3) Guidelines, 
despite the Commission’s best efforts to convey the contrary.104   
These factors all call into question the influence of the Article 81(3) Guidelines on 
the Commission’s own decision-making.105  They also highlight the lack of 
consistency in the Commission’s methodology when applying the object criterion 
and its evolving framework for applying the object criterion to agreements.106   
2.4. Conclusion 
This section sought to establish the characteristics of the orthodox approach.  
Under the guise of the object box and the Article 81(3) Guidelines the orthodox 
approach consists of a narrow category of obvious and serious agreements, which 
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 The revised De Minimis Notice relies heavily on the judgment in Expedia, supra n48 which the 
Commission may come to regret.  See chapter 5 for a detailed discussion on the de minimis doctrine. 
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 See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-728_en.htm.  Notice on agreements of minor 
importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty on the 
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 Contrast this with the obligations on the NCA’s under Regulation 1/2003 to follow the 
Commission’s rules when determining Article 101 TFEU cases.      
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 This could be attributed to a breakdown in its internal communication as it appears the Legal 
Services division is not always in agreement with DG COMP.   
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are presumed to restrict competition by object due to their necessary effect.  Such 
restrictions are labelled as ‘hardcore’ by the Commission.  Establishing whether an 
agreement restricts competition by object is seemingly straightforward as it 
involves, based on the content of the agreement, the identification of those 
restrictions set out in the object box or listed as hardcore by the Commission.  
Traditionally, there was little place for economic analysis as the negative effects of 
such agreements could be presumed.107  This is because such restrictions are taken 
automatically to distort competition in view of their serious nature and experience 
demonstrating such restrictions are likely to produce negative effects on the 
market.  It could therefore be assumed that this perception of the law would be 
overwhelmingly supported by the jurisprudence given the impact of the orthodox 
approach on legal discourse.  The orthodox approach continues to have many 
followers, though in recent years the more nuanced characteristics of the object 
criterion are increasingly acknowledged.108   
For instance, the influence of an agreement’s ‘legal and economic context’ is now 
seen as a necessary requirement in any assessment of an agreement’s object.109  
Though to what end, is not particularly clear.  Furthermore, the Commission has 
begun to recognise in its more recent guidelines that presumptions of harm under 
Article 101(1) TFEU cannot always be absolute.110  These are not the only 
anomalies.      
3. Problems with the orthodox approach 
The Commission’s decisional practice demonstrates that not all restrictions by 
object are ‘obvious’ or prima facie pernicious.  It is also clear that the Commission 
does not always follow its own Guidelines, and has taken the opportunity to expand 
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 This is re-enforced by the De Minimis Guidance, section 1.  
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the category of object restraints.111  Even at this juncture the advantage of a limited 
category of object restrictions is questionable.112  What is more, judicial support for 
the assertion that certain restrictions can be automatically found to constitute 
restrictions by object is notably absent within the Article 81(3) Guidelines.113  The 
Commission does not therefore seek to prove its categorisation of the object 
concept is legally correct by reference to case law.  Hence, it could be assumed that 
the Commission is citing its policy approach.  Having described the orthodox 
approach and shown the Commission’s Article 81(3) Guidelines follow it; this 
section looks more closely at its perceived problems. 
The supposed benefit of the orthodox approach is that it is clear which types of 
agreements contain restrictions that have an automatically anti-competitive object 
and thus require no analysis of their effects.  This is meant to provide undertakings 
with a degree of legal certainty, ease the burden on resources and simplify the 
process under Article 101(1) TFEU.114  More particularly, the orthodox explanation 
of the law does not then expand upon precisely how the object of an agreement is 
determined or applied.115  Decisions such as Lundbeck and Visa show that merely 
identifying an ‘obvious’ restriction of competition is not enough to taint an 
agreement with an anticompetitive object, despite the impression given under the 
Article 81(3) Guidelines.  This can be contrasted with decisions such as Polistil, 
which are faithful to the Article 81(3) Guidelines.116  Consequently, there is no 
                                                     
111
 (Goyder, 2011), p2 I, p5 III and p12 VI.  Goyder emphasises that the Commission’s power in 
identifying new object restraints is limited as the category of object restrictions is defined, not by 
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consistent approach in the Commission’s own decisional practice as to how the 
object criterion will be applied to agreements.  Moreover, by adding new 
restrictions to the object category, not having previously been found restrictive by 
object, undermines the key principal underpinning the orthodox approach.117  It 
cannot then be irrefutably stated that experience alone dictates those agreements 
that are automatically restrictive by object given their known negative effects on 
competition.    
Despite the clear benefit of the orthodox approach being that an economic 
assessment of an agreement can become superfluous, there is increasing 
acknowledgment that some form of analytical component is required in any 
determination of whether an agreement restricts competition by object.118  Though 
commentators usually limit such instances to when determining whether an 
agreement is appreciable, assessing whether it affects trade between Member 
States, or deciding the level of fine.119  What is less clearly articulated is the 
function of the legal and economic context in this regard, particularly as the 
Commission provides scant elucidation in its Article 81(3) Guidelines.120  The 
question of whether the orthodox approach over-simplifies the law was brought to 
light following judgments in BIDS and T-Mobile due to the way the CJEU expressed 
the application of the object criterion.121  Furthermore, the judgments - in 
particular the GC’s judgment in GSK - highlighted the importance of the legal and 
economic context in any assessment of an agreement’s object.  The Commission 
has subsequently cited this requirement in its latest Guidelines, Notices and many 
of its decisions.122  In practice, it has already been assessing the effects of those 
agreements that fall within the object category as demonstrated in its decisions in 
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GSK and Mastercard.123  Such assessment of the effects together with an ill-defined 
object category undermines the Article 81(3) Guidelines, and thus also the premise 
of the orthodox approach.  Ultimately the correctness of the Article 81(3) 
Guidelines is powerfully challenged.    
An additional concern with the orthodox approach is that it cannot account for a 
number of anomalies.  For instance, not all agreements falling within the object box 
classification have been held consistently to be restrictions by object: neither all 
price fixing cases nor all absolute territorial protection cases have been treated as 
object cases.124  Instead, some such have been considered as ‘effect’ cases, while 
others have been found to fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU altogether.125  As such 
not every agreement containing a restriction of competition necessarily has that 
object.  Additionally, agreements of a type that traditionally lies outside the object 
box have been found to be restrictive by object, as was the case in Lundbeck.  As 
recounted above, the Commission has responded to these anomalies by subtly 
altering its latest guidelines and Notices.126  It can be observed, as noted by Gerber 
in the past, that modernisation did not just bring about procedural change, but also 
substantive change.127  It would appear that the Commission is continuing this 
latter practice in relation to the object criterion.   
The premise that particular agreements ‘by their very nature’ restrict competition 
by object due to their known negative effects, and that they carry a presumption of 
harm in consequence is also questionable.128  In its Article 81(3) Guidelines the 
Commission provides scant judicial support for its contention that the necessary 
effect of an agreement means that certain restrictions are presumed to be 
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 Commission Decision GlaxoSmithKline 2001/791/EC; Commission Decision Europay (Eurocard-
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 For example, joint selling rights often involve price fixing.  See also Commission Decision 
2002/914/EC Visa International – Multilateral Interchange Fee, OJ 2002 L318.   
125
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anticompetitive under Article 101(1) TFEU.  Despite its prominent use, the phrase 
‘by its nature’ is not defined.129  Indeed, there is no indication whether any such 
presumptions of harm are rebuttable within the context of Article 101(1) TFEU.  
This in turn questions whether it can be emphatically stated that the meaning, 
application and role of the object criterion under the orthodox approach are clear.  
The problems identified here would suggest that the object criterion is not as 
straightforward as the orthodox approach contends.130  This is exemplified by the 
Commission’s failure distinctively to define what is policy and what is law within its 
Article 81(3) Guidelines.  Policy must play an important role within the Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, therefore an unequivocal confirmation regards where the distinction 
with the law lies would be welcome.131 
Aside from finding that the Commission does not always follow its own Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, the above discussion reveals a number of issues that require deeper 
reflection.  These include: (i) the significance that the Article 81(3) Guidelines lack 
detailed, explanatory assessment criteria, in particular the omission of the ‘legal 
and economic’ context,132 (ii) the lack of general judicial support and citation, (iii) 
the categorisation of restrictions labelled as hardcore or black-listed automatically 
constituting restrictions by object,133 (iv) whether restrictions by object must be 
appreciable, (v) the fact that any assessment of an agreements’ ‘effect’ for the 
purposes of establishing the object of an agreement is superfluous, and (vi) the role 
of presumptions.   
These aspects are explored in detail in the following chapters.  More importantly, 
the accuracy of the Article 81(3) Guidelines - and hence the orthodox approach – is 
tested against the case law of the European Courts.  It will be seen that the 
European Courts are also sometimes culpable in fudging the essence of the object 
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criterion, but that the orthodox approach lacks the legitimacy one would expect to 
find from the jurisprudence.  
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Chapter 2: The case law of the European Courts 
Part I: How the European Courts have interpreted the meaning and application of 
the object criterion under Article 101(1) TFEU: establishing the more analytical 
approach 
1. Introduction 
Whether the orthodox approach to the object concept, encapsulated most 
prominently within the Commission’s Article 81(3) Guidelines and Whish’s ‘object 
box’, comprises a sustainable interpretation has been questioned.  Nevertheless, 
that approach still permeates much legal discourse and carries great influence.  The 
argument developed here is that it is also questionable whether the orthodox 
approach has ever been a faithful interpretation of the jurisprudence of the 
European Courts.  This chapter sets out the legal foundations that underpin the 
object criterion.  It assesses how the European Courts have defined and applied the 
object concept over the years.   
The aims of Chapter 2 are threefold.  First, the case law on the object concept is 
mapped out comprehensively, and the reality that the European Courts have in fact 
deployed three distinct approaches when determining the object of an agreement 
is established.  With the ‘orthodox approach’ having been already described, this 
chapter identifies the two further approaches used by the Courts, termed the ‘more 
analytical approach’ and the ‘hybrid approach’.  The second aim is to determine the 
essence of the object criterion by focusing on the meaning and application of the 
object criterion adopted by the Community Courts.  Thirdly, it is confirmed that the 
orthodox approach has persistently failed to attract sustained judicial support.  This 
demonstration provides a basis upon which the Article 81(3) Guidelines can be 
critiqued.  To this end, the chapter is organised into two parts.  Part I focuses on the 
more analytical approach and documents the earlier jurisprudence of the European 
Courts, whereas Part II is concerned with the advancement of the hybrid approach.  
This review of the case law confirms that the concept of object is far more 
contested than the Article 81(3) Guidelines suggest.  It will illustrate the Courts’ 
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analytical - though at times confusing and unspecific - treatment of the object 
concept, which contrasts with the over-simplified per se style approach developed 
by the Commission in its Article 81(3) Guidelines.  Hence, in this chapter the 
Commission’s interpretation of the notion of a restriction of competition by object 
is criticised on account of its adopting, as almost sacrosanct, one narrow view of the 
case law.1  It is concluded that, on the contrary the jurisprudence lends far greater 
support to a ‘more analytical approach’.    
To aid the comparison between the judgments of the CJEU and GC and to help map 
the evolution of the concept of object, Part I is divided into three sections.  The first 
section deals with the CJEU’s early case law up until the inception of the GC in 1989.  
This will demonstrate the CJEU’s initial approach to object restrictions, which is still 
highly relevant today.2  The second section will examine the CJEU’s application of 
the object concept following the inception of the GC up until the judgment in BIDS 
(described in Part II).3  This is done to underline the continued prevalence of the 
more analytical approach.  Finally, the third section looks exclusively at the GC’s 
case law.  The GC has handed down some of the most incongruent and radical 
judgments, which bear a disproportionately significant influence on the 
Commission’s interpretation of the law relating to the object criterion.4   
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 This is clearly illustrated by its decision in GlaxoSmithKline 2001/791/EC, where the Commission 
decided that the object of the agreement was to restrict parallel trade and therefore was 
automatically prohibited.  Conversely, in the ensuing appeal the GC assessed the agreement within 
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section 4.2.1.   
2
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 See eg Cases T-374/94 etc European Night Services v Commission [1998] ECR II-3141 (ENS). The GC 
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experience in handling complicated competition law issues: (Wyatt & Dashwood, 2006), p397. 
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2. Early case law up until the inception of the GC: the European Court of Justice 
(1965 – 1989) 
The ambiguity and misunderstanding surrounding the concept of object is not 
solely attributable to the Commission.  The CJEU must also take responsibility.  For 
example, in this early case law it is possible to count a number of variations of the 
definition of ‘object’.5  Furthermore, the CJEU has not been entirely consistent in its 
application of object to agreements: it is possible, even during this early stage of 
the CJEU’s jurisprudence, to identify two approaches to the assessment of object 
under Article 101(1) TFEU.  The discrepancy in approach is arguably compounded 
by the CJEU’s habit of referring to both ‘object’ and ‘effect’ together when 
analysing whether an agreement restricts competition.6  As will be seen, however, 
this is because object and effect follow a similar assessment structure.  It cannot be 
contended therefore that the CJEU introduces the perception of the law in terms of 
the classic orthodox approach.  Instead, it is possible to discern where the orthodox 
approach may have stemmed from, although this is still based on a permutation of 
the more analytical approach.     
To help illustrate this propensity on the part of the early Court, the following 
section is divided into two main parts: those cases where the Court, adopted a 
‘more analytical approach’; and those cases in which agreements were held ‘by 
their very nature’ to restrict competition.7       
                                                     
5
 Including: “precise purpose” (supra n2, STM), “purpose” (Joined cases C-96/82 etc, IAZ v 
Commission/ ANSEAU [1983] ECR 3369), “aim” (Joined cases C-29/83, 30/83 CRAM & Rheinzink v 
Commission [1984] ECR 1679), “intention” (Case C-41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 
661, Case C-258/78 Nungesser v Commission [1982] ECR 2015), “objective” (Case C-31/80 NV L’Oréal 
v De Nieuwe AMCK [1980] ECR 3775 (L’Oréal), also arguably Case C-61/80 Cöoperatieve Stremsell-en 
Kleurselfabriek v Commission [1981] ECR 811) and “objective function” (Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim 
v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskat AmbA [1994] ECR I-5641 (Gøttrup-Klim), per AG Tesauro, para 
16).  See chapter 3. 
6
 See eg Case C-5/69 Franz Völk v SPRL Ets J Vervaucke [1969] ECR 295, Case C-28/77 Tepea BV v 
Commission [1978] ECR 1391, Case C-31/80 L’Oréal, Case C-61/80 Cöoperatieve Stremsell-en 
Kleurselfabriek v Commission, Case C-107/82 AEG-Telefunken v Commission [1983] ECR 3151, C-
23/67 Brasserie De Haecht v Wilkin [1967] ECR 407.   
7
 These headings are not perfect as the CJEU sometimes mixed different approaches when assessing 
restrictions by object in its judgments.  However, the headings allow the reader to appreciate more 
readily the basic emerging pattern.   
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2.1. Agreements that incorporate a ‘more analytical approach’: the need for a 
contextual assessment  
2.1.1. Establishing the more analytical approach: STM 
The CJEU set the bar high in its seminal judgment in Société Technique Minière 
(STM) by elucidating how Article 101(1) TFEU should be applied to agreements.8  
Despite often being referred to as a case that is pertinent only to restrictions by 
‘effect’,9 its influence on the perception of the object criterion is now unparalleled.  
This becomes increasingly evident throughout the thesis.10  In this case the CJEU 
adopted what this thesis refers to as the ‘more analytical approach’ (the MAAP).  
The term ‘analytical approach’ was coined by AG Tesauro in Gøttrup Klim and aptly 
summarises the greater analytical component attributed to assessing the object of 
an agreement through the consideration of its legal and economic context.11  Given 
the significance of STM in revealing a more analytical approach to object cases at 
the infancy of the EU’s competition law jurisprudence, it merits separate discussion.  
In STM an exclusive right of sale was held to be compatible with Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  To arrive at this conclusion, the CJEU made some revealing statements about 
the interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU as a whole.  The Court considered that in 
order for an agreement to be prohibited under Article 101(1) TFEU, it must fulfil 
certain conditions depending “less on the legal nature of the agreement than on its 
effects…on competition”.12  Therefore, as Article 101(1) TFEU is “based on an 
assessment of the effects of an agreement from two angles of economic evaluation 
[that of assessing the effects on trade between Member States and its effects on 
                                                     
8
 Supra n2, STM. 
9
 This is largely due to the nature of the restraint in issue, seen more typically as a restriction by 
effect. 
10
 Despite its 50 year age, STM is undisputedly the leading case on restrictions by object, but its 
status as such was masked for many years, due largely to the unchallenged prominence of the 
orthodox approach and cases such as ENS (supra n4).  STM underlines why cases relevant to the 
effect criterion may also be highly relevant to understanding the object criterion.  Hence the case 
law reviewed for the purposes of this thesis (not all of which is reported) deals not only with 
agreements restricting competition by object, but also the general application of Article 101(1) TFEU 
(and its former incarnations). 
11
 Supra n5 Gøttrup-Klim, para 16. 
12
 Supra n2, STM, p248. 
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competition], it cannot be interpreted as introducing any kind of advance judgment 
with regard to a category of agreements determined by their legal nature.”13  
Consequently, the prohibition under Article 101(1) “depends on one question 
alone, namely whether, taking into account the circumstances of the case, the 
agreement, objectively considered, contains the elements constituting the said 
prohibition as set out in Article [85](1).”14  It can be deduced from the Court’s 
statement that, certainly at this point in time, there were no preconceptions or 
presumptions as to the sort of behaviour automatically prohibited under Article 
101(1) TFEU by virtue of its object.  Moreover, the Court dismisses a form-based 
interpretation of the law.  It stressed that as object and effect are not cumulative, 
but alternative requirements, the first necessary step is for the precise purpose of 
the agreement to be considered.15   
The judgment in STM sets out a comprehensive test (hereinafter the STM Test) in 
which to determine the object of an agreement and prescribes that: 
(i) The ‘precise purpose’ of the agreement must be considered. 
(ii) The consideration must be in the economic context in which 
the agreement is to be applied.16   
(iii) Such purpose (interference with competition) must result from 
some or all of the actual clauses of the agreement itself.17   
(iv) Should this analysis not “reveal the effect on competition to be 
sufficiently deleterious, the consequences of the agreement 
should then be considered”.18   
(v) [When determining the purpose of the agreement] the 
competition must be understood within the actual context in 
which it would occur in the absence of the agreement in 
dispute [the counterfactual].19   
(vi) Whether a restriction is prohibited by reason of its object [or 
effect], it is appropriate to take account of:  
a. the nature and quantity of the products covered by the 
agreement,  
                                                     
13
 Ibid, p248. 
14
 Ibid, p248. 
15
 Ibid, p249. 
16
 Ibid, p249. 
17
 Ibid, p249. 
18
 Ibid, p249.  Emphasis added.  ‘Consequences’ relates to the ‘effect’ of the agreement. 
19
 Ibid, p250.  This is also relevant for restrictions by effect. 
Page 57 
b. the position and importance of the supplier and distributor on 
the market for the products concerned,  
c. the isolated nature of the disputed agreement or its position 
in a series of agreements, and  
d. the severity of the clauses intended to protect the restriction 
or the opportunities allowed for other commercial 
competitors in the same products by way of parallel re-
exportation and importation.20 
The first three of these elements comprise the main aspects of the STM Test.  
Subsequent judgments have expanded upon these elements over the years and 
reveal the object concept to be a nuanced legal provision.  STM therefore lays the 
foundation for an analytical, economics-based approach towards determining 
whether the object of an agreement is to restrict competition.  Under this 
methodology the standard of proof required to establish if an agreement is 
restrictive by object is considerably higher than that of the orthodox approach.  The 
CJEU is less concerned with identifying types of restriction as infringements by 
object per se, but rather in determining the “precise purpose” of the agreement 
based on an analysis of the terms of the agreement within its economic context.  If 
such an assessment reveals a “sufficiently deleterious” effect on competition the 
investigation can end there.  If not, the “consequences” of the agreement must be 
considered to determine if the agreement “in fact” has the effect of restricting 
competition “to an appreciable extent”.21   
The multi-textured nature of the assessment that the Court demands under the 
STM Test, with particular regard to factors pertaining to the market structure, the 
position of the parties, the severity of the clauses as well as the use of the 
counterfactual is notable.  This thesis explores a number of the themes introduced 
                                                     
20
 Ibid, p250 
21
 Ibid, pp249-250.  Paragraph 3 of the Operative part of the judgment uses slightly different 
wording.  Here the Court states that when assessing the “consequences” of an agreement (that is, 
the effects) those consequences must be examined and justify the conclusion that competition is 
restricted “to an appreciable extent”.  It would appear the Court has thereby decided that the actual 
or concrete effects need be determined only in the context of the analysis of the effect.  This is 
significant as it suggests that the Court recognises that the object criterion carries a lower standard 
of proof in comparison with restrictions by effect.  This can be contrasted with the orthodox 
approach, which does not account for a contextual analysis and thus makes the standard of proof 
even lighter. 
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by the judgment in later chapters, for instance, whether restraints can be ancillary 
to a primary pro-competitive purpose.22  At this juncture, however, it is notable 
how the Court’s use of wording lends itself to a more fluid dichotomy between 
restrictions by object and by effect.  For instance, the Court speaks of revealing a 
sufficiently deleterious “effect” on competition when determining an agreement’s 
object.23  Versions of the judgment in German and French similarly endorse the 
English translation of the text.  The German version could be directly translated as, 
“...if the examination of the provisions do not recognise a sufficient impairment of 
competition then the impact of the agreement must be investigated”.24  The French 
version likewise states, “If the analysis of these terms do not reveal a sufficient 
degree of harm in relation to competition, the effects of the agreement should then 
be considered...”.25 
What is so interesting about this case is that the Court envisages that object and 
effect share a similar analytical effects-based methodology when determining if an 
agreement restricts competition.  The distinction between object and effect as 
envisioned by the Court is that it demands the standard of proof for establishing 
the ‘effect’ of an agreement is greater, as the Court requires the actual effect to be 
determined.  Moreover, such effect must restrict competition to an appreciable 
extent.  It is therefore arguable that only the potential effects of an agreement 
need be found in order to satisfy a finding by object, but that those effects must be 
‘sufficiently’ harmful.  This is evidently not a precise science and hence the 
importance of an agreement’s own context is paramount. 
This conclusion is supported by Paul Lasok QC, who considers “that there is one 
basic methodology in competition analysis that informs both the object and effect 
criteria for identifying an anticompetitive agreement”.26  He notes that the CJEU in 
                                                     
22
 See chapters 3 and 4. 
23
 Supra n2, p249. 
24
 “Lässt die Prüfung dieser Bestimmungen keine hinreichende Beeinträchtigung des wettbewerbs 
erkennen, so sind die Auswirkung der Vereinbarung zu untersuchen.” 
25
 “Qu’au cas cependant au l’analyse des dites clauses ne revelerait pas un degre suffisant de 
nocivite a l’egard de concurrence, il conviendrait alors d’examiner less effects de l’accord...”. 
26
 (Lasok QC, 2008), who presented his paper to the Law Society on 8 October 2007. 
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STM and Consten & Grundig made it clear that the analysis is essentially “free” in 
that no assumptions are made about the (anti-)competitive nature of an 
arrangement on the basis of the type of agreement.27  The key question is whether 
or not “taking into account the circumstances of the case, the agreement, 
objectively considered, contains the elements constituting the prohibition set out in 
Article 101(1)”.28  He notes further that the exercise is “based on an assessment of 
the effects of the agreement”, which is measured by reference to the 
counterfactual.29  For Lasok, the object/effect dichotomy “concerns what one looks 
at when considering the effect of the agreement on competition”.30  By way of 
explanation, he recounts the STM Test, which can be condensed as the following: 
based on an analysis of the terms of an agreement within its context, the object of 
an agreement determines the potential effects of an agreement, whereas ‘effect’ 
determines an agreement’s actual effect.31   
This position can be contrasted with that of the Article 81(3) Guidelines and its 
formalistic approach, which bears little resemblance to this more analytical 
understanding of the law.  In STM the CJEU makes no mention of obvious or serious 
restrictions, nor does it talk about categorising agreements that automatically 
restrict competition.  Instead, the STM Test places emphasis on determining the 
‘precise purpose’ of an agreement; whether the purpose is to restrict 
competition.32  Thus, object means purpose.  As will be demonstrated below, this 
                                                     
27
 Ibid. Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten SA and Grundigverkaufs-GmbH v 
Commission, [1966] ECR 342 (Consten & Grundig). 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid, citing supra n2 STM, 248-250. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Ibid.  Should an analysis of the terms of the agreement reveal a sufficiently deleterious effect on 
competition bearing in mind its context, the investigation can end there.  If not, the “actual effect” 
of the agreement must be considered. See ft 19, where he notes that in General Motors, para 66, 
the CJEU found that when determining the object of an agreement “reference may also be made to 
the ‘aims’ of the agreement...derived from the terms of the agreement and any contextual 
evidence”. 
32
 The German text of the judgment calls it “eigentlichen zweck” which translates as the “actual 
purpose”. 
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original methodological approach to the object criterion has been subsequently 
upheld by numerous judgments and opinions.33   
2.1.2. Confirmation of a more analytical approach 
Contemporaneous with the judgment in STM, the CJEU in Consten & Grundig 
confirmed that the concrete effects of an agreement do not need to be taken into 
account once it “appears” that the object of an agreement is to restrict 
competition.34  The Court did not expound upon this, though the assertion was 
made in the context of whether the pro-competitive effects of an agreement meant 
that a restriction will escape the prohibition under Article 101(1) TFEU.35  The CJEU 
considered that just because an agreement tends to restrict competition between 
distributors of the same make, it does not follow that it automatically escapes the 
prohibition because it increases competition between producers.  The CJEU decided 
that this type of argument is irrelevant, however, because if it “appears” the object 
is to restrict competition, the concrete effects do not need to be considered.36 
The more analytical approach advocated by STM is supported by the Court when it 
says “to arrive at a true representation of the contractual position the contract 
must be placed in the economic and legal context in the light of which it was 
concluded by the parties”.37  The Court does not thereby imply that certain 
agreements are presumed to automatically distort competition by object.38  
Nonetheless, the judgment is somewhat incongruous with the sentiments set out in 
STM.  What is more pertinent is that the CJEU found that the legal and economic 
context plays a role in the determination of an agreement’s object.  The CJEU thus 
                                                     
33
 Though subsequent chapters will show how the emphasis on different elements of the STM Test 
has shifted over the years, which is why the object concept is seen to be so confusing.  
34
 Supra n27, Consten & Grundig, p342. 
35
 Ibid, p342. 
36
 Ibid, p342. 
37
 Ibid, p343: “since the agreement thus aims at isolating the French market for Grundig products 
and maintaining, artificially, for products of a very well-known brand, separate national markets 
within the Community”.  Emphasis added.  The goal of preserving the single market was an 
important aspect of the case and considered as part of the agreement’s legal and economic context. 
38
 It is possible that the ‘no concrete effects’ rule led to the proposition that object restrictions have 
‘necessary effect’, ie: certain restrictions are presumed to have a restrictive effect on competition 
due to their known anticompetitive effects and thus, by their nature, restrict competition.       
Page 61 
builds upon the judgment in STM by referring, not just to the economic, but also to 
the legal context.  Again, the notion that the object concept is based on the 
classification of particular agreements is absent, though the precise delineation of 
how the object criterion is applied to agreements is admittedly somewhat vague.  
What the judgments in STM and Consten & Grundig attest to, is that the approach 
of the European Courts is far more nuanced than the Article 81(3) Guidelines 
suggest.   
A further series of cases illustrate how the CJEU expands upon and refines aspects 
of the STM Test.  This can be seen in particular when assessing how it proceeds 
when confronted with agreements that, the orthodox approach would 
automatically depict as restrictions by object.39  However it is also evident, as aptly 
highlighted in STM and Consten & Grundig, that the CJEU has a somewhat 
haphazard approach.40  For instance, the Court does not always differentiate 
between object and effect despite the clear reference to this requirement in STM.41  
Nonetheless, the cases demonstrate how the Court applies an economics-based 
approach as opposed to automatically condemning agreements as restrictive by 
object per se.42   
2.1.2.1. Consideration of market power and market structure 
The case of Völk involved an exclusive sales agreement reinforced by absolute 
territorial protection (ATP).43  Far from denouncing such an agreement, the Court 
held that determining the object or effect of the agreement must be understood by 
reference to the “actual circumstances of the agreement”.44  Consequently “even” 
                                                     
39
 Such as absolute territorial protection (ATP), price fixing, sharing of markets.  See C-5/69 Völk v 
Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295 (Völk). 
40
 See eg supra n6 Case C-107/82 AEG-Telefunken v Commission. 
41
 See for instance supra n5, Joined cases C-96-102 & others/82 IAZ/Anseau where the Court 
duplicated the analysis by also considering the actual effect of the agreement despite having 
determined that the object of the agreement was to restrict competition.  However, the Court may 
not always differentiate between the two elements as it recognises that object and effect follow the 
same basic methodology. 
42
 See for instance C-5/69 Völk v Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295 (Völk) and Case C-27/87, Louis Erauw-
jacquéry Sprl v La Hesbignonne Société Coopérative, [1988] ECR 1999 (Louis Erauw). 
43
 Ibid, Völk. 
44
 Ibid, Völk para 5/7. 
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an agreement containing ATP falls outside Article 101 TFEU when it has “only an 
insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the weak position which the 
persons concerned have on the market of the product in question”.45  This endorses 
the STM Test as it confirms the importance of context and, that the effect on 
competition may not be ‘sufficiently deleterious’ when the parties have a weak 
position on the relevant market.   
The judgment could be construed to mean that any agreement will not restrict 
competition by object if the effect on the market is insignificant.  This conclusion is 
currently in contention following the CJEU’s judgement in Expedia which has called 
into question whether restrictions by object need be appreciable.46  For the 
purposes of this section, Völk is an important judgment as it illustrates an economic 
rationale behind the competition law rules applicable to both restrictions by object 
and by effect.  The CJEU does not, however, explain whether those effects need be 
concretely proven in respect of the object criterion.  The judgment also flags an 
important point; to assess the market power of the parties requires a market 
definition.  It is notable that the Commission chose not to follow this judgment in its 
previous and most recent De Minimis Guidelines nor indeed in its Article 81(3) 
Guidelines in respect of the object criterion.47         
As in Völk, the necessity of a market definition when considering the object of an 
agreement was raised in the case of L’Oréal.  While this concerned a selective 
distribution agreement, which is not typically seen as a restrictive of competition by 
object under Article 101(1) TFEU, the judgment is significant.48  It further supports 
the requirement of an economic analysis when applying the object criterion.  Here, 
the Court confirmed the application of the more analytical approach.  It held that 
whether an agreement is prohibited by reason of the: 
                                                     
45
 Ibid, para 5/7.   
46
 Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc v Autorité de la concurrence, 13 December 2012, nyr.  See chapter 5 
for an examination of the relationship between the object concept and appreciableness. 
47
 See chapter 5.  Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance that do not appreciably 
restrict competition under article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ 2001 
C368/13.  These were revised following the judgment in Case C-226/11 Expedia and came into force 
on 25 June 2014: OJ 2014 C 291/01.  
48
 C-31/80 NV L’Oréal [1980] ECR 3775. 
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“...distortion of competition which is its object or effect, it is 
necessary to consider the competition within the actual context in 
which it would occur in the absence of the agreement in dispute.  
To that end, it is appropriate to take into account in particular the 
nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the products covered 
by the agreement, the position and importance of the parties on 
the market for the products concerned and the isolated nature of 
the disputed agreement or, alternatively, its position in a series of 
agreements.”49 
This it can be sensibly argued that L’Oréal not only upholds the judgment in STM, 
but reaffirms the need for a market definition analysis in every case.50       
2.1.2.2. Taking into account the potential effects of an agreement to prove an anti-
competitive purpose: the importance of the economic context 
A number of cases that concern the need to assess the market structure in an 
object assessment, also draw attention to additional factors that the CJEU reflected 
on when contemplating an agreement’s context.   
CRAM and Rheinzink reinforces how the focus in any determination of the object of 
an agreement centres on uncovering its purpose or aim.51  The CJEU found that:  
“...in order to determine whether an agreement has as its object 
the restriction of competition, it is not necessary to inquire which 
of the two contracting parties took the initiative in inserting any 
particular clause or to verify that the parties had a common intent 
at the time when the agreement was concluded.  It is rather a 
question of examining the aims pursued by the agreement as 
                                                     
49
 Ibid, para 19.  Emphasis added. 
50
 See also C-262/81 Coditel v Ciné-Vog Films (No.2) [1982] ECR 3381, which assesses exclusive rights 
under a licence.  The CJEU stated that a copyright holder who grants an exclusive right for a specific 
period is not subject to Article 101 TFEU, unless, “in a given case the manner in which the right is 
exercised is subject to a situation in the economic or legal sphere the object or effect of which is to 
restrict the distribution of films or to distort competition within the cinematographic market with 
regard to its specific characteristics”.           
51
 C-29&30/83 Compagnie Royal Austrienne des Mines and Rheinzink v Commission [1984] ECR 1679, 
(CRAM and Rheinzink). 
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such, in the light of the economic context in which the agreement 
is to be applied.”52 
This assessment highlights that the subjective intention of the parties is irrelevant 
in determining the object of an agreement.  It would be easy for parties to argue 
that they never intended to restrict competition and thereby excuse their 
agreements from the remit of Article 101(1) TFEU.  The CJEU gives short shrift to 
such arguments.  Instead, the aim or purpose of the agreement based on the 
objective content of the agreement and viewed in the light of its legal and 
economic context is the crucial test.  
This position is also reflected in ACF Chemiefarma v Commission where the Court 
dealt with a concerted practice involving price fixing and the sharing of markets.53  
The CJEU referred to the need to take account of the agreement’s context when 
assessing the ‘effects’ of the agreement with regard to restrictions prohibited under 
Article 101(1) TFEU.54  To determine the object of the agreement the CJEU took 
account of, inter alia, the parties’ conduct, their importance on the market, sales 
figures as well as the structure of the market, the duration of the agreements and 
the general state of the market in relation to that time.55   
The parties argued the agreement was made during a time when there was a 
shortage of raw materials and that it had no effect on the market.  The Court found, 
on the facts of the case, that these factors were irrelevant.56  The Court held that 
“such a shortage cannot render lawful an agreement the object of which is to 
restrict competition”.57  Based on its assessment of the economic context, the 
Court found that the purpose of the agreement was to share markets and fix prices, 
which therefore amounted to an intention to restrict competition manifested 
through the faithful expression of the parties’ joint intention as to their conduct.  
                                                     
52
 Ibid, summary, point 3. Emphasis added. 
53
 C-41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661. The case raises the interesting question 
of how object is assessed in respect of a gentleman’s agreement.  The main problem is identifying 
the restriction and proving it.   
54
 Ibid, paras 110-114. 
55
 Ibid, also paras 129, 155 onwards.  See particularly para 160. 
56
 Ibid, paras 127, 157. 
57
 Ibid, para 127. 
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The Court also found that such an object could not be excused or justified by 
arguments that the agreement had no effect or there was a scarcity of raw 
materials.58  The Court argued that in order to preserve their territorial protection 
the parties had agreed to restrict their freedom of action and therefore the fact the 
parties were unable to then act upon such a restriction was deemed irrelevant.59  
This reasoning demonstrates to what degree the CJEU is willing to consider whether 
economic factors can assuage a proven anti-competitive purpose.   
What is emerging from the case law to this point is that the Court seeks to 
understand the economic rationale behind the agreement to determine whether its 
purpose is indeed to restrict competition, despite the parties’ protestations to the 
contrary.  Such considerations turn on the facts of the case.  The Court therefore 
appears to ask itself what the rationale is behind the agreement: is it designed to 
restrict competition and therefore pursue an anti-competitive aim?60   
Similarly in Anseau/IAZ the case centred on the intent and purpose of the 
agreement as the parties denied they knew they were restricting, let alone 
intended to restrict, competition.61  The Court took account of the context of the 
agreement and its effects on competition when determining whether the use of a 
conformity label for washing machines and dishwashers amounted to a restriction 
of parallel imports (a hardcore restriction) and thus had as its object the restriction 
of competition.  The parties contended that the Commission had not met the 
requisite legal standard of proof when it found the agreement anti-competitive by 
object.62  The Court agreed with the Commission, but noted in its judgment that the 
agreement made parallel imports of washing machines more difficult, which was 
exacerbated by the high market shares of the parties.63   
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 Ibid, paras 156-157. 
59
 Ibid, para 155-160.  This judgment is pertinent when considering the judgment in BIDS supra n3. 
60
 See eg, STM, Völk, ACF Chemiefarma and CRAM and Rheinzink. 
61
 Joined cases C-96-102, 104, 105, 108, 110/82 IAZ International Belgium v Commission [1983] ECR 
3369 (Anseau/IAZ). See paras 24 and 25. 
62
 Ibid, para 22 and see paras 23 and 25. 
63
 Ibid, para 22.   
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The Court found that the subjective intention of the parties must be objectively 
determined when assessing the purpose of the agreement.  Any claim that the 
parties did not intend to restrict competition must be borne out by an analysis of 
the agreement in its context.  In this case the parties argued they did not intend to 
restrict competition as the agreement’s true purpose was to protect the public’s 
health.  On analysis, the Court found, based on the agreement’s particular 
circumstances, that this alternative purpose was not sufficient to invalidate the 
anticompetitive object of the agreement.64  Having regard to the content, origin 
and circumstances of the agreement (that is, its terms and the legal and economic 
context), the Court held that the agreement had the intention of treating parallel 
imports less favourably than official imports.65  By signing the agreement the 
parties acted deliberately whether or not they were aware that doing so infringed 
Article 101(1) TFEU.  These factors were evidenced by the conduct of the parties 
and the procedures they implemented.66  This judgment reinforces how any 
analysis of the object criterion must be fact specific.  The context of an agreement 
thus dictates whether a factor is relevant in one case, but not another.67  The 
parties also argued the agreement did not affect competition.  Even though the 
STM Test does not require such effect to be resolved, the Court held that the 
agreement did have a restrictive effect given the considerable market shares of the 
parties.68        
The importance of an agreement’s specific context in determining the purpose of 
an agreement is further underlined in Louis Erauw.69  The judgment can be usefully 
contrasted with ACF Chemiefarma and Anseau/IAZ as here the Court found that a 
positive purpose was in fact sufficient to ensure the agreement was not restrictive 
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 Ibid, para 22.  See also section 2.1.2 below.  This is not to say such a factor may not carry more 
weight in a different context. 
65
 Ibid, paras 23-35. 
66
 Ibid, para 27. 
67
 For example contrast the views on legitimate objectives: Pierre Fabre vis-a-vis ACF Chemiefarma 
and BIDS.  See also how the CJEU in C-67/13 P Groupement des Cartes Bancaires v Commission, 11 
September 2014, nyr explained the judgment in BIDS, para 84. 
68
 Supra n61, Anseau/IAZ, para 27.  The Court held the agreement appreciably restricted 
competition, notwithstanding its other purpose to protect public health.  The question of whether 
the object criterion must be appreciable is discussed in chapter 5. 
69
 C-27/87 Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne [1983] ECR 1919 (Louis Erauw).  
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by object and, in fact, come outside Article 101(1) TFEU altogether.  The case 
concerned plant breeders’ rights.  The agreement (a licence) contained a ‘no 
export’ clause and a stipulation that there should be no selling below a minimum 
sales price.  The Court held, with regard to the no export ban, that - as plant 
breeders incur considerable financial costs in developing varieties of basic seed - 
such persons must be allowed to protect themselves against any improper handling 
of those varieties of seeds.  Therefore, the plant breeder was entitled to “restrict 
propagation to the growers which he has selected as licensees.  To that extent, the 
provision prohibiting the licensee from selling and exporting basic seed falls 
outside...Article [101](1)”.70   
Therefore an argument as to the positive attributes or ‘legitimate goal’ of the 
agreement was held to trump a restrictive object.  As such the CJEU held, again, 
that even absolute territorial protection can come outside the reach of Article 
101(1) TFEU.  Here, the CJEU was clearly balancing the pro-competitive aim of such 
a restriction against the negative aspects.71  This apparent tolerance of the 
balancing of the positive attributes of an agreement under Article 101(1) TFEU is 
notable.  As will be seen throughout this thesis, however, such balancing is fairly 
commonplace.72  Yet again, the Court’s approach highlights the individual nature of 
each case that comes before it and underlines the importance of assessing the 
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agreement within its context.73  Had the agreement been assessed in accordance 
with the Article 81(3) Guidelines, the Commission would not have come up with the 
same result.  More significantly, the Court held the restriction fell outside Article 
101(1) TFEU entirely.  Unlike in Völk, this was due to the Court finding a pro-
competitive purpose not because the parties had a low market share. 
2.1.3.  Interim Conclusion 
This section examined the jurisprudence of the CJEU up to the inception of the GC 
in 1989.  It found that the seminal case of STM outlined a comprehensive test in 
order to determine the object of an agreement.  The STM Test was further fleshed 
out by subsequent judgments, which all focused on uncovering the rationale behind 
an agreement drawn from its legal and economic context.  Put another way, is the 
agreement designed to restrict competition?  This approach is referred to as the 
more analytical approach (the MAAP).  Under the MAAP, to prove the ‘object’ of an 
agreement the following factors are taken into account: 
a) The key question is: what is the “precise purpose” of the agreement? 
b) Such purpose is extrapolated from: 
i) the content of the agreement, 
ii) the conduct of the parties to the agreement, 
iii) an objective determination of the purpose of the agreement only drawing on 
the subjective intention of the parties if appropriate, and 
iv) the circumstances of the agreement. 
c) The purpose is assessed within the agreement’s specific legal and economic 
context, which takes account of: 
i) The effect of the agreement on competition (both potential and even actual), 
ii) The market structure, markets shares, definition of the market, 
(1) High market shares can help confirm an anti-competitive purpose whereas 
very low markets shares can bring an agreement outside Article 101(1) 
TFEU as the effect on competition is not sufficiently deleterious, and 
iii) The severity of the clauses needed to protect the (pro-competitive) purpose of 
the agreement. 
d) If after this analysis it does not “appear” that the agreement has the object, that is, 
the purpose of restricting competition then the actual effects of the agreement 
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must be assessed to determine if an agreement in fact has the effect of restricting 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU. 
e) Should an agreement be found to be restrictive by object, then the exemption 
under Article 101(3) TFEU is applicable. 
It is clear that the objective purpose of an agreement overrides a subjective 
intention of the parties not to restrict competition.74  The subjective intention and 
conduct of the parties can, however, be relevant in helping determine whether the 
purpose of the agreement is to restrict competition.  Subjective intention plays a 
subordinate role to finding an objective aim to restrict competition.  It is also not 
relevant whether the parties did not know that what they were doing restricted 
competition.75  Furthermore, the CJEU has determined that even if an agreement 
was intended to restrict competition, but was not then implemented, this is not 
sufficient to remove the agreement from the ambit of Article 101(1) TFEU.76  This is 
a significant point as it shows that the competition rules will kick into action even if 
a restrictive agreement is not implemented or successful.  The case law also makes 
clear that the object criterion does not require the agreement to have had an actual 
effect on competition as the potential to affect competition is sufficient. 
In the above cases, the orthodox approach has little bearing on how the CJEU 
applies let alone defines the object criterion.  The Court took account those 
restrictions specifically named under Article 101(1) TFEU as being ‘restrictions of 
competition’, but did not automatically associate them with having a restrictive 
object.  The foundations of the orthodox approach were thus not apparent at this 
juncture.  To see whether it is possible to pinpoint the origins of the orthodox 
approach, the following section investigates those cases where the CJEU introduces 
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the phrase ‘by its nature’ to its jurisprudence.  This phrase is significant as the 
Commission specifically links it with its interpretation of the object criterion.77   
2.2. Questionable foundations of the orthodox approach: agreements that ‘by 
their very nature’ restrict competition: early case law up to 1989 
The phrases ‘by their very nature’ and ‘of their nature’ play a prominent role in the 
determination of restrictions by object under the orthodox approach.  The Article 
81(3) Guidelines clearly connect both the phrase and the orthodoxy by defining 
restrictions by object as those that “by their very nature have the potential of 
restricting competition”.78  The use of this phrase also marks, albeit in only a few 
specific cases, a shift in approach by the CJEU from the more analytical approach to 
an approach that is more analogous with the orthodox approach.  What is notable, 
however, about the case law of this period is that the CJEU’s reference to ‘of their 
nature’ is not always in accord with the Commission’s use of that phrase.79   
Despite the prevalent use of the term and its derivatives throughout the Court’s 
jurisprudence (both within its earlier and more recent jurisprudence), ‘by their very 
nature’ has rarely been defined.  One of the few instances is by the GC in GSK, 
which it held to mean “independent of any competitive analysis”.80  Such 
interpretation is borne in mind when examining the case law below.     
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 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 21.  The Commission does not cite any case law in support of its 
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2.2.1.  Cases that continue to support the more analytical approach 
The judgment in Brasserie De Haecht demonstrates how the CJEU has combined the 
more analytical approach with the use of the phrase ‘by its nature’.81  The Court 
confirmed the methodology in STM by verifying that in order to determine if an 
agreement is caught by Article 101(1) TFEU, it must be examined in its ‘legal and 
economic context’ and not in isolation.82  The Court found that exclusive supply 
agreements are not ‘by their very nature’ incompatible with the Common Market.83  
The reference to the phrase implies that certain types of restriction may ‘by their 
very nature’ be incompatible with the Common Market.  This statement cannot, 
however, be interpreted to mean that the object criterion should therefore be 
automatically associated with such restrictions.  Rather it suggests that particular 
restrictions fall foul of the competition rules (such as those restrictions listed in 
Article 101(1) TFEU).            
Cooperatieve Stremselen endorses this interpretation of Brasserie De Haecht by 
illustrating two issues.84   First, it affirms how restrictions not classically categorised 
as ‘hardcore’ can, upon a market analysis, still be held restrictive by object.85  
Secondly, that a reference to ‘of its nature’ is not an implicit reference to the 
orthodox approach.  The case concerned the rules of a cooperative and the Court 
first looked at the object and effect of the agreement together.  It held that the 
rules in respect of exclusive purchasing requirements reinforced by payment for 
expulsion or resignation “have clearly as their object to prevent members from 
obtaining supplies from other suppliers” or from making supplies themselves.86  As 
a result, the provisions are “of such a nature as to prevent competition at the level 
of the supply of rennet and colouring agents for cheese between producers holding 
a large part of the Community market in cheese”.87  Notably, the Court makes this 
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assessment having undertaken an analysis of the market.  It considered the market 
power of the parties, and thus of the effects of the agreement on the defined 
upstream market.     
2.2.2.  Origins of the orthodox approach 
The Court’s judgment in Miller is symbolic as it is consistently cited as supporting 
the proposition that, by law, certain restrictions of competition automatically 
restrict competition by virtue of their object.88   This is questionable.  The judgment 
does not, on analysis, offer any such unqualified support.  The case concerned 
restrictions on exports contained in an exclusive dealing agreement and in the 
terms and conditions of sale (therefore a vertical arrangement), which the 
Commission found incompatible with Article 101(1) TFEU.  The CJEU held that “by 
its very nature a clause prohibiting exports constitutes a restriction of 
competition”.89  This statement was made, however, in the light of Miller claiming 
that it did not have a blameworthy objective, but that the restriction was adopted 
at the behest of its customers.90  The Court rejected this stating that by its very 
nature prohibiting exports constitutes a restriction of competition “whether [that 
clause] is adopted at the instigation of the supplier or of the customer since the 
agreed purpose of the contracting parties is the endeavour to isolate a part of the 
market”.91  This statement does not therefore specifically link object with the 
prohibition of exports rather that such a prohibition is a restriction of competition 
under Article 101(1) TFEU.  More fundamentally, the Court referred to the objective 
purpose of the parties being to restrict competition, which underlines the 
interpretation of the object criterion in STM.   
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Upholding its reasoning in ACF Chemiefarma, the CJEU found arguments that the 
parties did not enforce the no-export prohibition did not then denote it had no 
restrictive effect.92  It noted that, as customers knew of the prohibition on exports, 
a visual and psychological background was created contributing to a division of the 
market.93  More pertinently, the case is concerned less with the object of the 
agreement and more with whether the agreement affected trade between Member 
States.  Miller specifically challenged the appraisal of the effects of its behaviour by 
the Commission. It contended that the export ban cannot have appreciably affected 
trade between Member States due to its insignificant effect on the market.94  This 
was despite its acknowledgment that prohibitions on exports are not compatible 
with the common market.95  In determining whether the agreement affected trade 
between Member States the CJEU conducted an analysis of Miller’s position on the 
market so as to dismiss the fact that the parties had an insignificant market share.   
Given the focus on the effect on trade element, it is highly questionable whether 
Miller should be cited as such strong authority for the contention that export bans 
automatically have the object of restricting competition, or indeed, for the more 
general proposition that there is a category of agreements which have the object of 
restricting competition.96  At best, the judgment provides support for the 
proposition that an export ban is a restriction of competition. 
A case that probably provides better support for the orthodox approach, though is 
not often cited as such, is Bureau National v Guy Clair.97  The case concerned an 
inter-trade organisation (BNIC), which fixed the price of cognac and other wines 
and spirits in an agreement between its members.  The CJEU held that: 
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“For the purposes of Article 101(1) it is unnecessary to take account 
of the actual effects of an agreement where its object is to restrict, 
prevent or distort competition. By its very nature, an agreement 
fixing a minimum price for a product which is submitted to the public 
authorities for the purpose of obtaining approval for that minimum 
price, so that it becomes binding on all traders on the market in 
question, is intended to distort competition on that market.”98 
The passage suggests that, by law, certain restrictions automatically restrict 
competition by virtue of their object.99  Through using the word “intended”, which 
is taken to refer to the objective intention of the agreement and not the subjective 
intention of the parties, the CJEU submits that such agreements automatically 
intend to restrict competition regardless of their actual effects.  The inference is 
that particular restrictions are presumed to restrict competition due to an implied 
intention to distort competition.  The language of the Court would seem to suggest 
that price fixing has the ‘necessary effect’ of always restricting competition as, by 
its very nature, fixing minimum prices is intended to restrict competition and should 
thus be prohibited.  Consequently, the judgment raises more questions than it 
answers.     
The orthodox approach, as encapsulated in the Article 81(3) Guidelines, does not 
refer to an agreement’s ‘intention’.  Rather, the Commission claims that particular 
restrictions by their very nature have the potential to restrict competition owing to 
the high potential of negative effects on competition, the serious nature of the 
restriction and on experience showing such restrictions are likely to produce such 
negative effects on the market.100  The Commission does not cite any case law in 
support of this contention.  Hence, determining whether an agreement restricts 
competition by object is based upon an identification exercise.101  Guy Clair does 
not support all these elements of the orthodox approach.102    
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Despite the passage cited above, there is still a question as to whether, as a result 
of this judgment, the phrase ‘by its very nature’ should automatically be associated 
with object cases rather than the notion that certain agreements constitute 
restrictions of competition.  In its answer to the referring court, the CJEU merely 
said that “Article [101](1) must be taken to apply to inter-trade agreements fixing a 
minimum price for a product concluded by two groups of trades within the 
framework of, and in accordance with the procedure of, a body such as BNIC”.103  
On balance, however, it is likely that Bureau National v Guy Clair provides the 
greatest justification to date for the Commission’s approach to object under its 
Article 81(3) Guidelines. 
2.2.3. Necessary consequence/necessary effect 
The concept of necessary effect has been raised a few times, particularly in the case 
of Bureau National v Guy Clair as an element, which encapsulates the ‘by its very 
nature’ approach to the object concept.  It has been noted the concept plays an 
important role in the Commission’s approach to object cases.104  To recap, 
necessary effect is based on the assertion that the concrete effects of an agreement 
do not need to be considered under the object heading, as certain restrictions of 
competition automatically infringe Article 101(1) TFEU due to their known negative 
effects derived from experience.105  Impliedly, there is an irrebuttable presumption 
of anti-competitiveness.106  That it is therefore safe to assume particular restraints 
automatically infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object, is almost certainly derived 
from the principal that ‘actual’ effects do not need to be proven in object cases.107       
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According to Odudu, CRAM and Rheinzink is often cited as supporting the 
contention that the actual effects of an agreement do not need to be established 
under the object criterion, because the presumption is that they exist.108  Odudu is 
right to assert the judgment does not offer any such unqualified support.109  The 
case concerned restrictions on parallel trade usually designated by the Commission 
as a hardcore infringement.  When assessing the agreement, the Court examined 
the conduct of the parties, the prices charged and the circumstances surrounding 
the contract.  It held as a result of this analysis that the export clauses were 
“designed” to prevent the re-export of the goods to the country of production so as 
to maintain a system of dual prices and restrict competition within the common 
market.110  Such analysis does not support the presumption that particular 
restrictions automatically have the object of restricting competition.  The concept 
of necessary effect only requires proof that the restriction is contained within the 
agreement.  Here, the Court went further than merely identifying the purported 
restriction. 
2.2.4.  Interim conclusion 
It has been established that, overall, there is little endorsement by the CJEU of the 
orthodox approach within its early jurisprudence.  This is evidenced when the case 
law that focuses on those agreements that ‘by their nature’ restrict competition do 
not wholeheartedly align with the orthodox tradition.  Instead, the case law focuses 
more heavily on understanding the aim or purpose of the agreement within its 
context.  One case that bears more resemblance to the Commission’s interpretation 
of the object criterion is that of Guy Clair.  However, even here the CJEU refers to 
the “intention” of the agreement.  The value of these cases as precedents for the 
orthodox approach is therefore questionable.  Conversely, the cases demonstrate 
how the CJEU adopts language that can be construed so as to support a more 
orthodox meaning.  Nevertheless, the Court provides no definition for the phrase 
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‘by its nature’.  This emphasises the Court’s own shortcomings in terms of clarity of 
the law and its contribution to the confusion surrounding the object concept.   
The lack of case law that unequivocally supports the orthodox approach is further 
confirmed in the next section, which substantiates the proposition that the MAAP 
forms the basis of the law on the object criterion.    
3. The more analytical approach continues to inform the CJEU’s application of the 
object concept: 1989 to 2006 
This section documents how the MAAP continues to play a significant role in the 
evolution of the object concept within EU competition law after the inception of 
the General Court up until 2006.  The year 2006 marks a turning point as at that 
juncture the ‘hybrid approach’ starts to materialise within the European Courts’ 
jurisprudence.111  The case law of the period between 1989 and 2006 reinforces the 
centrality of the STM Test as the foundation of the Court’s application of the object 
criterion and its constituent parts.112  One particular Advocate General (AG) opinion 
is pertinent in this respect, that of AG Tesauro in Gøttrup-Klim.113  AGs are not 
subject to the same constraints as the CJEU, for example, they do not need to form 
a judgment based on a consensus.114  Therefore their opinions can be influential 
and helpful in their detail.  His opinion is a useful exposition of the judicial thinking 
at the time.  It is apparent that the object concept as interpreted in accordance 
with the MAAP is not a new phenomenon.115   Nevertheless, despite the orthodox 
approach lacking the commensurate judicial authority, it is clear just how influential 
the Commission’s interpretation of the object criterion is.  As the cases below 
demonstrate the CJEU has in fact paid very specific attention to the object criterion.   
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In Gøttrup-Klim, AG Tesauro’s opinion cements a number of key features identified 
in the case law to this point.116  He underlined the importance of the STM Test in 
assessing agreements under Article 101(1) TFEU, and reiterated that to establish 
whether an agreement is caught by Article 101(1) TFEU a two stage examination is 
necessary.  First, the object of the agreement must be considered.  To that end, the 
“aims pursued by the agreement will have to be appraised in the economic context 
in which it is to operate.  If the agreement seeks to restrict competition, it must be 
considered to be prohibited automatically and its effects need not be 
considered.”117  Where the object is not anticompetitive, a second stage is 
undertaken: “the agreement will be prohibited if it appears likely to restrict 
competition appreciably.”118  The AG confirmed that object and effect must be 
viewed in the context of how competition would have operated in the market in 
question in the absence of that agreement (the counterfactual): 
“...according to that analytical approach, agreements which, 
viewed objectively and in the abstract, have no other function 
than to restrict freedom of competition between parties in a 
manner considered incompatible with the common market will be 
regarded as prohibited by virtue of their object”.119   
Conversely, he considered agreements that are capable of performing more 
complex functions are not regarded as having an anticompetitive object.120  As 
such, AG Tesauro found the Court usually decides that “no anti-competitive object 
is contained in clauses which are found in the abstract to be necessary to ensure 
that contract, which is not in itself harmful to competition, can fully discharge the 
legal and economic function which it pursues.”121  According to the AG, this explains 
why non-compete clauses and exclusive supply clauses are not seen to be 
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restrictive by virtue of their object (presumably as the precise purpose of the 
agreement is not to restrict competition).   
The AG also gave some thought to the reasoning for the distinction between object 
and effect.  He emphasised that the analysis of object and effect are to be clearly 
distinguished, though acknowledged the distinction is usually disregarded by the 
Commission, which tends to make an overall assessment for both object and effect, 
concluding that a particular agreement does or does not infringe Article 101(1) 
TFEU as a whole.122  He consequently recognised that it is not clear the way in 
which the principle, that object and effect are distinct, is applied.123  The AG 
understood the dichotomy as follows: 
“[To determine whether a particular clause is anticompetitive in 
intent, the object criterion]...is intended to assess, in the abstract, 
the objective function of a particular set of conditions in its 
contractual context.  The second, on the other hand, is designed 
to establish whether, specifically, an agreement whose object is 
not anti-competitive is nevertheless liable, in the specific market 
context in which it is to operate, appreciably to affect competition 
in the common market.’124     
This version of the distinction is persuasive, to an extent.  It is, however, a vital clue 
in the understanding of the functioning of Article 101(1) TFEU as a whole and 
underlines the importance of the more analytical approach in legal history.  In 
accordance with this distinction, every agreement must first be assessed to 
determine if the object is to restrict competition.  If this is not established, then the 
role of effect is to sweep up those agreements that do not intend to restrict 
competition, but nevertheless have that effect.  However, the notion that the 
object concept is viewed in the abstract is somewhat controversial.  The AG does 
not explain what the term ‘abstract’ means.  There is a conflict between assessing 
an agreement in the abstract, but within its specific context.  A contextual analysis 
cannot be deemed abstract.  Arguably, the AG is merely referring to the position 
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established in STM; that the analysis undertaken when determining the object of an 
agreement is less intensive than when establishing the actual effect of an 
agreement.  The precise parameters of the object analysis are therefore unclear.       
The importance of context is reinforced by AG Tizzano’s opinion in General Motors 
v Commission.125  The case involved what the Commission would automatically 
consider to be an object restriction: an export ban.  The export ban was ‘indirect’ 
and therefore it was not clear on the face of the documentation that the aim or 
purpose of the agreement was to restrict competition.126  The AG held that for 
there to be a restriction of competition by object, the agreement does not need to 
have a restriction of competition as its sole aim.127  Where an agreement “obviously 
has an anticompetitive purpose”, this renders “irrelevant and uninfluential” the fact 
that it also pursues other legitimate objectives.128  This position can be contrasted 
with earlier case law where, even in the context of a hardcore restriction, such as 
the export ban in Louis Erauw, such an agreement was considered to fall outside 
the realms of Article 101(1) TFEU due to justifications to the contrary.129  It is 
submitted the determinative factor as to whether alternative purposes are able to 
justify particular restrictions turns on the context of the agreement.   
To then “ascertain whether an agreement is capable of restricting competition” the 
agreement must be assessed within the actual context in which it would occur in 
the absence of the agreement in dispute.130  Moreover, the AG upheld the principle 
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that the object of an agreement is deduced from the content of its clauses, the 
intention of the parties “as it arises from the ‘genesis’ of the agreement or 
manifests itself in the circumstances in which it was implemented” and the conduct 
of the undertakings concerned.131  Thus, the characteristics of the measure, as well 
as the objectives pursued by the manufacturer inferred from its general strategy, 
were relevant.132  Finally, it is notable that the AG found it irrelevant that the 
objective pursued was not attained and therefore did not produce anticompetitive 
effects.133    
Notably the CJEU confirmed much of the AG’s opinion.  When making an 
assessment of object the CJEU held that: 
“...account must be taken not only of the terms of the agreement, 
but also of other factors, such as the aims pursued by the 
agreement in the light of the economic and legal context, in order 
to determine whether an agreement has a restrictive object.”134  
The CJEU affirmed that such an objective can be achieved through direct and 
indirect means.135  The CJEU therefore held that the agreement had the object of 
restricting competition even though it was not explicitly obvious that the agreement 
had that object.136  In making its assessment, the CJEU looked at the conduct of the 
parties and considered what the competitive situation in the market would have 
been if, as in this case, export sales had not been excluded from the bonus policy.  
Proof of intention was not seen as a necessary factor in determining the object of 
the agreement.137  Such intention, however, may be taken into account when 
assessing the object of the agreement.   
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The need to ascertain the true objective of an agreement and the significance of an 
agreement’s context was again reinforced by the judgment in Asnef Equifax.138  
Here, the issue concerned a horizontal credit information exchange agreement.  
Information exchange systems raise intriguing questions under Article 101(1) TFEU 
as they involve a form of collusion.  Therefore, the assessment of whether such an 
arrangement is a restriction by object is an important and revealing one.  Horizontal 
agreements to exchange information have been held to constitute restrictions by 
object when they concern future pricing intentions or where the commercial 
independence of an undertaking is compromised.139  The CJEU focused on the 
positive attributes of the information exchange system when dismissing the 
suggestion that the object of the agreement was anticompetitive.140  Instead it 
found that the “essential object of credit information exchange systems is to make 
available to credit providers relevant information about existing or potential 
borrowers”.141  The CJEU considered the positive benefits of such credit information 
systems, such as the lender being able to foresee the likelihood of repayment, and 
decided that they are in principle capable of improving the functioning of the 
supply of credit.142  Therefore, the register did not “by its very nature” have the 
object of restricting competition.143   
The impact that the positive benefits of the agreement had on the outcome of the 
judgment is significant.  The CJEU weighed, albeit briefly, the positive benefits 
(arguably the positive effects and aims) of the agreement against the negative 
aspects.  As a result of this exercise, it found that the “essential object” of the 
agreement was not anticompetitive.144  This supports the view that the object 
criterion is concerned with identifying the precise purpose of the agreement by 
determining what the rationale behind it is, and specifically whether the agreement 
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is designed to restrict competition.  More interestingly, the judgment leads to the 
conclusion that the object criterion can accommodate the consideration of the 
positive attributes of an agreement.  Hence, if an agreement’s purpose is pro-
competitive then it does not have the object of restricting competition.145  This 
conclusion was certainly evidenced in Louis Erauw.  However, this position is 
controversial.  Having a legitimate aim or objective, indeed an objective justification 
as a reason for entering into a potentially restrictive agreement did not convince 
the CJEU in a number of cases.146  Therefore, where the distinction lies between 
these concepts requires further reflection.   
3.1. Conclusion: 1989-2006 
The case law of this period continues to support the application of the MAAP when 
determining an agreement’s object.  Based on the STM Test, the CJEU assesses 
whether the objective aim or purpose of an agreement within its specific legal and 
economic context is to restrict competition.147  There is little evidence of the 
orthodox approach being applied to agreements.  Instead, the AG’s outline more 
nuanced aspects of the object criterion.  This highlights how the Court seeks to 
understand the rationale behind an agreement: whether it seeks to restrict 
competition.  The case law does, however, expose that the object criterion lacks 
absolute consensus and clarity relating to all its aspects.  For instance, the defining 
factor between a pro-competitive purpose and a legitimate objective is unclear.  A 
positive purpose is purportedly able to circumvent the application of the object 
concept whereas a legitimate objective is not.  Additionally, the AG in Gøttrup-Klim 
referred to agreements performing more complex functions coming outside the 
remit of the object criterion, which are assessed in the abstract.  These are all 
factors that require further scrutiny.148   
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This thesis rationalises the law as follows.  It is clear that actual effects do not have 
to be demonstrated in order to find an anti-competitive object.  Rather, the role of 
the object criterion is to tease out those agreements that are designed to restrict 
competition, hence there being no requirement that an agreement is successful or 
in fact has a physical effect on competition.149  STM requires that the effect on 
competition is “sufficiently deleterious”, which is conceivably why judgments often 
show the Court taking account of the potential and indeed actual effects of a 
restriction.150  Nevertheless, the standard of proof under the object heading is less 
onerous than when determining an agreement’s actual effect on competition.  
What is not resolutely clear from the Court’s perspective is the question of precisely 
why no actual effects need be shown under an object analysis.  It is contended that 
the reason, certainly at this juncture, is less dependent on the necessary effect of 
the agreement and more on the fact the agreement itself intends, or has the 
‘purpose’ of ‘restricting competition’.  Such purpose to restrict competition, 
objectively determined based on the agreement’s content and its particular legal 
and economic context is sufficient alone to satisfy the object requirement.  In 
contrast, the effect criterion captures those agreements that may not have the 
objective intention to restrict competition, but nevertheless have a restrictive 
effect.  This interpretation of the case law is consistent with Arved Deringer’s 
earliest works deciphering Article 101 TFEU.151   
Deringer is one of the early pioneers of EU competition law and therefore drawing 
on his insightful early interpretation of the Treaty is helpful in understanding the 
competition law rules.  The English version of his German text describes Article 101 
infringements as those “whose purpose or effect” is to restrict competition.152  
Deringer saw the wording “purpose or effect” to indicate that there are “two 
independent and equally important possibilities”.153  Accordingly, it is sufficient if an 
agreement results in a restraint of competition, even if it was not intended to have 
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this effect.  It is also sufficient that the agreement “aimed at” restricting 
competition, but fails to achieve that result.  As such, it is not necessary that the 
agreement expressly states the intention to restrict competition, but that the 
content of the agreement conclusively indicates such a purpose.154  The fact that 
the agreement pursues other objectives is unimportant.155  It is the illegal purpose 
of the agreement that renders an agreement illegal, not the agreement itself.156  
Deringer considers that the Court requires the purpose of an agreement to be 
determined first.  This purpose must be a direct result of the agreement.  When 
ascertaining this purpose the economic circumstances surrounding the 
implementation of the agreement should be taken into account in accordance with 
the STM Test.  If the result of this examination is that the agreement is “designed” 
to restrict competition, there is no need to evaluate its actual effects.157  The 
examples listed in Article 101(1) TFEU are thus illustrations of the concept of a 
“restraint of competition”.158  They are not necessarily automatically synonymous 
with restrictions by object.   
Deringer’s assessment of the law is compelling.  It lends weight to an interpretation 
of the law on the object criterion as following a more analytical approach as 
opposed to the orthodoxy.  However, certain case law from this period marks an 
alternative approach to the object concept, particularly evident in the case of 
Bureau National v Guy Clair.  These cases contend that the agreement ‘by its very 
nature’ restricts competition.  The CJEU does not elaborate on this terminology, 
though does not subscribe to the orthodox approach as it does not categorise the 
object concept as applying only to hardcore or obvious restrictions of competition.  
Therefore defining the phrase as ‘independent of any competitive analysis’ appears 
wide of the mark.  A more appropriate definition is the recognition that actual 
effects do not need to be proven.  Such terminology does, however, permeate 
more profoundly the jurisprudence of the European Courts going forwards.   
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It is apparent at this juncture that the judgment in ENS is not reflective of the 
CJEU’s case law to that point.   This can be contrasted with the GC’s judgment in 
GSK, which looks rather less surprising.       
4. Case law of the General Court  
The GC assesses the legality of the Commission’s decisions in the first instance.  Its 
judgments can be appealed to the CJEU on points of law only.159  The GC has taken 
a robust approach to EU competition law and its judgments have helped shape the 
competition law landscape.  That is not to say it has been consistent.  Since its 
inception in 1989 and in contrast to the CJEU, the GC’s jurisprudence expresses 
most clearly the stark dichotomy between the orthodox approach and the MAAP.  
Four seminal judgments are selected for review, which best demonstrate this 
diversity in approach to the object criterion.  It becomes evident from this analysis 
that the GC has exerted the most influence on the orthodox approach.  However, 
the dominance of the orthodox approach is again challenged as the GC subscribes 
to the MAAP in two key cases.160  This raises the question of why the orthodox 
approach has become so dominant within legal discourse.  It may be that the 
Commission has given its policy in respect of the object criterion an inflated status 
over the law.  Certainly, the Commission failed openly to acknowledge the 
existence of a more analytical approach in its Article 81(3) Guidelines: it has not 
distinguished its policy approach from the law.  Hence, the repercussions are that 
the MAAP was overshadowed by the orthodox approach.  This has had far-reaching 
consequences on the legal landscape.       
4.1. ‘Per se’ infringements: a new dimension to agreements that ‘by their very 
nature’ restrict competition 
The GC was evidently keen to adopt a more formalistic approach in its early case 
law, but also confirmed a number of principles in respect of the object criterion 
established by the CJEU.  In Tréfilunion v Commission, the parties to a concerted 
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practice engaged in price fixing amongst other hardcore cartel activity.161  The court 
confirmed that even if undertakings participate with others in meetings at which 
decisions are taken concerning prices, but do not then observe the agreed prices, 
such inaction will not change the fact that the object of those meetings was 
anticompetitive.  As a result, an undertaking that participated in the agreement has 
no defence in saying it did not then implement the agreement.162  This is because 
the concrete effects of an agreement do not need to be accounted for where “it 
appears” that an agreement has as its object the prevention of competition within 
the common market.163  Participation is therefore only relevant to the culpability of 
the party.   
Moreover, when considering the object of the agreement, the GC stated that as the 
infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU - in particular sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) - was 
“clear”, it “necessarily precludes the rule of reason since in that case it must be 
regarded as an infringement per se of the competition rules”.164  This statement is 
fascinating.  Aside from the wholly inappropriate use of US antitrust terminology, it 
is one of the first times that object has been linked so obviously with the fact 
certain restrictions (such as those listed in Article 101(1) (a) to (c) TFEU) 
automatically infringe Article 101 TFEU.  In this respect, the GC breaks new ground.  
Critically, the GC relied on Montedipe SpA v Commission when making this 
statement.165  This is because it was unable to rely on a Court of Justice judgment: 
there are none supporting such an interpretation.  To exacerbate the absence of 
judicial support for its reasoning, in Montedipe the GC merely repeated the same 
statement utilised in Tréfilunion, though provided no citation supporting its 
statement.166  Therefore the GC was relying on its own unsubstantiated 
jurisprudence.   
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The GC reiterated the same reasoning in European Night Services (ENS).167  While 
the case concerned proof of effects of an agreement under Article 101(1) TFEU, the 
GC held that when assessing an agreement under Article 101(1) TFEU: 
“...account should be taken of the actual conditions in which it 
functions, in particular the economic context in which the 
undertakings operate, the products or services covered by the 
agreement and the actual structure of the market concerned, 
unless it is an agreement containing obvious restrictions of 
competition such as price-fixing, market-sharing or the control of 
outlets [reference to Case T-148/89 Tréfilunion v Commission, 
paragraph 109]. In the latter case, such restrictions may be 
weighed against their claimed pro-competitive effects only in the 
context of Article 85(3) of the Treaty, with a view to granting an 
exemption from the prohibition in Article 85(1).”168     
This extraordinary statement reveals a number of points.  First, the GC was, again, 
using its own case law to support a statement of law, without noting the conflict 
between its position and that of the CJEU.  Secondly, the GC’s approach in 
Tréfilunion and ENS creates a clear analytical distinction between object and effect 
analyses: the former relying solely on whether the restriction of competition is 
‘obvious’, and all economic analysis is being reserved for the effects analysis.  
Thirdly, the GC acknowledges that even agreements restrictive by object may be 
allowed, on the basis of Article 101(3) TFEU.  These two cases provide unequivocal 
judicial support for the orthodox approach.  Their status is questionable, 
nonetheless, in view of the CJEU’s case law described in the previous sections and 
the lack of creditable judicial citation.169   
4.2. The return to a more analytical approach 
Despite its stance in Tréfilunion and ENS, the GC subsequently adopted a more 
analytical approach in Volkswagen and GSK.  Both cases involved ‘obvious’ 
restrictions of competition, yet the GC undertook an effects-based approach to the 
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cases by looking at the market and economic context to determine the agreement’s 
object.   
In Volkswagen its dealers in Italy were told to sell cars to customers in Italy only.  In 
addition, Volkswagen implemented a split-margin system on registration of vehicles 
and a bonus payment cancellation for cars sold outside Italy.170  The GC held that it 
was clear from the documents taken as a whole the Commission was entitled to 
conclude that, as a result of the agreements, Volkswagen had the express aim of 
hindering re-exportation from Italy and therefore partitioning the Italian market.171  
The imposition of the quotas and bonus system was “of such a nature” to induce 
Italian dealers to only sell cars in Italy.172 
The GC confirmed it is settled case-law that there is no need to take account of the 
actual effects of an agreement when the object is to restrict competition.  The 
Court expressed the rule differently, however, by stating that “it is not necessary to 
show actual anticompetitive effects where the anticompetitive object of the 
conduct is proved”.173  Previously, the case law focused on whether it ‘appears’ that 
the object is to restrict competition or that the effect on competition is ‘sufficiently 
deleterious’ before the ‘consequences’ are considered.174   
The significance of this divergent terminology is unclear, but could be rationalised 
as follows: under the approach in Tréfilunion and ENS, an agreement of a 
particularly pernicious type, such as price fixing, automatically restricts competition 
by object.  In Volkswagen, the GC apparently requires proof of anticompetitive 
effects to demonstrate an anticompetitive object.  The GC’s proof requirement 
seems to rest on two elements.  First, the judgment focuses on the aims of the 
agreement based on its content in order to satisfy that the object was to restrict 
competition.  Secondly, the GC considers the agreement in its relevant economic 
context.  This may be inferred from the Court’s consideration of the need for a 
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market definition.  The GC held that when applying Article 101 TFEU, the reason for 
defining the market, if at all (emphasis added), is to determine whether the 
agreement or concerted practice is liable to affect trade and has as its object or 
effect the restriction of competition.175  It found the Commission is thus obliged to 
define the market where it is impossible without such a definition to determine 
whether the agreement has as its object or effect the restriction of competition.176  
This appears directly to contradict the judgment in ENS where it was held that 
obvious restrictions require no such analysis.177           
As a result of the GC’s reasoning, it can be implied that in order to prove the object 
of an agreement is to restrict competition, it is not enough to state that certain 
restrictions automatically infringe competition by object.   
4.2.1. GlaxoSmithKline 
In view of the impact that the GC’s judgment in GSK had on the general perception 
of restrictions by object, it warrants careful consideration.178  The judgment 
triggered an intense, though overdue, academic debate on the legal interpretation 
of the object criterion and also encapsulated the GC’s more ambitious assertions.  
Here the GC reversed the Commission’s decision that GlaxoSmithKline’s general 
sales conditions restricted competition by reason of their object, though it upheld 
the finding that the agreement was a restriction of competition by effect.  The case 
concerned the general sales conditions of GlaxoSmithKline in respect of its 
wholesalers in Spain.  In particular, clause 4 (which was contained within the 
general sales conditions) provided for a dual pricing system.  This meant that there 
was a distinction between prices charged to Spanish wholesalers in the case of 
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domestic resale and higher prices charged in the case of exports to any other 
Member State.179   
The GC examined in detail whether clause 4 of the general sales conditions was a 
restriction of competition.180  To give a context to its findings, the GC made some 
bold assertions.  It held that the competition referred to in Article 101 TFEU “is 
taken to mean effective competition, that is to say, the degree of competition 
necessary to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty”.181  It 
reaffirmed that price competition is not the only effective form of competition or 
that to which all absolute priority must be given.182  As such:  
“...a restriction of competition within the meaning of Article 101 
must take account of the actual framework and, therefore, of the 
legal and economic context in which the agreement to which that 
restriction is imputed is deployed.  Such an obligation is imposed 
for the purpose of ascertaining both the object and effect of the 
agreement.”183            
It went on to say that, when the examination of the clauses within the agreement, 
carried out in their legal and economic context, reveals in itself the “alteration of 
the existence of competition, it may be presumed that that agreement has as its 
object the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition”.184     
This context is crucial.  Effectively, the GC confirmed the majority of the CJEU’s case 
law set out in the sections above.  It reaffirmed the need for an examination of the 
agreement within its ‘legal and economic context’.  The GC also underlines that 
assumptions regarding certain types of anticompetitive behaviour, such as hardcore 
restrictions, which even the parties themselves acknowledge they intend to impose, 
is not enough to ensure that those sorts of restrictions are automatically restrictive 
by object.  Therefore, any presumption that a particular type of restriction is a 
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restriction by virtue of its object is rebuttable under Article 101(1) TFEU.  The GC 
explained that: 
“...having regard to the legal and economic context, the 
Commission could not rely on the mere fact that Clause 4 of the 
General Sales Conditions established a system of differentiated 
price intended to limit parallel trade as the basis for its conclusion 
that that provision had as its object the restriction of 
competition.”185  
However, the Court’s subsequent requirement that an agreement requires an 
analysis to determine whether the object or effect of the agreement is to restrict 
competition to the detriment of the final consumer was, correctly, rejected by the 
Court of Justice on appeal.186  Notably, the CJEU did not reject the requirement that 
regard must be had to the ‘legal and economic context’ within an object 
assessment.187   
What is so fascinating about the GC’s judgment is that, despite its general reception 
as anomalous, within the context of much of the Court of Justice’s case law the GC’s 
reasoning is not unusual.  The court also proffered an interesting way of describing 
the analysis of object stating that, it “may be abridged when the clauses of the 
agreement reveal in themselves the existence of an alteration of 
competition...[though] must on the other hand, be supplemented, depending on 
the requirements of the case, where that is not so”.188     
The relevance of the ability to undertake an abridged analysis of object is also 
underlined by the judgment in Consten & Grundig.  The GC found in GSK that the 
Court of Justice in Consten & Grundig never held that an agreement intended to 
limit parallel trade must be considered ‘by its nature’ (which, for the first time, is 
defined as “independently of any competitive analysis”) to have as its object the 
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restriction of competition.189  The GC stated that the Court of Justice in Consten & 
Grundig carried out an analysis of the agreement that was “abridged but real”.190  
The GC makes clear that it is not enough to presume that certain agreements 
automatically restrict competition, though it alludes to the fact there is a rebuttable 
presumption of harm.191  Instead, an evaluation of the terms of the agreement, 
within its legal and economic context, is required to determine if the object is 
indeed to restrict competition.  The GC also gave the Commission short shrift for 
merely drawing parallels with its previous decisional practice as the basis upon 
which it found the agreement restrictive by object.192  Doing so ignores the 
elements of a legal and economic context, “which are not present in the decisions 
adopted pursuant to Article [101](1) to which the Commission referred”.193   
The GC also carried out an analysis of the main characteristics of the legal and 
economic context by examining how the medicines were priced and noting the 
significant price differentials between Member States due to the lack of 
harmonisation.194  The Commission is even criticised by the GC for not examining 
the “specific and essential characteristic of the sector, which would show that 
medical products are significantly shielded from the free play of supply and demand 
unlike the prices of other consumer goods”.  This means that it cannot be that 
presumed parallel trade has an impact on the prices charged to the final 
consumer.195  The examination of the legal and economic context undertaken by 
the GC of clause 4 does not therefore reveal in itself that competition is 
restricted.196       
As a result, the GC found that it could not uphold the Commission’s decision that 
clause 4 of the general sales conditions constituted an infringement of Article 
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101(1) by reason of its object.197  It held that due to the nature of the 
pharmaceutical market it cannot be taken for granted at the outset that parallel 
trade tends to reduce prices and therefore increase the welfare of final consumers.  
The GC does, however, add a caveat to its judgment.  It states that this is a “largely 
unprecedented situation”.198  Thus most agreements intending to restrict parallel 
trade are likely still to be found to have the object of restricting competition.   
Ultimately, the GC’s judgment in GSK takes the principles set out in the STM Test 
and confirms the assessment that should be undertaken when determining the 
object of an agreement.  It emphasises the application of the legal and economic 
context, the importance of uncovering the purpose of the agreement and assessing 
each case on its merits.  The judgment is a salutary reminder that past precedent 
alone cannot condemn an agreement as restrictive by object.   
Whether the GC was correct to hold that the agreement did not restrict 
competition by object is moot.  Rather, the significance of the judgment is that it 
legitimately questions the orthodox approach and as such the position taken by the 
Commission in its Article 81(3) Guidelines.  Certainly, the GC went out of its way to 
hold that the agreement did not restrict competition by virtue of its object, despite 
agreeing with the Commission that the agreement had the effect of restricting 
competition.  This alone stresses the importance of the distinction between object 
and effect.           
4.3. Conclusion: case law of the General Court 
The four GC judgments discussed above clearly illustrate the GC’s divergent 
approach to object cases.  The GC veers between applying the more analytical and 
the orthodox approaches, the latter of which it has apparently devised on its own 
accord.199  The reason behind such diversity is unclear, but the judgments leave it 
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unsurprising that the object criterion is subject to so much confusion and 
misunderstanding.  These cases also raise some interesting issues.  These relate, 
inter alia, to the role of legal presumptions, the significance of the requirement that 
concrete effects do not need to be demonstrated (and as such the distinction 
between object and effect) as well as the categorisation of ‘obvious’ restrictions.  
The judgments in Tréfilunion and ENS, in particular, are anomalous and their legal 
basis precarious.  Hence, the emphasis placed on these cases is questionable given 
their lack of credible judicial support. 
What this means for the Commission’s approach in its Article 81(3) Guidelines is 
further cause for concern.  Although the Commission does not cite any GC case law 
in its Article 81(3) Guidelines (aside from an incorrect citation of Volkswagen in 
paragraph 23), it would seem clear from its tenor that Tréfilunion and ENS are the 
source of the Commission’s stance.200  Furthermore, it is increasingly clear that the 
Commission does indeed sympathise with and follow the principles of the more 
analytical approach.201   Where this then leaves the Article 81(3) Guidelines is 
uncertain.  Both the GC and the CJEU, rendered judgments concurrent with the 
Commission’s drafting of the Article 81(3) Guidelines that follow the more analytical 
path.  Hence, the foundations of the Commission’s stance on the object concept are 
not obvious.  The only sensible answer is that they reflect a policy approach; the 
Guidelines are certainly not an accurate reflection of the law.     
5. Conclusion: Part I 
This review of the jurisprudential back-catalogue of the European Courts 
demonstrates that the CJEU devised an analytical approach to the object criterion, 
which the GC has largely upheld.  The STM Test sets out a clear basis upon which to 
determine an agreement’s object and the judgment has constituted a significant 
part of the legal landscape since the CJEU’s earliest proclamations on Article 101 
TFEU.  Furthermore, the case law of both Courts reveals that the MAAP reflects the 
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most prominent interpretation of the law on the object concept.  Conversely, the 
orthodox approach enjoys less judicial support and what support it does have is 
easily challenged.  Whether this conclusion still stands in the light of an 
examination of the CJEU’s more recent case law, and the subsequent emergence of 
the ‘hybrid approach’ to the object criterion is considered in Part II of this chapter.    
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Part II: How the European Courts have interpreted the meaning and application of 
the object criterion under Article 101(1) TFEU: the metamorphosis of the more 
analytical approach 
1. Introduction 
Part II of chapter 2 undertakes a more focused examination of the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU following the judgment of the GC in GSK.  It investigates how the concept 
of object has evolved and the degree of influence (if any) that the GC imparts on 
the CJEU.  It will become evident that there is little reliance on the GC’s case law.  
Instead, the most influential case in the evolution of the object concept continues 
to hark back to the earliest days of the Community’s jurisprudence: Société 
Technique Minière (STM).202  The discord between the jurisprudence and the 
eminence of the orthodox approach is exemplified by the identification of a third 
key approach to the object criterion, which emerges more clearly during this 
period.  This is the ‘hybrid approach’.   
The hybrid approach is a crude amalgamation of the orthodox and more analytical 
approaches.203  The case law in Part II therefore confirms a significant finding first 
revealed in Part I: that the more analytical approach garners greater support in law 
than the orthodox approach.  This queries the origins of the orthodox approach as a 
legal methodology.  The judgments reviewed in Part II continue to emphasise the 
concern that the Commission fails to distinguish between its preferred policy 
approach and the law in its Article 81(3) Guidelines.204  It is imprudent simply to 
dismiss the orthodox approach, however, as it has shaped a key element of the 
hybrid approach.  A more intriguing issue, therefore, is how far the Commission’s 
policy has influenced the CJEU’s interpretation of the law in recent years, given the 
CJEU’s increased use of orthodox terminology.   
To demonstrate the emergence of the hybrid approach, Part II focuses on three 
prominent judgments.  These drew long overdue attention to the mechanics and 
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interpretation of the object concept.  More particularly, the judgments signalled a 
shift in academic debate and a growing consensus that the orthodox approach, 
adopted by the Commission in its Article 81(3) Guidelines, is too limited and 
formalistic.205  Hence, these cases are referred to as the ‘Game Changer Cases’.          
2. The European Court of Justice: the dawn of the hybrid approach  
2.1. The Game Changer Cases 
In conjunction with the GC’s judgment in GSK, the CJEU’s judgments in BIDS, T-
Mobile, and GSK signalled a greater appreciation of the nuances of the object 
criterion by the academic community.  Unlike much previous case law, these cases 
revolve specifically around the concept of object.  Given the specific need in these 
cases for the CJEU to rule directly on ‘object’, the expectation was that the Court 
would take the time to clarify the more uncharted and complex areas of this 
substantive element of Article 101(1) TFEU.206 Some commentators assumed the 
CJEU would confirm the orthodox approach to object restrictions, in particular, by 
“rectifying” the General Court’s judgments in GSK.207  To a limited extent, this has 
been the case.208  However, the lasting legacy of these cases is to devise a hybrid 
approach.  In terms of the position adopted in this thesis, the cases reaffirm the 
significance of the MAAP adopted in STM.  They also accord a certain legitimacy to 
the orthodox approach, which consequently continues to linger within the case law.    
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Although there was ample scope to conduct a careful assessment of the object 
criterion, the level of analysis and clarification undertaken by the CJEU was largely 
disappointing, despite detailed opinions being offered by the AGs.  This was 
compounded by its contradictory handling of the object criterion in so far as the 
CJEU appeared to be genuinely confused about what the object concept is there to 
achieve.209  By referencing STM, the CJEU demonstrated its recognition of the 
analytical approach to object cases, but then used language which seemingly 
endorsed and gave legitimacy to the orthodox approach.210  This uneasy tug of war 
between the two key approaches to restrictions by object underlines the 
importance of uncovering the fundamental essence and constituent elements that 
form the object concept.   
2.1.1. BIDS  
On 4 September 2008, AG Trstenjak handed down a comprehensive and compelling 
opinion in Beef Industry Development Society Ltd (BIDS).211  The opinion superbly 
demonstrates the complexities, inconsistencies and confusion surrounding the 
concept of object in contrast to the simplicity of the orthodox approach, which is 
why it is recounted in some detail.  The Supreme Court in Ireland made a 
preliminary reference to the CJEU and asked the Court to interpret the “notion of 
restriction of competition by object”.212  BIDS is an important case as it does not 
concern a classic ‘object box’ restriction, but rather a number of what are more 
typically seen as restrictions by effect, such as non-compete clauses and other 
restrictions on the parties’ freedom to act.213   
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The opinion highlights that the assessment criteria put forward by the Commission 
in its Article 81(3) Guidelines are deficient.214  The permeation of the orthodox 
approach throughout the various Member States is evident at the outset of the 
case.  When the Irish Competition Authority challenged the legality of the 
agreements devised by BIDS to reduce the over-capacity in the Irish processing 
industry, the Irish High Court held that the agreements did not fall under Article 
101(1) TFEU because the agreements did not have as their object the restriction of 
competition as the agreements were “not aimed at fixing prices, sharing customers, 
or limiting production for the purposes of Article 101(1)(a) to (c) TFEU”.215     
In stark contrast, AG Trstenjak advocated an analytical and economic approach to 
assessing object cases.216 She confirmed that in order to assess whether an 
agreement has as its object the restriction of competition, “regard must be had to 
the content of the agreement in the light of its legal and economic context”.217  If 
the object of an agreement is to restrict competition, then it is irrelevant whether 
“it actually has as its effect the restriction of competition”.218   
Turning to the meaning and purpose of restrictions of competition by object, she 
referred to the “anti-competitive aim or tendency of an agreement”.219  This is 
found “in particular” where the “necessary consequence” of the agreement is the 
restriction of competition, and “in principle” the parties may not argue they did not 
intend any restriction or that the agreement pursed a different aim.220  Significantly, 
the AG did not define what she meant by ‘necessary consequence’ though she used 
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Miller as a case citation.221  The choice of wording suggests that the AG recognised 
that the object criterion relates to the aim of the agreement.  Such aim usually, but 
not exclusively, relates to situations where the anticompetitive effects of certain 
types of agreement are known.  She also recognised that it is not a defence for 
parties to contend they did not intentionally infringe the rules.  Moreover, the AG 
made an interesting analogy: she suggested that object is designed as a form of 
inchoate offence and that regard is to be had not solely to the necessary 
consequences of an agreement.222  Therefore, the parties to the agreement do not 
need to put into practice their restrictive actions in order to infringe Article 101(1) 
TFEU by object.   
As a result, the AG considered that “it is clear that the category of restrictions of 
competition by object cannot be reduced to agreements which obviously restrict 
competition”.223  Likewise, there is no exhaustive list of object restrictions.  Object 
is not limited to restrictions of competition covered in Article 101(1)(a) to (c) TFEU 
and is not reduced to price-fixing, market sharing or control of outlets.224  Merely 
because the Community Courts have considered hardcore restrictions in many 
object cases “does not mean that agreements with another purpose cannot [also] 
have as their object the restriction of competition”.225  This was one of the first 
times that the categorisation of the object criterion was so obviously rejected.   
In order to examine whether an agreement has as its object the restriction of 
competition:   
“First of all it must be considered whether such agreements have 
restrictions of competition as their necessary consequence or are 
aimed at limiting the freedom of the parties to determine their 
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policy on the market independently and thereby at affecting 
market conditions.  Subsequently it must be examined as part of 
an overall assessment whether the restrictive elements are 
necessary in order to achieve a pro-competitive object or a 
primary objective which does not come under the fundamental 
prohibition contained in Article 101(1).”226 
At the time, this was seen as an extraordinary statement.  The case law review 
shows, however, that AG’s Trstenjak’s interpretation of the law is not without 
merit.  Moreover, her opinion highlighted the limited role assigned to the object 
criterion by the Commission in its Article 81(3) Guidelines. The value of the legal 
context, which includes past precedent and thus its necessary effect, is not 
conclusive when determining an agreement’s object in accordance with its actual 
legal and economic context.227   
2.1.1.1. The judgment 
The judgment in BIDS is significant, as it cited STM as authority for the proposition 
that first the precise purpose of an agreement must be considered within its 
economic context and should “an analysis of the clauses” not reveal the “effect on 
competition to be sufficiently deleterious, its consequences should then be 
considered”.228  It thus reinforced the need for the object of an agreement to be 
determined within its economic context.229  To that end, the CJEU found that based 
on the contents of the agreement within its economic context, the essence of the 
object criterion goes to determining “the objectives which [the agreement] is 
intended to attain”.230  Therefore, finding that the parties lacked the subjective 
intention to restrict competition or indeed intended to remedy, in this case, the 
failing Irish Beef industry, may be irrelevant if the contents of the agreement within 
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its legal and economic context establishes a restrictive object.231  Repeating the 
understanding handed down in General Motors, the CJEU held that “an agreement 
may be regarded as having a restrictive object even if it does not have the 
restriction of competition as its sole aim but also pursues other legitimate 
objectives. It is only in connection with Article 81(3) EC that matters such as those 
relied upon by BIDS may, if appropriate, be taken into consideration for the 
purposes of obtaining an exemption from the prohibition laid down in Article 81(1) 
EC”.232   
The CJEU found that as the agreements did not allow each undertaking to 
determine independently the policy which it intended to adopt on the common 
market, the agreements had the object of restricting competition.233  In reaching 
this conclusion, however, the CJEU took account not only of the structure of the 
market and the position of the parties on it, but also the potential effects of the 
BIDS arrangements.234  For instance, the CJEU considered that as “the investment 
necessary for the construction of a new processing plant is much greater than the 
costs of taking over an existing plant, those restrictions are obviously intended to 
dissuade any new entry of competitors throughout the island of Ireland”.235 
One of the most striking elements of the judgment is the CJEU’s interpretation of 
the distinction between object and effect, which despite AG Trstenjak’s opinion, it 
decided to describe in its own terms.  This was said to arise “from the fact that 
certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by their very 
nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal competition”.236  This 
contrasts with the view of the AG who argued that the aim of an agreement usually, 
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but not exclusively, relates to situations where the anticompetitive effects of a 
certain type of agreement are known.237  The CJEU did disagree, however, with 
BIDS’ submission that:  
“...the concept of infringement by object should be interpreted 
narrowly. Only agreements as to horizontal price-fixing, or to limit 
output or share markets, agreements whose anti-competitive 
effects are so obvious as not to require an economic analysis 
come within that category.”238  
Instead, it held that the types of agreements covered by Article 101(1)(a) to (e) 
TFEU do not form an exhaustive list of prohibited collusion.239  The inherent 
contradiction, though, between the CJEU’s depiction of the distinction between 
object and effect and its rejection of the submission that object should be 
interpreted narrowly is ultimately unhelpful and simply fuels speculation.  The 
Court’s failure to provide judicial support for its understanding of the object/effect 
dichotomy means that it is impossible to say definitively how the dichotomy should 
be interpreted, particularly as the judgment emphasises the importance of STM.240   
2.1.2. T-Mobile 
For the purposes of this chapter, the significance of T-Mobile is that the Court 
concludes that STM, is to be treated as the leading case when assessing an 
agreement to determine its object.241  Again, the CJEU finds that “since STM, it has 
been settled case law and it is necessary first to consider the precise purpose of the 
concerted practice, in the economic context in which it is to be pursued”.242  Where 
“an analysis of the terms of the concerted practice does not reveal the effect on 
competition to be sufficiently deleterious, its consequences should then be 
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considered and, for it to be caught by the prohibition, it is necessary to find that 
those factors are present which establish that competition has in fact 
been…restricted…to an appreciable extent”.243  Therefore, there is “no need to take 
into account the actual effects once it is apparent that its object is to…restrict 
competition within the common market”.244    
Notwithstanding the clear endorsement of the judgment in STM as a case that 
informs the application of the object criterion, the CJEU again chooses to express 
the distinction between object and effect in the same terms as in BIDS.245  The CJEU 
thereby reinforced the statement’s significance.  As highlighted above, the 
statement is confusing.  STM suggests that there are no absolute presumptions 
about the anti-competitiveness of any agreements.  Therefore, theoretically, object 
is not limited to hardcore or obvious restrictions of competition.  It is thus in one 
sense contradictory for the CJEU to refer to “certain forms of collusion…by their 
nature…being injurious to the proper functioning of competition”.    
One explanation for the CJEU’s reasoning is that it is actually referring to the fact 
that object is distinguished from effect, because it does not require the actual or 
concrete effects of an agreement to be determined.  The rationale for this is that it 
is known that certain restrictions have a high potential for negative effects on 
competition due to experience gleaned over the years.  Therefore, such restrictions 
automatically restrict competition regardless of their actual effects.  They are 
injurious by their very nature.  Conversely, it could be argued that concrete effects 
do not need to be demonstrated, because if an agreement has the aim or purpose 
of restricting competition that in itself is sufficient to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.  
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This is a complex issue and therefore the merits of these arguments will be pursued 
in subsequent chapters.246   
In T-Mobile, the CJEU found that for a concerted practice to have the object of 
restricting competition, it is sufficient that it has the “potential to have a negative 
impact on competition”.  That is, “the concerted practice must simply be capable in 
an individual case, having regard to the specific legal and economic context, of 
resulting in the…restriction of competition within the common market.”247  Not that 
it must restrict competition.  This propensity to affect competition is a condition 
which must be satisfied under the object criterion.248  The statement in T-Mobile is 
arguably a derivative of the principal first established in STM: that if the effect on 
competition is not “sufficiently deleterious” then the actual consequences of the 
agreement require determination and that an agreement does not need to be 
successful.249  In T-Mobile, the Court held that if it is found that such 
anticompetitive effects do result from the agreement, then the actual effects are 
only relevant when determining the amount of any fine and assessing any claim for 
damages.250  The implication of this finding is controversial.  Some commentators 
interpreted the judgment in T-Mobile as implying that standard of proof was 
reduced further for restrictions by object.251  Such a conclusion is not, however, 
necessarily implicit as can be seen in more recent CJEU judgments.252 
More particularly, the case concerned a horizontal exchange of information and the 
CJEU held that an exchange of information which is capable of removing 
uncertainties between participants of a concerted practice regarding the “timing, 
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extent and details of the modifications to be adopted by the undertaking 
concerned” will have an anti-competitive object.253  Nevertheless, in its assessment 
the CJEU made reference to the nature of the products, the size and number of 
undertakings involved and the volume of that market.254  The judgment therefore 
confirms the emergence of the hybrid approach as, despite upholding a number of 
key principles established in earlier case law supporting the MAAP, it references the 
BIDS object/effect distinction.  The implications of this are investigated in the 
following chapters.      
2.1.3. GlaxoSmithKline 
The final case reported in this section is the CJEU’s judgment in GSK.255  In light of 
the GC’s controversial judgment, this judgment was highly anticipated. 
Disappointingly, the CJEU did not rise to the challenge of rigorously examining the 
GC’s analysis of object.256  Instead, it would appear that the CJEU’s main objective 
was to reject, with strong evidential support, the GC’s proposition that proving an 
“agreement entails disadvantages for final consumers being a prerequisite for a 
finding of object”.257  Furthermore, the judgment substantiates the place of the 
hybrid approach alongside the orthodox approach and the MAAP. 
The pre-eminence of STM as the leading case on determining restrictions by object 
is referred to as “settled case-law”.258  The CJEU reverts, however, to language 
more suited to the orthodox approach (as it did in BIDS and T-Mobile).  The CJEU 
refers to how the “anti-competitive nature” of an agreement should be assessed, 
but then reiterates the STM Test.259  More intriguingly given that GlaxoSmithKline 
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 Supra n186, GSK, para 64. 
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 Ibid, para 55.  Note that the CJEU also refers to the “aim” of the agreement in para 59.   
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 Ibid, para 58. 
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admitted it had the intention of deterring parallel imports, it is significant that this 
factor alone was deemed insufficient to determine the object of the agreement.   
Instead the CJEU recounted the well-known principal that the parties’ subjective 
intention is not a necessary factor in the objective assessment of an agreement’s 
object, but can be taken into account.   
When reflecting on the issue of parallel trade, the Court is unclear on the question 
of whether there is a rebuttable (or irrebuttable) presumption that agreements 
aiming to restrict parallel trade have the object of preventing competition.  This is 
because of a lack of consistency in the CJEU’s turn of phrase.260  Instead it finds, 
correctly, that the GC committed an error of law as “requiring proof that the 
agreement entails disadvantages for final consumers as a prerequisite for a finding 
of anti-competitive object”.261  The CJEU takes this a step further, however, by 
finding that the GC also committed an error in law as it did not find that the 
agreement had the object of restricting competition.262  Other than a reliance on 
the fact that the Court has “on a number of occasions” held that an agreement 
aimed at limiting parallel trade is a restriction of competition by object, this 
statement of the CJEU is fairly weak in light of its historical case law which has not 
always supported such a contention.263  Nevertheless, it is notable that the CJEU 
does not overturn the GC’s references to STM and hence the MAAP.   
The judgment thus upholds the hybrid approach as it endorses the categorisation of 
the object criterion as per the orthodox approach, but approves the methodology 
postulated under the more analytical approach in view of its references to STM.  
Unhelpfully, the CJEU chooses not to examine the concept of necessary effect, nor 
the reason for the distinction between object and effect or the role of the object 
criterion under Article 101(1) TFEU.  Instead, the judgment leaves the impression 
                                                     
260
 For instance, despite confirming the importance of STM, in paragraph 60 of the judgment, the 
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that the CJEU wanted swiftly to end speculation over the consumer detriment 
aspect of the GC’s judgment, and thus glossed over more pertinent issues.  
2.2. Conclusion: the Game Changer Cases 
Even though the Game Changer Cases reflect a relatively brief period of the CJEU’s 
jurisprudence,264 they ignited an important debate regarding the assessment and 
function of the object criterion.  They do not, however, signal a ringing 
endorsement of the orthodox approach advocated within the Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, nor do they blur the lines between restrictions by object and by effect.  
Rather, they confirm an aspect of the CJEU’s jurisprudence that had been largely 
overlooked: that of the more analytical approach.  Following the case law review in 
Part I, the judgment in STM is seen to continue to influence the CJEU to a greater 
degree than, for instance, the GC’s judgment in ENS.  However, the Game Changer 
Cases did initiate a key development in the evolution of the MAAP.  This was by 
formalising a third approach to the object criterion, the hybrid approach.265   
The hybrid approach emerged as all three judgments found that the methodology 
applied to determine if an agreement is restrictive by object did not depart 
dramatically from the original STM Test, but despite this acknowledgment, the 
distinction between object and effect was presented in orthodox terms.  Hence the 
language of the orthodox approach, through the use of phrases such as ‘by its very 
nature’, was revitalised.  The concern with the hybrid approach stems from the fact 
the CJEU did not explain, at this juncture, its rationale for such description of the 
dichotomy.  Furthermore, this blend of the orthodox and more analytical 
approaches appears contradictory if the application of the legal and economic 
context is taken seriously.  The judgment in BIDS, in particular, exposes this 
paradoxical approach when the CJEU recognises the limitations of an exhaustive 
category of agreements.  
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 The CJEU’s judgment in BIDS was rendered on 20 November 2008, T-Mobile on 4 June 2009 and 
GSK on 6 October 2009. 
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 See also AG Kokott in T-Mobile and AG Trstenjak’s subsequent opinion in GSK. See chapter 4 for a 
more in-depth discussion of the scholarly commentary on this issue. 
Page 110 
Therefore it must be surmised that the hybrid approach is more fluid that the 
orthodox approach.  In particular, any categorisation of agreements automatically 
seen to restrict competition by object must be deemed a rebuttable presumption 
under Article 101(1) TFEU owing to the analysis of the ‘legal and economic context’ 
required under STM.  Notably, the AGs in these cases were better orientated 
towards providing more detailed elucidations of the more complex characteristics 
of the object criterion.   
The fact the CJEU overturned the GC’s judgment in GSK in the respect that it held 
the agreement was indeed restrictive by object is not of great concern, as the more 
important factor is how the CJEU recounted the application of the law.  It upheld 
the requirement that an agreement’s legal and economic context plays the central 
role when determining its object and, upon its own application, decided that the GC 
was wrong.  Such a requirement had been overshadowed by the Article 81(3) 
Guidelines, which do not reference the legal and economic context determinatively.  
More recent case law continues to uphold the hybrid approach, which also 
highlights the unsatisfactory nature of the Article 81(3) Guidelines, particularly as 
the Commission tends to follow the hybrid approach in its decisional practice as 
opposed to its own Article 81(3) Guidelines.266   
3. Overall conclusion: Parts I and II 
The purpose of this chapter was to scrutinise how the meaning and application of 
restrictions by object had been applied to agreements by the European Courts.  
Such an analysis of the case law would thereby allow the testing of the accuracy of 
the orthodox approach as portrayed under the Article 81(3) Guidelines.  To this 
end, a comprehensive review of the case law emanating from both the CJEU and GC 
was undertaken.   
What materialised from this review is that the Courts have approached object in 
two key ways, though a third hybrid approach has evolved as an amalgamation of 
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the two.267  One method is based on categorising those agreements that “by their 
very nature” restrict competition.  This approach has had the greatest influence on 
the orthodox approach, which is reflected in the Commission’s Article 81(3) 
Guidelines.  The other key method identified from the case law was the more 
analytical approach, based on the seminal case of STM.  One of the most striking 
aspects of this review was that the more analytical approach has greater judicial 
support.  The language of the orthodox approach has been found to permeate the 
case law, however, particularly more recently through the development of the 
hybrid approach.  This is confusing.      
The key differentiation is that the objective of the assessment of an agreement’s 
object is different under the three approaches.  The orthodox approach prescribes 
that a narrow category of agreements (which are usually ‘hardcore’, ‘serious’ or 
‘obvious’) are presumed to automatically restrict competition by object.268  If it is 
proved that the agreement contains such a restriction, then the agreement has the 
object of restricting competition.  This is deemed an irrebuttable presumption 
under Article 101(1) TFEU.269   
On the other hand, the more analytical approach is ‘free’ insofar as there are no 
preconceptions about the anti-competiveness of an agreement.  Instead, the focus 
is on establishing whether the aim or purpose of the agreement is to restrict 
competition.  To ascertain that purpose an assessment of the specific ‘legal and 
economic context’ in accordance with the STM Test is required.  As such, the 
process is flexible and the case law demonstrates that the level of economic 
analysis depends on the facts of the case and its particular context.  There are no 
absolute presumptions as to the anti-competitiveness of an agreement from the 
outset.  Therefore, potentially any restriction of competition could be a restriction 
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by object.  As such, categorisation does not exist.  Under this more analytical 
method, in theory, agreements that could be seen to contain hardcore restrictions 
of competition may be excused under the object heading or even come outside 
Article 101(1) TFEU as a whole.270  Conversely, those agreements that do not 
contain hardcore restrictions could be held to have an anti-competitive object.  The 
case law of the CJEU and GC upholds this interpretation: there are ample examples 
where prima facie hardcore restrictions of competition have not been held to be 
restrictive by object and,271 conversely, agreements which do not contain obvious 
or hardcore restrictions have been found to restrict competition by object.272   
Despite the delineation between these approaches, the case law also reveals that 
the object criterion’s role under Article 101(1) TFEU is ambiguous.  This lack of 
clarity is also demonstrated by the fact that the most consistent message from the 
Community Courts is that STM provides the legal foundation for the application of 
the object element.  Hence how the MAAP, as advocated in STM, relates to the 
orthodox approach requires further investigation.  The case law also demonstrates 
that the object concept encompasses a number of subtleties and complexities.273  
For instance, indirect restrictions can be anticompetitive by object.  Conversely, an 
assessment of an agreement’s object can consider its pro-competitive aspects or 
whether it pursues a legitimate goal or has an objective justification.  As such, the 
use of the object criterion as a legal tool to determine whether an agreement 
restricts competition has a far greater function than that allocated to it by 
Commission in its Article 81(3) Guidelines.  The categorisation of the object 
criterion under the orthodox approach has meant its assessment under Article 
101(1) TFEU has been confused, unclear and over-simplified.     
What can be said with certainty is that the Commission’s approach to restrictions 
by object in its Article 81(3) Guidelines is an extremely limited exposition of the 
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correct position in law.274  Within the Article 81(3) Guidelines, the Commission has 
failed to highlight that the assessment of object should be undertaken within the 
legal and economic context.  Furthermore, it neglected a significant portion of the 
case law, particularly that emanating from the CJEU.275  Instead, the Commission 
has embarked on a redefinition of the case law without alluding to the volume of 
jurisprudence supporting an alternative approach to restrictions by object.  This 
meant that the more complex nature of the object criterion was largely ignored.  
Identifying restrictions of competition by object is not as straightforward as the 
orthodox approach suggests and thus the Commission belies the technical difficulty 
in establishing whether an agreement is anticompetitive by object for those less 
obvious cases.  Therefore, the orthodox approach is unable to explain the 
anomalous case law where agreements that would be condemned under the 
orthodox approach are found not to restrict competition by object and vice versa.  
The MAAP is able to explain such anomalies by reference to the agreements’ 
context and the objective aim to restrict competition. 
The detail in which this chapter recounts the law is justified as it has sought to 
prove overwhelmingly that the orthodox approach is not fully reflective of the case 
law.  In order to provide a platform from which to examine the impact this 
assessment of object has on Article 101 TFEU as a whole, the following chapters will 
conduct a deeper investigation into the various characteristics of the object 
criterion identified in this chapter.  Given the prominence of the MAAP within the 
jurisprudence of the Community Courts, chapters 3 and 4 will focus more closely on 
explaining what the object concept means under than approach.  To this end, more 
recent case law of the European Courts is drawn upon to further demonstrate how 
the object criterion has evolved and ascertain whether the hybrid approach now 
informs how the European Courts, and indeed the Commission, applies the object 
criterion.   
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Chapter 3: Identifying the concept of object 
1. Introduction 
The following two chapters are both designed to probe the features comprising the 
legal structure of the object criterion, identified in chapter 2, in greater depth.  This 
exercise enables a comprehensive legal account of the true meaning, application 
and role of the object criterion to be drawn.  Having restated the case law,1 chapter 
3 has two main tasks.  First, it identifies the core principles of the object criterion 
that are a common thread in each of the orthodox, more analytical and hybrid 
approaches.  These key themes are consistently upheld by the Community Courts 
and are applicable irrespective of which approach is followed.  Secondly, it 
examines whether it is possible to elicit a clear definition of the object concept from 
the case law.   
2. Universal legal principles of the object criterion  
It is possible to elicit from the case law a number legal principles or rules relating to 
the object criterion.   These principles, as general statements, are rarely disputed by 
either the European Courts or in academic texts.  They are universally applied no 
matter how the Courts scrutinise the object of an agreement.  The devil, however, 
is in the detail, which gives rise to a great deal of contention as regards the precise 
interpretation of these core principles.   
2.1. ‘Object’ and ‘effect’ are distinct concepts 
The European Courts have consistently reiterated the basic principle that an 
agreement falls within the prohibition under Article 101(1) TFEU when it has as its 
‘object or effect’ the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition.2  
Therefore, whether an agreement restricts competition under Article 101(1) TFEU 
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 See chapter 2. 
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 See Joined Cases C-403 & 429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure and Karen 
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, [2011] ECR I- 9083 (FA), para 135 and Case C-56/65 Société 
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can be as a result of either its object or its effect and hence both elements do not 
need to be proven.  Consequently, object and effect are not cumulative concepts, 
which need to be applied together, but disjunctive ones.3       
2.2. Object does not require the concrete effects of an agreement to be examined 
Closely interwoven with the principle that object and effect are distinct and not 
cumulative concepts, is the principle that the concrete effects of an agreement do 
not need to be proven under the object criterion.4  The General Court described 
this when stating that “it is not necessary to show actual anticompetitive effects 
where the anticompetitive object of the conduct is proved”.5  As discussed 
previously, this principle is consistently upheld by the Community Courts.  Object is 
therefore an incredibly powerful tool: determining the actual effects of an 
agreement demands a higher and thus more intensive and costly level of economic 
analysis.6   
The ‘no actual effects’ rule has been the source of much of the confusion and 
misinterpretation surrounding the object criterion.  It has often been construed to 
mean that any form of effects assessment is superfluous and has no place in 
determining the object of an agreement.  This misunderstanding has sometimes 
been exacerbated by the Courts handling of this principle.  The use of the words 
‘actual’ or ‘concrete’ have often been omitted when setting out the principal in 
judgments despite the reference to cases such as STM.  For instance, in Pierre Fabre 
the Court omits to use the words ‘actual’ or ‘concrete’ effects and cites GSK as its 
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 Confirmed in Case C-219/95P Ferrière Nord v Commission [1997] ECR I-4411, “it is not necessary 
that an agreement should have both an anti-competitive object and an anti-competitive effect”, 
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authority.7  GSK does not use the words either, but cites T-Mobile, which then does 
use the word ‘actual’.8   
The omission of one vital word has had a huge impact on the interpretation of this 
principle.  There is a subtle distinction, often missed, between the propositions that 
actual effects need not be demonstrated under the object criterion versus no 
effects need be demonstrated at all.  The case law does not prescribe that effects 
must never be demonstrated under the object criterion.  Therefore, demonstrating 
potential (or even in some cases actual) effects is allowed, not least desirable, when 
determining the object of an agreement.9  Certainly, much, if not all, of the case law 
of the Community Courts has involved some form of analysis of effects under the 
object heading.10  How those effects are in fact utilised is dependent on the context 
of the agreement.  This is seen, in particular, in various selective distribution cases 
where the Courts have recognised restrictions are necessary in order to promote 
competition.  The no-effects rule raises important issues that require deeper 
reflection.11  These are examined in chapter 4.   
2.3. Object must be considered first 
Having established that object and effect are disjunctive, a pertinent issue is 
whether object and effect are true alternatives: can the effect of an agreement be 
determined without having first considered its object?12  On the basis of the leading 
case on object, STM, this issue would seem to be settled.  The Court held that, first, 
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 Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence, 
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 See (Faull & Nikpay, 1999), para 2.60.  Black states object is often evidence of effect, but not vice 
versa, (Black, 2005), p115. 
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the precise purpose (the object) of the agreement needs to be considered.13  Then, 
where such analysis of the clauses of the agreement does not “reveal the effect on 
competition to be sufficiently deleterious, the consequences of the agreement 
should then be considered”.14  This suggests that the object criterion should be 
determined before ‘effect’ can be considered. 
This interpretation has been upheld by numerous commentators and Court 
judgments.15  The pragmatic rationale for this is that affirming an agreement’s 
object avoids the examination of practical effects, “which is considerably more 
difficult”.16  An inference that can be drawn from this principle is that testing for 
object is different from testing for effect.  The object concept encapsulates those 
agreements which aim to restrict competition, but fail.17  Additionally, it is not 
necessary for the agreement expressly to state the intention to restrict 
competition.  Instead, it is sufficient if the content of the agreement conclusively 
indicates such a purpose.18  Effect then captures those agreements that do not 
necessarily aim to restrict competition, but nonetheless have (or could have) that 
effect.19  According to Black, object captures agreements not caught by effect and 
vice versa.20   
The issue then is whether object must be applied first and what the implications are 
should this not be done.  Put another way: is a finding of effect alone without first 
having recourse to the object of an agreement sufficient for the purposes of 
discharging obligations under Article 101(1) TFEU.  The answer is somewhat fudged 
in Court statements.   
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 Supra n2, STM, para 249. 
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 Ibid para 249. Upheld in Pierre Fabre (supra n7). 
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 (Deringer, 1968), p20, para 131.  
19
 (Black, 2005), p115. 
20
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In FA, even though the CJEU agreed that object and effect are alternative criteria, it 
said this meant: 
“that it is appropriate, first and foremost, to determine whether 
just one of them is satisfied, here the criterion concerning the 
object of the agreement.  It is only secondarily, when the analysis 
of the content of the agreement does not reveal a sufficient 
degree of impairment of competition, that the consequences of 
the agreement should be considered...”.21   
The Court’s statement does not fully support the principle that the object criterion 
needs to be decided first before the effect of an agreement can be considered.  This 
is despite the Court citing cases, which in turn cite STM as authority.22  Thus, the 
effect of an agreement can be assessed without having recourse to object first.  
Conversely, in GSK the CJEU described why it is important that object is considered 
before effect: because if that assessment is held to be an error of law then the 
effect analysis will be dismissed.23   
From a procedural perspective, there have been a number of notable instances 
where the Commission has not determined the outcome of its object assessment 
before considering the effect of an agreement.24  It has also been seen how both 
the European Courts and the Commission have considered both object and effect 
together in Article 101(1) TFEU assessments.25  Given that the onus is on the 
Commission to prove that an agreement restricts competition under Article 101(1) 
TFEU, whether it chooses to tackle the object or effect of an agreement first may 
appear to be irrelevant.  In more practical terms, however, the importance of 
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considering object first is that: (i) an object assessment does not require actual 
effects to be proved, which reduces the burden on administrative resources, (ii) 
even if an agreement is not implemented or successful does not negate a finding by 
object,26 (iii) a finding of object is usually perceived as a more serious offence given 
the higher level of fines attributed to restrictions by object,27 (iv) the availability of 
an Article 101(3) TFEU exemption is statistically more unlikely for agreements found 
restrictive by object,28 (v) parties have less inclination purposefully to restrict 
competition by colluding if they know it is prohibited regardless of effect (the 
preventative nature of the law), and (vi) the application of the object criterion can 
result in an agreement falling outside Article 101(1) TFEU altogether without the 
need to determine its actual effects.29   
For the Commission to ignore these practical consequences and insist on a full 
effects analysis demonstrates how the advantages of applying the object criterion 
are considerably weakened.30  In light of STM, it is sensible that the “precise 
purpose” of the agreement is considered first.31  This means that the alternatives of 
object and effect involve a two-stage examination in so far as if the object of an 
agreement is not to restrict competition, then it must be determined whether it 
then has that effect.32   
2.3.1. When is the object criterion satisfied? 
Having determined that the object of an agreement should be examined first under 
Article 101(1) TFEU, this sub-section considers at what point that obligation is 
discharged before the concrete effects of the agreement are considered.  In other 
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 C-277/87 Sandoz Prodotti Farmaceutici SpA v Commission [1990] ECR I-45; C-246/86 Belasco v 
Commission [1989] ECR 2117.  But upholding the judgment in STM, the CJEU in T-Mobile held that an 
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Page 120 
words, when is the object of an agreement satisfied?  It is an important issue, as 
once the object of an agreement is proved, it is presumed anticompetitive: no 
further evidence of an agreement’s restrictive effects needs to be produced.33  The 
European Courts have not particularly focused on this issue: the jurisprudence 
reveals itself to be inconsistent and discordant.  In STM, the Court held that if the 
analysis of the clauses of the agreement does not “reveal the effect on competition 
to be sufficiently deleterious, the consequences of the agreement should then be 
considered”.34  Conversely in Consten & Grundig the CJEU found the concrete 
effects of an agreement do not need to be taken into account once it “appears” the 
object of the agreement is to restrict competition.35  Alternatively, in Pierre Fabre, 
the Court held that “where the anticompetitive object of the agreement is 
established it is not necessary to examine its effects on competition”.36   
The jurisprudence therefore suggests an element of discretion when proving 
whether an agreement’s object to restrict competition is satisfied.  Arguably, the 
standard of proof is flexible and depends on the nature of the case.37  This is 
underlined by the use of expressions such as when an agreement “appears” to have 
the aim of restricting competition.38  This discretion ties in with the argument that 
in EU competition law a judge decides less as to what the standard of proof is, but 
instead to the persuasiveness of the evidence without being bound by pre-
determined evidentiary or probability “thresholds”.39  Hence, the object criterion is 
satisfied when the evidence is persuasive enough.40   The ‘effect’ criterion does not 
suffer from the same level of uncertainty in this regards as proving actual effects on 
a market is less subjective and far more measurable.  It is therefore helpful to 
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understand the types of indicators that aide the determination that an agreement 
restricts competition by object.41  One of those indicators is the subjective intention 
to restrict competition.42 
2.4. Subjective intention is not determinative when assessing object 
Subjective intention relates to whether the parties to an agreement themselves 
intend to restrict competition by entering into such agreements.  The European 
Courts have consistently found that subjective intention is not determinative when 
assessing the object of an agreement.  However, subjective intent can be taken into 
account as part of that determination: evidence of subjective intent on the part of 
the parties to restrict competition is a relevant factor, but not a necessary 
condition.43  Conversely, a lack of subjective intention whereby the parties argue 
they did not intend to restrict competition is not a defence.44  This is analogous with 
ignorance of the law being no defence. Instead, whether an agreement has the 
object of restricting competition depends on the content of the agreement and its 
extenuating circumstances (such as its implementation, and the parties’ conduct).45   
That the object of the agreement is dependent on objective manifestations 
supporting that aim is logical.  This is because the notion of subjective intention has 
complexities.  IAZ/Anseau is a good example of this.46  In that case, the parties 
denied they knew they were restricting competition, let alone had the intention of 
doing so.  The factual scenario concerned the restriction of parallel trade by use of a 
conformity label for washing machines and dishwashers.  The parties argued that 
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 See generally, eg (Bailey, 2012), (Jones, 2010), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation’. 
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 Other factors, such as the conduct of the parties, content, circumstances and context of the 
agreement were discussed in chapter 2.  
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 Article 81(3) Guidelines, para 22. Though no supporting citation provided. See IAZ/Anseau (supra 
n10); C-551/03 P General Motors v Commission [2006] ECR I-3173. 
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Mines and Rheinzink (CRAM) v Commission [1984] ECR 1679 and supra n43 General Motors. 
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the purpose of the agreement was to protect public health, not to restrict 
competition.  The CJEU rejected this argument.  It held that, if the parties who 
drafted the agreement were aware that the agreement, by looking at its terms, the 
legal and economic context in which it was concluded and to the conduct of the 
parties, had as its purpose the restriction of parallel imports; they acted 
deliberately by signing it.  This was regardless of whether or not they were aware 
that in so doing they were infringing Article 101(1) TFEU.47  In this case the Court 
found the legal and economic context did not support the argument raised by the 
parties that the purpose of their agreement was to protect public health.   
2.4.1. Odudu and intent 
The role of subjective intention has been extensively analysed by Odudu.  According 
to his early formula, subjective intention alone is proof of a restrictive object.48  This 
view was later modified: Odudu subsequently asserted that allocative inefficiency 
established by legal presumption has the object of restricting competition if it is 
based on either the concept of necessary effect, or if an outcome is intended 
(which he terms “intent based presumptions”).49  It is this latter contention that is 
of interest here.  Odudu claims that “if an outcome is intended it is more likely to 
occur than if that same outcome is not intended”.50  Therefore, intent is relevant, 
because undertakings are more likely to restrict competition when they intend to 
restrict competition.51  The use of the word ‘intention’ therefore has great 
significance in this context, particularly in view of its correlation with English 
criminal law.  Thus, the consideration of whether the intention needs to be 
subjective or objectively determined is pertinent.52    
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 Ibid, paras 23–25. 
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 (Odudu, 2001), ‘Object as subjective intention’.  See also the AG’s opinion in Case C-209/07 
Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers (Carrigmore) 
Meats Ltd [2008] ECR I-8637 (BIDS), which supports Odudu’s interpretation, paras 44-46. 
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 (Odudu, 2006), pp114, 127. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid, p121. 
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 For analogies with UK criminal law and the requirement of the ‘mens rea’ being satisfied by 
oblique intent see R v Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025; (Smith & Hogan, 2011) state that: (1) A 
consequence is intended when it is the accused's purpose. (2) A court or jury may also infer that a 
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According to Norrie when it is claimed a person intends to do something what is 
actually meant is that it is seen to be a virtually certain result of their action.53  This 
means that an outcome can be predicted if it is intended.54  For Odudu, this is 
sufficient to decide that ‘intent-based presumptions’ have the object of restricting 
competition.55  Odudu goes further, claiming that such intent based presumptions 
are irrebutable under Article 101(1) TFEU.56  This is not a comfortable conclusion.  
Technically, Odudu’s research may reveal that (based on outcomes) such intent-
based presumptions exist.57  However, the European Courts have not alluded to this 
phenomenon of intent based presumptions as a conclusive indicator that, by law, 
an agreement restricts competition by object.58  Instead, subjective intent is one of 
a number of factors that may be taken into account depending on the legal and 
economic context of the agreement.  It is understandable why Odudu submits that 
intent carries a predictive nature and thus justifies a legal presumption that 
“collusion with the intention to contrive a scarcity of output will lead to contrived 
scarcity of output”.59  From an economic perspective this formula may make sense, 
but irrebutable intent based presumptions ultimately detract from a legal analysis 
of an agreement in its own context in accordance with the test established in STM.  
A more compelling argument that could be deduced from Norrie’s hypothesis is 
that intent based presumptions form a useful policy basis for establishing a 
rebuttable presumption that Article 101(1) TFEU is infringed by object.   
More fundamentally, it is easy for parties to argue that an outcome was not 
intended.  Odudu recognises this problem and therefore agrees that intent should 
                                                                                                                                                      
consequence is intended, though it is not desired, when (a) the consequence is a virtually certain 
result of the act, and (b) the accused knows that it is a virtually certain consequence. 
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 (Odudu, 2006), p121 citing Norrie, ‘Oblique Intention and Legal Politics’ [1989] CrimLR 793-807, 
800-802.  Additionally, failure of that intention means that such a person will continue with a 
scheme until it succeeds. 
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 (Odudu, 2006), p122.  See also AG Trstenjak in BIDS (supra n48), para 45.  
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 Ibid, p127. 
56
 Ibid, p127. 
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 Ibid, pp121, 127. Though he qualifies his conclusion by stating that the content of such intent 
based legal presumptions must therefore be paid great attention. 
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 Rather judgments focus on the extenuating circumstances, content of the agreement, conduct of 
the parties etc. 
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 (Odudu, 2006), p121. 
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be objectively determined from “external manifestations”.60  Odudu reasons that to 
enhance deterrence, Article 101(1) TFEU must prohibit unsuccessful attempts, 
hence the presumption of intent is conclusive, and in particular, ex post conduct 
cannot be rebutted.61  This reasoning is more persuasive, though could be 
explained alternatively: that the prohibition of unsuccessful attempts to restrict 
competition is merely an elucidation of why the concrete effects of an agreement 
need not be demonstrated under the object heading.  As, based on its content and 
context, an agreement aimed to restrict competition.  This explanation better 
reflects the jurisprudence.62 
2.4.2. Conclusion 
It is clear from the case law that subjective intention can play a key role in 
establishing whether an agreement restricts competition by object.  However, in 
GSK the GC held that the agreement to restrict parallel trade, which was the 
admitted intention of the parties, did not have the object to restrict competition.  
Even though the Court of Justice overturned this by holding the agreement did have 
such an object, it highlights that basing a finding of object on subjective intent 
alone is insufficient.  Jones agrees, stating that “intention is determined objectively, 
so that the parties’ subjective intent cannot be relied upon to exculpate otherwise 
unlawful behaviour”.63   
2.5. Success and non-implementation of an agreement are extraneous  
As seen above, the jurisprudence demonstrates that for a finding of object under 
Article 101(1) TFEU it is not necessary to show an agreement is successful, nor that 
it was implemented, applied or enforced.64  This enhances the role of the object 
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criterion as a deterrent factor against undertakings seeking to restrict 
competition.65  
2.6. An agreement that restricts competition by object can still benefit from an 
Article 101(3) TFEU exemption.  
Technically, all agreements that infringe Article 101(1) TFEU can be exempted under 
Article 101(3) TFEU if all the conditions of Article 101(3) TFEU are met.66  Hence, 
restrictions by object have the possibility of exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.  
The relationship between the object criterion and Article 101(3) TFEU is considered 
in chapter 5.67   
2.7. Burden of proof 
Under Article 101(1) TFEU, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff, therefore usually 
the Commission.  The burden is shifted to the defendant under Article 101(3) 
TFEU.68  The question whether, when determining if the object of an agreement is 
to restrict competition, the burden can be shifted on to the defendant under Article 
101(1) TFEU, is discussed in chapter 4. 
2.8. Conclusion 
Even though common principles can be drawn out from the case law that are 
applicable under the three key approaches to the object criterion, this section 
highlights that they entail a degree of complexity.  Therefore, a deeper 
consideration of the issues is required in order to draw out the legal characteristics 
of the object criterion as well as reveal areas that still require clarity from the 
Courts.  The multifaceted legal nature of the object criterion has long been 
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concealed by policy and indeed economic and legal desires for ‘bright lines’.  The 
case law exposes a far more nuanced substantive provision.  Teasing these issues 
out and investigating their properties is an important step in revealing the legal 
essence of the object criterion.   
3. The definition of ‘object’: what does it mean?  
Given the centrality of the legal term ‘object’, it would be reasonable to assume 
that the Courts would have taken some trouble to define it.69  Having reviewed the 
case law, this assumption is unfounded.  On the contrary, defining the term has not 
been high on the Courts’ agenda.    Instead, the case law reveals that, depending on 
how the Courts approach the object criterion, the way it has been defined differs.  
Goyder notes that “it is hard to discern clear outlines of the concept of ‘object 
restriction’...no meaningful over-arching definition has emerged”.70  By using the 
three key approaches, how the Community Courts have tackled the meaning of the 
object criterion is illustrated in this section.  How legal presumptions and the 
concept of necessary effect impact on such definitions is also investigated, and a 
view as to which meaning should be given priority and why is proposed.         
3.1. The more analytical approach 
Under the more analytical approach the Community Courts place a greater onus on 
the term ‘object’ itself.  As highlighted in chapter 2, however, there is no single, 
absolute definition of the object concept in the case law of the Community Courts.  
Instead, the case law reveals at least seven different variants.  These terms are 
based on derivatives of the term ‘object’.   References to the object of an 
agreement have thus included the “precise purpose”,71 “purpose”,72 “aim”,73 
                                                     
69
 This can be contrasted with the Court’s clear definition of an “effect on trade between Member 
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 (Goyder, 2011), section I. 
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“intention”,74 “objective”,75 “objective function”,76 and the “design” of an 
agreement.77   
Under the MAAP, the definition of ‘object’ is intricately linked with the phraseology 
of Article 101(1) TFEU as a whole.78  As such, the term itself is nonsensical without 
reference to the context in which it operates.  Hence, ‘aim’ or ‘purpose’ relates 
intrinsically to the question of whether an agreement ‘aims’ to restrict competition.  
The literal wording of Article 101(1) TFEU therefore plays a key role in the definition 
of object restraints.79  This may seem an obvious point, but in the light of the 
dominance of the orthodox approach even this simple statement of fact has 
become muddied.  The inter-relationship with what constitutes a ‘restriction of 
competition’ therefore heavily influences the outcome of the application of this 
definition.80  For instance, what constitutes a restriction of competition is 
determined by, inter alia, competition law goals, economics, as well as those 
restrictions of competition identified in Article 101(1)(a)-(c) TFEU).81  In one sense, 
any so-called categorisation would encompass those restraints that are defined as a 
‘restriction of competition’, not what is contained in an ‘object box’.   
Establishing the aim of an agreement is an objective concept based on the content 
of the agreement in its specific legal and economic context, though - as described 
previously - the subjective intention of the parties may be relevant as may 
extenuating circumstances and conduct.  Therefore, defining object as the objective 
aim or purpose of an agreement to restrict competition provides a good degree of 
flexibility as opposed to the formalistic nature of the orthodox approach.  
Conversely, such flexibility brings its own degree of complexity.  This becomes 
apparent when the purpose of an agreement is said to be a positive or pro-
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competitive one.  This conundrum was evident in Asnef.82  Here, despite being a 
horizontal credit information exchange agreement, the Court focused on 
determining the ‘essential object’ of the agreement.  The Court found that its aim 
was to make relevant information on borrowers available to credit providers and 
therefore the agreement did not have the object of restricting competition.83   
The case law reviewed in chapter 2 revealed, that in some cases, an overriding 
positive aim can trump or discharge a prima facie finding of restriction by object 
under Article 101(1) TFEU.  This, arguably, is the view taken by the Courts in 
selective distribution cases.84  Conversely, in General Motors and cases such as 
BIDS, an agreement may be regarded as having a restrictive object even if does not 
have the restriction of competition as its sole aim, but also pursues other legitimate 
objectives which, in some cases, are also pro-competitive.85  This discrepancy could 
be attributed to the specific legal and economic context of an agreement.  Hence, 
better sense of the law would be gained by defining ‘object’ as the ‘precise 
purpose’ of an agreement.86  Taking account of the content, circumstances and 
context of the agreement, the object concept inquires whether the primary 
purpose of the agreement is to restrict competition.  The definition of ‘object’ is 
thereby interwoven with its application.  Whether an agreement is or is not 
successful, or not even implemented, is unimportant if the true purpose is to 
restrict competition.  What matters most is understanding the rationale behind the 
agreement.87 
3.2. The orthodox approach 
Defining ‘object’ under the orthodox approach is challenging.  In ENS, the GC 
deemed that when assessing an agreement containing “obvious restrictions of 
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competition” such as price-fixing, market sharing or control of outlets, such 
assessment does not require that account be taken of the legal and economic 
context.88  Subsequently, it can be reasoned that the orthodox approach suggests 
that object means ‘obvious restrictions of competition’ or in the Commission’s 
terms ‘hardcore restrictions’.89  The inference is that price fixing, market sharing 
and other similar ‘hardcore’ restrictions can be understood as being automatic or 
prima facie restrictions by object as they form part of a category of object 
agreements.   
Waelbroeck and Slater define the object concept as follows: 
“According to established case law, restrictions of competition by 
object are those which due to their very nature are highly likely to 
restrict competition, in other words ‘manifest’ or ‘patent’ 
restrictions which display a sufficient degree of harm.”90 
In support of this contention they cite one case, namely, the GC’s judgment in 
GSK.91  As demonstrated in chapter 2, this case does not support such a definition 
of the object concept.  This only serves to highlight the entrenchment of the 
orthodox approach.  Hence, the concept of object encompasses ‘obvious’, serious 
and easily identifiable restrictions of competition.  This is further corroborated by 
commentators such as Bennett and Collins for whom the object concept simply 
reflects their belief in the categorisation of the particular restraints.92  It is therefore 
“sufficient to demonstrate that the agreement fits into the object category and 
hence breaches Article 101(1)”.93  Likewise, Goyder asserts that the object concept 
is based on a category of restrictions, the precise scope of which is a crucial issue in 
                                                     
88
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any given case.94  To determine whether an agreement then restricts competition 
by object, the party alleging the infringement “need only show the presence of an 
agreement including such a restriction, and so does not need to establish the 
relevant market, or the degree of market power held by the undertaking 
concerned”.95   
The categorisation of object restrictions under the orthodox approach is thus its 
defining characteristic.  Understandably, the question regarding which restrictions 
are contained within the category features heavily in debate.  This is due, in 
particular, to its subsequent expansion over the years, which thereby questions 
how influential and/or important the concept of necessary effect is on the 
category.96   
3.3. The hybrid approach 
The hybrid approach draws heavily from the orthodox approach in terms of its 
interpretation of the legal nature of the object criterion.  In BIDS, notwithstanding 
the AG’s opinion, the Court described the distinction between object and effect in 
its own terms, which was a replication of its statement in T-Mobile.97  To reiterate, 
this was said to arise: 
“...from the fact that certain forms of collusion between undertakings 
can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper 
functioning of normal competition”.98 
Like the orthodox approach, this statement implies that there is a category of 
agreements that automatically restrict competition by object, ostensibly based on 
the notion of their necessary effect.  As noted in chapter 2, this contention was not 
wholly supported by the AG, who argued that the aim of an agreement usually, but 
not exclusively, relates to situations where the anticompetitive effects of a certain 
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type of agreement are known.99  Though the CJEU acknowledged in its judgments 
that agreements covered by Article 101(1)(a) to (e) TFEU do not form an exhaustive 
list of prohibited collusion.100 
This distinction drawn by the CJEU between object and effect has been replicated in 
nearly every judgment concerning the object concept post BIDS.101  Up until 11 
September 2014, the rationale behind this distinction was purely speculative, as the 
CJEU did not cite any case law in support of such distinction nor expound upon it.  
Ostensibly, the CJEU has now provided clarification on this point in Cartes 
Bancaires.102  The facts of the case relate to various pricing measures introduced by 
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) to balance the issuing and acquiring 
activities within the CB payment system in France.  CB was set up by the French 
banks to manage a system for bank card payments and withdrawal.  The measures 
largely consisted of a series of fees paid by CB members that varied depending on 
the type of membership.  Both the Commission and GC found the agreement 
restricted competition by object.  The CJEU, however, disagreed.    
The CJEU held that the case law shows “certain types of coordination between 
undertakings reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition that it may be found 
there is no need to examine their effects”.103  That case law “arises from the fact 
that certain types of coordination can be regarded, by their very nature, as being 
harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition.”104   Therefore: 
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“it is established that certain collusive behaviour, such as that leading to 
horizontal price fixing by cartels, may be considered so likely to have 
negative effects...that it may be considered redundant... to prove that 
they have actual effects on the market.  [Citing Guy Clair, para 22]  
Experience shows such behaviour leads to falls in production and price 
increases resulting in poor allocation of resources to the detriment...of 
consumers”.  
Moreover the object concept “can be applied only to certain types of coordination 
between undertakings which reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition that 
it may be found that there is no need to examine their effects.”105 
The CJEU therefore finds that the concept of necessary effect provides the rationale 
behind the distinction between object and effect first elucidated in BIDS.  It also 
berates the GC for finding that the object concept should not be given a strict 
interpretation, but does not then go on to define precise parameters for the 
categorisation of the object concept, acknowledging that Article 101(1) TFEU does 
not provide an exhaustive list of prohibited collusion.106  In fact, despite finally 
articulating the concept of necessary effect within its jurisprudence, the CJEU does 
not specifically cite any case law supporting its finding that experience leads to an 
apparent presumption of effects other than its reference to Guy Clair.107  
Furthermore, the CJEU has openly shifted emphasis on to a condition first 
established in STM, that to be restrictive by object an agreement must have a 
‘sufficient degree of harm’.   
At first blush, the CJEU suggests that this requirement is satisfied by certain types of 
collusion whose injurious effects on competition and indeed consumers are already 
known.  As such, only those types of collusion are able to satisfy a finding that they 
are restrictive by object as they entail a sufficient degree of harm.  Moreover, the 
CJEU reasoned that it is not enough merely to find that an agreement has the 
‘potential’ or is ‘capable’ of restricting competition, rather it must entail a sufficient 
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degree of harm.108  The CJEU distinguishes these notions and thus on its own 
understanding raises the standard of proof on the Commission.   
Therefore, under the hybrid approach, the CJEU has seemingly refined the 
definition of ‘object’ as meaning certain types of collusion that by their nature are 
injurious to competition as they entail a sufficient degree of harm.  This is owing to 
experience and explains why the effects of an agreement do not need to be 
demonstrated.  To summarise, object means presumption of effects.109  An 
important question is how this impacts on the application of the object criterion.  
As was clear in chapter 2, a reliance on necessary effect alone is not considered 
sufficient to explain this distinction between object and effect, nor to provide the 
justification for why the concrete effects do not require determination under the 
object heading. 
Placing so much emphasis on necessary effect creates problems.  Moreover, under 
the hybrid approach, any presumption of harm must be capable of rebuttal owing 
to the assessment of the agreement’s legal and economic context as prescribed in 
the STM Test.  These issues are considered below.   
3.4.  Legal Presumptions  
Before turning to the legal application of the object criterion, it is pertinent to 
comment more fully on the relationship between legal presumptions and the object 
criterion.110  The debate over legal presumptions and their association with the 
object qualification is particularly unclear and ill-defined.  One reason for this is the 
amount of differing and undefined terminology associated with this area.  For 
instance, legal presumptions under the object criterion are often inter-linked with 
the concept of ‘necessary effect’, ‘categorisation’ of object restraints, and 
agreements that ‘by their very nature’ restrict competition.   
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This section will concern itself with the fundamental question of whether the 
concept of object embodies a presumption of anticompetitive effects as a result of 
necessary effect or for alternative reasons.  Then, if such presumption exists, such 
restrictions embody a category of rebuttable or irrebuttable presumptions of 
effect.111  The position adopted in this thesis is perhaps a controversial one: it is 
contended that even the most ‘serious’ restrictions of competition carry no 
absolute presumption of harm and hence do not automatically restrict competition 
by object.112  As such, any presumption of effect is rebuttable within the context of 
Article 101(1) TFEU, and not just under Article 101(3) TFEU.  To this end, the 
following issues are examined: first, the definition of a ‘legal presumption’; then 
whether ‘hardcore’ restrictions are synonymous with restrictions by object; next 
the concept of necessary effect and its influence on the debate; and finally, the 
framework in which any legal presumptions are rebuttable under Article 101(1) 
TFEU. 
3.4.1.  Definition of a ‘legal presumption’ 
Legal presumptions have a number of functions and are created to support 
decision-makers.113  Presumptions can be evidential, substantive or procedural.114  
An evidential presumption is one where a party will typically need to prove certain 
facts in order for another fact to be inferred.  The result of such a presumption is to 
shift the burden of proof to the other party to prove the contrary is true, though 
the legal burden of proof is not necessarily shifted and remains with the party that 
it is originally held by.115  Substantive presumptions are often grounded in 
administrative or judicial experience in applying the law and are often “an 
expression of mainstream economic theory”.116  They may also be rebuttable or 
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conclusive.117  A procedural presumption is one where for procedural reasons, 
usually convenience, a presumption can be made, for example, under Article 10(6) 
of the EU Merger Regulation a merger is presumed compatible with the internal 
market if the Commission has not taken a decision on the merger within the 
prescribed time limits.118  From a procedural perspective, legal presumptions can 
also indicate the shift of the burden of proof from the party who has proved the 
fulfilment of the presumption to the party who could rebut such presumption.119      
Whether competition law in the EU has developed legal presumptions under Article 
101(1) TFEU in general is contested.  Bailey asserts that “legal reasoning creates 
presumptions in order to assist a decision-maker.  A fact or conclusion may 
(provisionally) be presumed because experience shows it is self-evident, or for 
reasons of public policy or procedural convenience”.120  Such presumptions can 
then be conclusive or rebuttable.  An oft-made analogy is the connection between 
hardcore restrictions and the object concept, which is examined below.   
3.4.2. Hardcore restrictions 
Whether ‘hardcore’ restraints (as determined by the Commission in its Article 81(3) 
Guidelines) are synonymous with restrictions by object is an issue that appeared to 
be largely resolved, though following the definition of the object criterion provided 
in Cartes Bancaires the question may have reopened.121  The Commission has long 
placed significance on the term in its soft law instruments and therefore it has 
strong associations with the object criterion.  Furthermore, the Commission claims 
hardcore restrictions of competition are presumed to restrict competition by object 
given their high potential for negative effects and serious nature based on 
experience.122   
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Chapter 2 evidenced that the case law on the whole does not support the notion 
that object and hardcore restrictions are one and the same.  STM suggests that any 
restriction of competition can infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object.  Moreover, 
there are cases where apparent ‘hardcore’ restrictions have been held not to 
infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object and conversely restrictions that are not 
usually seen to be ‘hardcore’ have been found restrictive by object.123  Goyder 
lends support to this view.124  She neatly summarises the position: “object 
restrictions of competition are conceptually different from ‘hardcore’ restrictions, 
even if the types of restriction they refer to overlap to a large extent...the 
Commission’s 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints conflate the two concepts”.125    
Despite such criticism of the Commission, Goyder labels the object concept as a 
category of agreements that have the necessary consequence of restricting 
competition.126  Even though the necessary consequence of an agreement forms 
the basis of her understanding of what constitutes an object restriction, she 
acknowledges - but moreover emphasises - that it is not sufficient simply to identify 
a restriction as a type that has been found to be ‘by object’ before.127  This is 
because she recognises that the analysis of an agreement’s object must go further 
and such considerations may “negate the presumption of infringement arising 
because the type of clause in question appears to be an object restriction”.128  More 
importantly, Goyder does not base the categorisation of object on the 
Commission’s understanding of the object concept, but rather on how object has 
been determined by the CJEU.129  Goyder is therefore an advocate of the hybrid 
approach. 
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It befell the Court in its Pierre Fabre judgment to settle the matter of whether 
hardcore restrictions and the object concept are synonymous.  The question 
referred to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling was whether “a general and absolute 
ban on selling contract goods to end-users via the internet...in fact constitutes a 
“hardcore” restriction of competition by object”.130  The CJEU swiftly recast the 
question pointing out that neither Article 101 TFEU nor Regulation No 2790/1999 
refers to the concept of ‘hardcore’.131  The Court reframed the question as whether 
the contractual clause at issue amounts to a restriction of competition by object.132   
Consequently hardcore restrictions and the object criterion are distinct concepts, 
though they do of course at times overlap.  
3.4.3. Necessary effect/necessary consequence/prior belief 
Closely linked with the concept of hardcore restraints is the tricky issue of 
necessary effect.  Chapter 2 briefly recounted what the concept means, but did not 
resolve whether it forms an absolute presumption of harm.133  A presumption of 
anti-competitiveness is said to arise in respect of certain agreements, which have 
the inevitable consequence of restricting competition.134  The concept of necessary 
effect is thus consistently used to justify two propositions: first, that it is the reason 
why the actual effects of an agreement do not need to be demonstrated under the 
object criterion, and secondly, that as a result there is a category of agreements 
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that are presumed to restrict competition by object.  Often these two concepts are 
not distinguished.  It is submitted that these propositions are not uncontentious.135     
The examination of the case law undertaken in Chapter 2, demonstrated that there 
is greater judicial support for the approach adopted in STM than that advanced in 
ENS.136  The approach in STM does not support the idea of legal presumptions, or 
alternatively, does not support irrebuttable legal presumptions of anti-competitive 
effect under Article 101(1) TFEU.  It is also clear from Consten & Grundig that the 
concept of necessary effect was not considered to justify the rule that no actual 
effects need be demonstrated under an object assessment.  The simple reason for 
this is that at the time of the judgment there was no body of case law or experience 
to draw on.  Moreover, the wording of Article 101(1) TFEU does not specifically link 
‘object’ with particular restrictions.  Instead, Article 101(1)(a)-(e) TFEU lists a 
number of examples of the types of agreements that restrict competition.  
Therefore it is unclear how some commentators argue the wording of Article 101(1) 
TFEU endorses the categorisation of those restrictions within an object category.137   
In fact, until the judgment in Cartes Bancaires the CJEU never offered a sufficient 
explanation for the no actual effects rule.138  Even the Commission offers no judicial 
support for the proposition.  In Cartes Bancaires the CJEU expanded upon the now 
well-known delineation between object and effect: that the case law shows 
“certain types of coordination reveal a sufficient degree of harm to competition 
that it may be found there is no need to examine their effects”.139  It went far 
further than in cases such as BIDS as it expressly used the concept of necessary 
effect as the rationale behind the object concept and the no actual effects rule.140  
Moreover the CJEU reiterates that the coordination must result in a ‘sufficient 
degree of harm’, which it pointedly differentiated from the ‘potential’ to restrict 
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competition.141  However, the CJEU’s choice of citation in support of these 
statements includes STM, BIDS and Guy Clair, which chapter 2 evidences do not 
unequivocally support the concept of necessary effect as the only rationale for the 
no actual effects rule.142 
The CJEU also muddies the water by using ambiguous phraseology, for example, 
that certain agreements “may be considered” harmful.143  Coupled with its 
requirement that an “analysis” of the coordination must reveal a sufficient degree 
of harm to competition determined on the basis of its content, objectives and 
economic and legal context, this suggests that any prior belief is capable of 
rebuttal.144  Therefore, relying purely on ‘necessary effect’ cannot be the only 
explanation for the no actual effects rule.  To date, the CJEU has not provided a 
convincing explanation. 
An alternative explanation for the rule is proffered in STM: if the agreement itself 
intends or has the ‘purpose’ of restricting competition, then that is enough to 
satisfy the object requirement.  This is based on the notion that EU competition law 
is also preventative or ex ante in nature.  Hence, it is irrelevant whether or not an 
agreement is successful.145  How this purpose is proven is objectively determined 
and relies heavily on what constitutes a ‘restriction of competition’ and thus the 
STM Test.  This means that even if an agreement contains an apparent ‘restriction 
of competition’ as listed in Article 101(1)(a) to (c) TFEU, it may not have that object 
when assessed in accordance with the principles of STM.146  The determinative 
question is whether the agreement is designed to restrict competition.147  The case 
law is unequivocal in demonstrating that even supposed hardcore restrictions of 
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competition have been found to come outside Article 101(1) TFEU or been found to 
be restrictive by effect and vice versa.148 
This alternative vision of the law as described under the MAAP is favoured over the 
concept of necessary effect as the only sustainable explanation of the object 
concept’s no actual effects rule.  The case law proves that prior experience of 
negative effects is not enough to taint an agreement with an anticompetitive 
object.  The Courts have, naturally, gained experience in applying Article 101(1) 
TFEU over the decades, so it is axiomatic that certain types of agreement tend to 
infringe competition by object more often than other types, in particular those 
agreements which are seen to be the most serious forms of collusion.149   As such, it 
makes sense that necessary effect plays a role in the assessment of object restraints 
and gives rise to legal presumptions of harm.  However, such presumptions are not 
absolute or determinative.150 
This view was shared by AG Mazák in Pierre Fabre who pointed out that “the 
anticompetitive object of an agreement may not...be established solely using an 
abstract formula”.151  Moreover:  
“...while certain forms of agreement would appear from past 
experience to be prima facie infringements by object, this does 
not relieve the Commission or a national competition authority of 
the obligation of carrying out an individual assessment of any 
agreement...while the inclusion of [hardcore] restrictions in an 
agreement would give rise to concerns regarding the conformity 
of that agreement with Article 81(1) EC and indeed, after 
examination of, inter alia, the particular agreement and the 
economic and legal context of which it forms a part, may in fact 
result in a finding of a restriction by object, there is no legal 
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presumption that the agreement infringes Article 81(1) EC...a 
individual examination is therefore required in order to assess 
whether an agreement has an anticompetitive object even where 
it contains a restriction which falls within the scope of [the 
Vertical Block Exemption Regulation].”152 
In BIDS, AG Trstenjak, was also clear that the necessary consequence of an 
agreement was not the only factor to be taken into consideration in an object 
assessment.153  She sided more closely with Odudu’s interpretation, finding that 
“when acting rationally undertakings will expect the agreement to have the effects 
which can reasonably be assumed according to the circumstances, with the result 
that they intended those effects at least to some extent.”154  Overall, the question 
of necessary effect requires a degree of sensibleness.  The case law does not uphold 
the notion that the object concept is based entirely on the concept of necessary 
effect.  It would, of course, be ludicrous to deny that necessary effect has any place 
in an object assessment.  However, it is not the sole nor overriding consideration in 
any assessment of an agreement by object under Article 101(1) TFEU.  That role is 
left to the ‘legal and economic context’.155 
3.4.3.1. Categorisation 
Associated with the concept of necessary effect is the ensuing belief that a category 
of agreements exist, which are ‘by their very nature’ restrictive by object.156  How 
this category of agreements is constituted is controversial,157 and in particular the 
question of whether it is narrow or widely construed.  Any widening of the object 
category is deemed concerning as raises the prospect of abuse should the 
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authorities be able to expand the category of nefarious agreements and thereby 
disengage in an effects assessment.158   
The interpretation of the law on the object concept as consisting of a category of 
agreements is a false friend.  It conveys an impression that is not consistently 
upheld by the CJEU.  In BIDS, the CJEU did not agree that the object concept relates 
to an exhaustive list of prohibited forms of collusion.159  Furthermore, the AG in 
BIDS did not support the argument that it can be inferred from ENS that the notion 
of restriction of competition by object is limited to ‘obvious’ cases.160  This is 
compounded by the case law which shows that agreements can indirectly restrict 
competition by object.161   
Categorisation is a useful policy tool as it gives undertakings guidance as to the 
types of agreement that are generally restrictive by object, but to rely on it as a 
legal mechanism is imprudent.  The judgment in Cartes Bancaires shows that 
“relying on pigeon holes or formal categories to identify object restrictions can 
often be misleading.”162  The interpretation of the law offered under the MAAP 
ensures that there is no emphasis on categorisation, particularly in view of how the 
object of an agreement is determined.163  The constant reference by the Courts to 
agreements that ‘by their very nature’ harm competition also gives an artificial 
impression.  Ideally, the term should be struck from the vocabulary of the object 
concept.  The case law shows that that it does not conclusively mean 
“independently of any competitive analysis”.164  If it merely refers to the ‘no effects’ 
rule, then the CJEU should clarify this.  What is clear is that the question of 
categorisation will continue to be debated.  The judgment in Cartes Bancaires 
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exacerbates this.  Indeed, some practitioners have hailed the judgment as 
confirming a narrow interpretation of restrictions by object.165   
3.4.4. Rebuttable legal presumptions versus no legal presumptions under Article 
101(1) TFEU 
Having acknowledged the relationship between the concept of necessary effect and 
the object criterion, this section examines whether legal presumptions of harm are 
rebuttable under Article 101(1) TFEU.166  It is clear that any such presumptions are 
not absolute.  This position owes itself partly to the conflict between the concept of 
necessary effect and the definition of the object criterion under STM, but in 
particular to the consideration of the legal and economic context.  The object 
criterion is thus context driven and fact specific.  Jones agrees that there are 
“undoubtedly possibilities of rebutting a presumption of illegality under...Article 
101(1) TFEU”.167  Those situations are “rare and hard to identify” and therefore 
could lead to a perception of per se illegality.168  For Jones, the starting point in an 
assessment of whether an agreement restricts competition by object is that: 
“...the restraints identified in past precedents have, in principle, as 
their object the restriction of competition, and it is only in 
exceptional circumstances that an analysis of the purpose of the 
agreement in its economic and legal context may indicate that the 
presumption of anticompetitive effects is inappropriate”.169      
Though this position improves on the orthodox approach, it diminishes the role of 
an agreement’s context.  Jones is correct to say that it is difficult to determine when 
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the presumption can be rebutted given the confused status of the case law.170  For 
her the answer to this question remains obscure.171   
The question of which agreements could give rise to a legal presumption of a 
restriction by object is a pertinent one.  An easy answer is that the concept of 
necessary effect plays a key role in identifying those restraints most likely to 
infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object.  Odudu has a more sophisticated answer, 
contending that “legal presumptions developed from experience or based on party 
intent that certain collusive conduct will result in allocative inefficiency”.172  Jones 
also has a two-pronged approach to what she terms the “categorisation” of object 
restraints, which have the “presumption of illegality” attached to them.173  She 
argues that the category of object restraints constitutes specific restraints that 
experience shows are likely to be anticompetitive, and “other arrangements whose 
anticompetitive nature is apparent from the objective it pursues and/or the context 
in which it operates”.174  Therefore she believes that “the category does not... 
comprise a finite list of conduct based on past precedent” as highlighted by the AG 
in BIDS.175   
The fact that legal presumptions can be rebutted under Article 101(1) TFEU (and 
not just under Article 101(3) TFEU) begs the question of who has that task: whether 
the burden of proof under Article 101(1) TFEU is reversed to fall onto the 
defendant. 
3.4.4.1. Reversing the burden of proof within Article 101(1) TFEU 
As discussed above, the definition of the object criterion under the MAAP does not 
support presumptions of illegality.  Conversely, the hybrid approach does.  Hence, 
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the following question of rebuttal is more pertinent to an understanding of the law 
postulated under the latter approach.   
It is clear that the onus of proof as regards a finding that an agreement restricts 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU rests on the plaintiff, usually the 
Commission.176  Whether the burden of proof can then be shifted onto the 
defendant to disprove a presumption of illegality by object under Article 101(1) 
TFEU is tricky.  Under the MAAP, the onus arguably remains at all times on the 
Commission to prove to the requisite level that the object of the agreement is to 
restrict competition.  An incorrect or incomplete assessment would open the 
Commission up to challenge.  The burden and standard of proof under the MAAP is 
clearly more demanding than under the orthodox approach.  The extent to which it 
is more demanding depends on the facts of the case.177  That is not to say, however, 
that the defendant cannot influence the outcome.  
Bailey submits that the legal burden remains on the competition authority to prove 
the infringement it is asserting.  However, the evidential burden of proving the facts 
in issue may shift between the parties.178  A number of commentators support the 
proposition that the defendant plays a role in rebutting a presumption under Article 
101(1) TFEU.  Andreangeli interprets AG Trstenjak in BIDS as accepting that “a party 
seeking to disprove the allegations of an infringement to prove the existence of 
‘elements of legal and economic context which could cast doubt on the existence of 
a restriction of competition’”.179  Odudu also supports this by stating that the effect 
of the presumption is to shift the burden of proof within Article 101(1) TFEU.180  He 
considers that it is for those engaged in the practice to demonstrate the absence of 
detrimental consequences.181       
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This interpretation is supported by the CJEU in FA.182  The Court did not believe the 
defendant (in this case the FA) to have provided sufficient evidence of 
circumstances within the legal and economic context to justify a finding that the 
agreement did not restrict competition by object.183  Mahtani surmises that the 
Court did not clarify precisely when a prima facie breach by object will not result in 
a restriction by object, “although it seems to have been the FA’s burden to 
discharge”.184  Thus, the shift in the evidential burden of proof is a valid argument: 
in FA it was for the parties to provide convincing evidence “falling within the 
economic and legal context”, to disprove that the agreement was not liable to 
impair competition and therefore not have an anticompetitive object.185   
Nevertheless, the issue of rebuttal is far from straightforward.  Odudu suggests that 
it is possible to disprove detrimental consequences, which - if one believes that 
object means ‘necessary effect’ or ‘presumption of effect’ - then dilutes the sense 
of that concept.186  Additionally, the concept of necessary effect is supported by the 
common rule that the success of an agreement is irrelevant to a finding by object.  
Hence, the real issue is the need to understand what the function of any such 
rebuttal is.  For instance, is its role to rebut: (i) the legal presumption of harm, that 
is, restrictive effects and/or, (ii) that particular agreements are automatically 
considered restrictive by object, or (iii) that the aim of the agreement to restrict 
competition?  The answer to this remains unclear.  It arguably depends on how the 
object criterion is assessed.  The orthodox approach does not permit presumptions 
of negative effects to be rebutted, whereas the hybrid approach suggests that 
presumptions of harm are capable of rebuttal, either because the aim of an 
agreement is not to restrict competition despite containing a prima facie object 
restraint, or because the detrimental consequences can be disproved.  Although 
technically the MAAP demands that the plaintiff must prove an agreement has the 
purpose of restricting competition, it recognises necessary effect as a relevant 
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factor in such assessment.  Hence, parties would be wise to adduce evidence to 
rebut any presumptions of harm and prove that the agreement was not designed to 
restrict competition.       
This issue is aided by Bailey who argues that there should be no conclusive 
substantive or evidential presumptions in EU competition law.187  Moreover, he 
considers that what may suffice as convincing evidence to rebut a presumption and 
the ease with which this is done will vary depending on the presumption in 
question.188  Ultimately this underlines, again, how dependent the assessment of 
the object criterion is on the facts of the case.  Indeed, the case law suggests that it 
is for the plaintiff to convince the Court it sufficiently assessed whether an 
agreement has the object or effect to restrict competition.189   
The contention is, therefore, that ultimately the legal burden under Article 101(1) 
TFEU remains with the Commission, though the defendant can produce evidence 
demonstrating why the burden should be rebutted.190  Evidently, the consideration 
of an agreement’s specific legal and economic context is key to such a finding.191  
Hence the application and assessment of the object criterion under Article 101(1) 
TFEU is considered closely in chapter 4, which focuses on the role of the legal and 
economic context.  
3.4.5. Conclusion: presumptions of harm 
This section examined whether there are legal presumptions that particular 
restraints restrict competition by object due to their known negative effects.  The 
outcome is that there are no absolute legal presumptions: under the MAAP any 
agreement is capable of restricting competition by object whereas under the hybrid 
approach any such presumptions are capable of rebuttal.192  The role of necessary 
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 (Bailey, 2010), IV, E. 
188
 Ibid, III.C. 
189
 See both GSK judgments, GC judgement in particular (supra n9 and n10).   
190
 (Svetlicinii & Sad, 2011), III (3), p351. 
191
 See chapter 4. 
192
 Odudu agrees the presumption of necessary consequence is rebuttable as was successfully 
demonstrated in the GC’s judgment in GSK and in O2: (Odudu, 2009). 
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effect is significant in this regard.  It is axiomatic that, after 60 years of case law, 
experience will now play a part in the determination of infringements of 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU.  However, the concept of necessary effect is 
not sufficient justification for a category of restrictions to exist, by law, which can 
be said to automatically restrict competition by object.  Even if such a category of 
agreements were to exist, then it would need to be flexible.193  As such, the value of 
categorisation is limited given its fluidity.  How the CJEU grapples with this issue 
unfortunately becomes no clearer with time.194  Moreover, the presence of the 
legal and economic context in every assessment of object reinforces this view.  The 
question as to whether the burden of proof within Article 101(1) TFEU shifts on to 
the defendant can nonetheless be answered by reference to Bailey’s interpretation.  
The evidential burden may shift, but ultimately the legal burden under Article 
101(1) TFEU to prove that an agreement has the object of restricting competition 
remains with the plaintiff.    
3.5. The definition of ‘object’: conclusion 
This section was tasked with assessing how the Courts have defined (if at all) the 
object criterion.  This exercise revealed that the definition is dependent on the 
context in which it is delivered, namely, whether under the MAAP, the orthodox 
approach or the hybrid approach. 
Under the MAAP, the object of an agreement is understood as whether its ‘precise 
purpose’ is to restrict competition and thus is an open-ended enquiry as any type of 
agreement has the propensity to restrict competition under this guise.195  
Conversely, the orthodox and hybrid approaches do not turn on a literal definition 
of the term, rather a notion that the object criterion relates to serious and 
ostensibly obvious restrictions of competition, which ‘by their very nature’ infringe 
Article 101(1) TFEU.  Hence, the notion of ‘object’ rests on a category of 
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 Further, any category would only be based on judgements of the European Courts and not on 
pronouncements by the Commission. 
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 See eg Cartes Bancaires (supra n101). 
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 The relationship between the object concept and what constitutes a restriction of competition is 
considered in chapter 5. 
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agreements that automatically restrict competition, primarily due to their 
necessary effect.   
These definitions appear to conflict and can immediately be seen as capable of 
producing different results.  For instance, under the MAAP it is perfectly 
conceivable (though that is not to suggest it is likely) that restrictions that are not 
obvious or prima facie hardcore may be found to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by 
object.  Conversely, the orthodox approach applies to obvious restrictions based on 
their known negative effects.  The concept of necessary effect is a key driver in the 
interpretation of the object criterion under both the orthodox and hybrid 
approaches.  However, chapter 2 found that, on the whole, the MAAP benefits from 
greater judicial support.  Its attributes as regards the definition of the object 
criterion are clear; it is flexible and has the ability to adapt to changing economic 
circumstances in view of its close association with what constitutes a ‘restriction of 
competition’.  Hence, the definition of the object criterion should follow the 
MAAP’s interpretation.  The merits of the MAAP versus the hybrid and orthodox 
approaches cannot be appropriately assessed, however, until the application of the 
object criterion is investigated.196    
Having explained the way in which the three approaches define ‘object’, this 
chapter closes the discussion on its meaning.  The next chapter, therefore, hones in 
on how the object of an agreement is determined under the MAAP.  To this end, it 
focuses on the application of the legal and economic context, which is the 
cornerstone that underpins our understanding of the notion of restrictions of 
competition by object. 
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 See chapter 4. 
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Chapter 4: Applying the object concept to agreements in accordance 
with the MAAP 
1. Introduction 
Building upon the legal analysis of the meaning of the object concept in accordance 
with the jurisprudence of the European Courts, this chapter examines the 
application of the object concept under Article 101(1) TFEU.  Chapter 3 identified 
that, under the MAAP, the object concept means the ‘precise purpose’ of an 
agreement.  How that purpose is then determined in accordance with the more 
analytical approach is the focus of this chapter.   
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, it considers the application of the legal and 
economic context.  This comprises an investigation of its definition and how it 
determines an agreement’s purpose with reference to influences such as legitimate 
goals/ objectives and ancillary restraints.  How the legal and economic context may 
be used as tool to rebut presumptions of harm is also reflected upon.  Secondly, it 
asks how restrictive effects impact on the application of the legal and economic 
context, including use of the counterfactual.  Thirdly, it examines how other 
commentators have rationalised the case law on the object criterion and highlights 
the subtle differences between the MAAP and hybrid approaches in respect of 
presumption rebuttal.  Finally, it will make a judgment from a purely legal 
perspective as to what is the best interpretation of ‘restrictions of competition by 
object’.  It will conclude that, based on a granular investigation of the case law, the 
best interpretation of the object criterion is in accordance with the MAAP. 
2. Legal and economic context 
The direction of recent case law has driven attention towards the pivotal role of the 
legal and economic context in determining the object of an agreement.1  The 
                                                     
1
 Such as the Game Changer Cases and more recently Case C-32/11, Allianz Hungária Biztosító Zrt v 
Gazdasági Versenyhivatal, 14 March 2013, nyr (Allianz Hungária); Case C-439/09 Pierre Fabre 
Dermo-Cosmétique SAS v Président de l’Autorité de la concurrence, [2001] ECR I-9419 (Pierre Fabre); 
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European Courts have consistently reiterated the significance of context to an 
object assessment in nearly every judgment since BIDS.  This is largely due to the 
consistent citation of STM.  Determining an agreement’s object within its legal and 
economic context is therefore not a choice, it is a legal requirement.2  Despite the 
recognition of its importance, the precise boundaries of the legal and economic 
context and hence its role in the assessment of agreements under Article 101(1) 
TFEU necessitates examination.   
A useful starting point is to examine the AG’s Opinion in BIDS.  AG Trstenjak dealt 
specifically with the issue of the legal and economic context and her opinion 
highlights how it impacts on the outcome of a determination by object, and notes 
the various issues that can be taken into account under its umbrella.3  As seen in 
chapter 2, the Advocate General insisted that the legal and economic context “must 
be taken seriously”, though it should not be “seen as a gateway for any factor which 
suggests that an agreement is compatible with the common market”.4  Instead, 
only the elements of the legal and economic context which may cast doubts on the 
existence of a restriction of competition can be taken into account.5  The AG 
thereby suggested that the legal and economic context is a means by which to 
question and rebut legal presumptions of anti-competitiveness under Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  She recognised that presumptions play a role in the determination of the 
object of an agreement, but also that such presumptions are rebuttable within the 
context of Article 101(1) TFEU.  In this guise, she has supported the hybrid 
approach.  
AG Trstenjak recounted three categories where the “assumption of a restriction of 
competition” could be rebutted as a result of an investigation into the legal and 
                                                                                                                                                      
Case C-67/13 P, Groupement des Cartes Bancaires (CB) v Commission, 11 September 2014, nyr 
(Cartes Bancaires). 
2
 Andreangeli notes that even though the CJEU in BIDS found that the arrangements constituted an 
inherently ‘obvious’ infringement which justified a presumption of anti-competitive effects, the CJEU 
still expressly chose to analyse the arrangement against its legal and economic context: 
(Andreangeli, 2011), p225. 
3
 Case C-209/07 Competition Authority v Beef Industry Development Society Ltd and Barry Brothers 
(Carrigmore) Meats Ltd [2008] ECR I-8637 (BIDS), paras 50-59. 
4
 Ibid, para 50. 
5
 Ibid, para 50. 
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economic context.6  These are: (i) when a limitation on the freedom of undertakings 
to determine their policy on the market independently has no effects in relation to 
competition;7 (ii) where an agreement is ambivalent in terms of its effects on 
competition (that is, it has a pro-competitive aim) and there is a necessary 
restriction of the requirement of independence; and (iii) ancillary agreements which 
are necessary in order to pursue a primary objective.  In this last respect, where the 
primary objective is neutral or promotes competition then the ancillary restrictions 
are necessary to achieve that aim and so do not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.8       
Arguably, the legal and economic context does not simply provide a rebuttal 
mechanism for legal presumptions, but provides the scope to assess whether an 
agreement has the primary purpose of restricting competition.  This can be 
achieved by applying the counterfactual, the ancillary restraints doctrine and 
assessing whether a restriction in an agreement has a legitimate objective or is 
objectively justified.9  The case law is not entirely clear in this respect, particularly 
as regards the law on an agreement having multiple purposes and legitimate 
aims.10  Nevertheless, it does permit tentative conclusions to be drawn, particularly 
with a view to how the law could be applied in the future.  
2.1. Definition 
As with the phrase ‘of its nature’, what constitutes the ‘legal and economic context’ 
is rarely defined. Mahtani complains that there is insufficient clarity to show how 
the application of the legal and economic context should be applied to cases and 
that it has been invoked inconsistently.11     Certainly, the definition is wide and has 
the propensity to encompass any aspect of analysis of an agreement needed to 
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 Ibid, paras 51-54. 
7
 See eg (Mahtani, 2012), p37.  He interprets this as an application of a form of the counterfactual. 
8
 Ibid, p37.  Mahtani likens the final two categories as being similar to when a prima facie object 
restriction is balanced against a legitimate commercial purpose and the conduct is necessary to 
achieve that purpose. 
9
 See Joined Cases C-403 & 429/08, Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure and Karen 
Murphy v Media Protection Services Ltd, [2011] ECR I- 9083 (FA), para 140.  Cf (Mahtani, 2012), p19. 
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 See eg supra n3, BIDS; Joined Cases C-96/82 etc, IAZ v Commission/ ANSEAU [1983] ECR 3369; cf 
supra n1, Pierre Fabre. 
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 (Mahtani, 2012), p26. 
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determine its object.12  STM provides the best indication of the factors, particularly 
economic ones, that should be taken into account when considering the object of 
an agreement.13  These factors have already been documented.14  What is pertinent 
is that such factors are applicable to determining both object and effect.15  This 
level of assessment indicates that defining the market would not be a step too far in 
order to apply the STM Test.  In fact, it may be necessary to understand not only 
one market, but the relationship between two or more markets.16  L’Oréal also 
supports such conclusion.17  The case law review in chapter 2 demonstrates how 
extensively the European Courts have looked at the market concerned, the position 
of the parties on that market, the nature of the product or services and the 
surrounding circumstances of the agreement when carrying out an examination of 
the object criterion.  Hence, the economic context relates to the specific context of 
the agreement itself: what were the circumstances of its implementation and why, 
what is the background to the agreement as well as what were the market factors 
and the position of the parties within that market.  Ultimately, the Court is asking, 
what is the agreement’s genesis?   
The extent to which such analysis is undertaken varies from case to case.18  It is 
consistently reiterated by the Courts, and indeed by commentators, that the 
context refers to the specific context of the particular case.19  As such, each case is 
considered on its merits and unique circumstances.20  From the perspective of the 
MAAP, the goal of assessing an agreement in its legal and economic context is not 
to prove that the agreement has the actual effect of restricting competition,21 but 
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 This view is supported by the CJEU in Cartes Bancaires, para 78 (supra n1).  See also paras 77-90. 
13
 Confirmed in Allianz Hungária and Cartes Bancaires (supra n1). 
14
 See the STM Test (chapter 2). 
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 Case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière V Maschinenbau Ulm [1966] ECR 235, (STM), 250.  
Reinforced by cases such as Allianz Hungária. 
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 See supra n1, Cartes Bancaires, paras 73-82, which considered two-sided markets. 
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 Case C-31/80 L’Oréal NV and L’Oréal SV v De Nieuwe AMCK PVBA [1980] ECR 3775, para 19. 
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 See eg STM (supra n15).   
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 See (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013), para 4.19 onwards; (Jones, 2010), Left Behind By Modernisation?  
Indeed the GC rebuked the Commission in Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v 
Commission [2006] ECR II-2969 for simply looking at past precedents without proper reference to 
the agreement’s context, para 138. 
20
 See (Lasok QC, 2008). 
21
 Thereby distinguishing itself from ‘effect’. 
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simply to ascertain whether the true purpose (that is, the object) of the agreement 
is to restrict competition.22  Under the hybrid approach, there is an additional 
challenge.  The use of the legal and economic context is also required to determine 
if a presumption of anti-competitiveness can be rebutted.  As will be seen, despite 
the Courts alluding to the application of the hybrid approach when describing the 
distinction between object and effect, in many cases they are in fact looking to 
determine the aim of the agreement when applying the legal and economic 
context.23  Considering the context of an agreement to determine an agreement’s 
purpose may encompass, inter alia, assessing its potential effects.  Therefore, the 
economic context of an agreement is wide-ranging and by its nature unspecific.  
Yet, it cannot be comfortably described as completely ‘abstract’.24      
The ‘legal context’ on the other hand presumably consists of the relevant law, such 
as the case law of the European Courts, and any relevant Directives, Regulations or 
other applicable national laws or regulatory frameworks, including the legal or 
regulatory context within which the parties to the agreement operate.  These 
factors suggest that past precedent is a factor to be taken into consideration.  This 
requirement needs to be balanced against the economic context of the agreement.  
Notably, the CJEU has not always referred specifically to an agreement’s ‘legal’ 
context, instead specifying the consideration of its ‘economic’ context.25  The 
implications of this inconsistency are unclear though probably immaterial, as 
arguably taking account of an agreement’s legal context can be inferred from the 
requirement that the general circumstances of the agreement should be considered 
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 See eg (Ibáñez Colomo, 2014), ‘Groupement des cartes bancaires and the resilience of the case law 
on restrictions by object’. 
23
 See eg BIDS (supra n3). 
24
 Cf, opinion in Case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim v Dansk Landbrugs Grovvareselskat AmbA [1994] ECR I-
5641 (Gøttrup-Klim).  This understanding of ‘context’ subjects the MAAP to criticism from 
proponents of categorisation who value bright lines and legal certainty. 
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 The judgment in Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Etablissements Consten SA and Grundigverkaufs-GmbH 
v Commission, [1966] ECR 342 (Consten & Grundig) introduced the notion of the ‘legal and 
economic’ context, though judgments such as Case C-5/69 Franz Völk v SPRL Ets J Vervaecke [1969] 
ECR 295 (Völk) do not refer specifically to the ‘legal’ context. 
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in any assessment of an agreement’s object.26  Nevertheless, the CJEU usually now 
refers to the ‘legal and economic context’ of an agreement.27 
To demonstrate how wide ranging the application of the legal and economic 
context is, the section below focuses on three areas.  It will examine how context is 
used as a medium: (i) to undertake a form of balancing exercise by balancing the 
positive attributes of an agreement against its negative attributes; (ii) to consider 
the applicability of an objective justification or legitimate aim; and (iii) to consider 
whether particular restrictions are ancillary to an overall pro-competitive object.   
2.2. Applying the legal and economic context to determine the precise purpose of 
an agreement: balancing the positive aims of an agreement against negative ones 
Any proposal to balance the positive and negative attributes of an agreement is 
contentious as it leads, inevitably, to comparisons with the US rule of reason.  As 
has been clearly established by the Courts (regardless of whether that 
interpretation is correct), the rule of reason does not have a role in EU competition 
law, more specifically within the context of the effect analysis.28  Therefore, as with 
references to ‘per se’, the rule of reason does not provide an appropriate analogy 
under EU law for the balancing process that sometimes occurs under Article 101(1) 
TFEU.29  Instead, this process can be viewed somewhat differently: the question is 
whether a pro-competitive aim of an agreement has the power to trump particular 
restrictions of competition contained within it.30  Chapter 2 revealed that there 
have been a number of cases where, when assessed under the object criterion, the 
positive attributes of an agreement have either outweighed the negative attributes 
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 See eg Case C-23/67, Brasserie De Haecht v Wilkin (no.1), [1967] ECR 407; and Anseau/IAZ (supra 
n10).  In C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission (GSK) [2009] ECR I-9291 (GSK), 
paras 61-64 the CJEU referred to the fact that agreements aimed at limiting parallel trade are, in 
principal, prohibited by object.  See chapter 2.   
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 See eg Pierre Fabre; Cartes Bancaires, para 53 (supra n1). 
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 See Andreangeli’s analysis of the balancing undertaken by the European Courts under Article 101 
TFEU: (Andreangeli, 2011), p227 onwards. 
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 See eg Case T-328/03, O2 (Germany) GmbH & Co OHG v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1231, Case C-
519/04P, Meca-Medina v Commission, [2006] ECR I-6991, Case C-309/99, Wouters v Algemene Raad 
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so that the agreement did not restrict competition by object or were not 
considered sufficient to excuse the application of object.31 
Knowing quite when the positive attributes of an agreement will trump an 
application of the object criterion is difficult.  This is because the case law 
establishing the MAAP proposes that the legal and economic context should 
determine whether such attributes will be successful in a particular case.  
Therefore, it is not possible to predict with certainty whether the factors that were 
successful in rebutting a restriction by object in one case will be equally as 
successful in another case.  The outcome will depend on the facts of the case.32  It is 
of course helpful nevertheless to understand when the European Courts look at the 
positive attributes of an agreement and in what circumstances those attributes 
either fail or succeed to rebut a presumption of restriction of competition by 
object, bringing an agreement outside Article 101(1) TFEU entirely or warrant that 
its ‘effect’ requires determination.33 
Under the MAAP it is conceivable that an agreement that has a pro-competitive aim 
could be found not to restrict competition by object despite containing apparent 
‘by object’ restrictions.  The question for consideration is: how is the primary 
purpose of the agreement determined if an agreement has an apparently pro-
competitive aim, but otherwise contains restrictions of competition?  In responding 
to this question, the case law has produced some interesting answers.   
In Asnef Equifax a horizontal credit information exchange agreement was held not 
to have the object of restricting competition as its “essential object” was to make 
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 See eg Case C-41/69 ACF Chemiefarma v Commission [1970] ECR 661.  In Anseau/IAZ (supra n10) 
the purpose of the agreement (to counter a shortage of raw materials and to protect the public 
health respectively) was not enough to invalidate the anticompetitive object of the agreement. In C-
27/87 Erauw-Jacquery v La Hesbignonne [1983] ECR 1919 (Louis Erauw) absolute territorial 
protection was not held to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU and, in fact, came outside it as the Court 
recognised it was important that persons should be allowed to protect their financial investment in 
developing their products.  Whereas in Völk (supra n25, paras 5-7), ATP was held to come outside 
Article 101(1) TFEU as the effect on the market was insignificant, which was established by a 
reference to the actual circumstances of the agreement. 
32
 See supra n9 FA, paras 140, 143. 
33
 Scholars such as Jones, Andreangeli, Goyder, Mahtani and Odudu have also found no consistent 
rational explanation or methodology and have thus proffered their own conclusions. 
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available to credit providers relevant information about existing or potential 
borrowers.34  Therefore, its positive attributes outweighed the fact that it was a 
horizontal information exchange agreement.  The CJEU has viewed selective 
distribution agreements in a similar vein.  In AEG, the Court found that the object of 
the agreement was to improve competition and therefore particular restrictions of 
competition were justified.35  In Pierre Fabre the AG articulated very well the 
inherent balancing that takes place as regards selective distribution systems.36  He 
emphasised that “an individual examination is...required in order to assess whether 
an agreement has an anticompetitive object even where it contains a restriction 
which falls within the scope of [the VBER]”.37   When allowing absolute territorial 
protection (ATP) in Louis Erauw, the Court explained that plant breeders need to 
protect their financial investment when developing products.38  In that case, the 
Court considered that such a clause would fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU.39  
Conversely, in Asnef the CJEU found that the register did not have a restrictive 
effect.  It appears that once an agreement is not found restrictive by object the 
circumstances of the case dictate whether it then falls outside Article 101(1) TFEU 
or must be assessed by effect.40     
These cases show that there is clear precedent for a positive, pro-competitive 
purpose of an agreement to be taken into account and actively balanced against 
the restrictions contained in the agreement under the object criterion.  
Furthermore, a positive aim may trump a finding that any related restraints have 
the object of restricting competition.  In these instances, those restrictions do not 
outweigh the benefits of the positive aim of the agreement and therefore should be 
                                                     
34
 Case C-238/05, Asnef-Equifax, Servicios de Información sobre Solvencia y Crédito, SL v Asociación 
de Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc), [2006] ECR I-11125 (‘Asnef’).  This point is also noted 
by (Jones, 2010), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation’, pp649, 652. 
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 C-107/82 AEG-Telefunken v Commission [1983] ECR 3151. 
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 Pierre Fabre, footnote 39 of the opinion and paras 35, 42 and 52 of the opinion (supra n1). 
37
 Ibid, para 30. 
38
 Louis Erauw, paras 10-11 (supra n31).  Though the reasoning for this decision could also be 
attributed to the fact such restrictions are ancillary to the main purpose of the agreement. 
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 Ibid, paras 10-11. This can be contrasted with a different approach that the Court adopted in Völk 
(supra n25, paras 5-7).  Here, the Court held that any restriction of competition will not be a 
restriction by object if the effect on the market is insignificant. In fact, in such cases the agreement 
would fall outside Article 101 TFEU entirely. 
40
 This is considered further below. 
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assessed by reason of their ‘effect’ or fall outside Article 101 TFEU entirely.  
Whether this is a true case of ‘balancing’ is, however, a matter of labelling.  Any 
such balancing is not concerned merely with weighing the effects of an agreement 
(though these may be taken into consideration).  It could instead be described as a 
method by which the Court establishes the primary purpose of the agreement, and 
finding that on the facts, restrictions required to achieve that (pro-competitive) end 
are justified.41    
The best examples of this kind of balancing are seen when the Courts assess 
selective distribution agreements.  In Pierre Fabre the Court held a restriction of an 
absolute ban on internet sales was a step too far: it was not justifiable.42  The Court 
took this a step further by pronouncing that selective distribution agreements were 
“restrictions by object” in the absence of “objective justification”.43  Understanding 
the law in accordance with the MAAP does not support such a proposition.  
Selective distribution agreements are not automatically designated or categorised 
as restrictions by object.  Instead, it is perhaps more appropriate to say that they 
“necessarily restrict competition”, that is, they restrict competition.44  The AG made 
the point in a more adroit fashion, “the mere fact that the selective distribution 
agreements in question...may restrict parallel trade may not in itself be sufficient to 
establish that the agreement has the object of restricting competition pursuant to 
Article 101(1)”.45     
The main point of interest in Pierre Fabre was the reference by the Court to 
“objective justification”.46  This pointed to an open acknowledgment that an 
agreement can escape a finding of object if it can be objectively justified, which 
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 The notion that the analysis of the object of an agreement must reveal a sufficient degree of 
impairment of competition is also pertinent in this regard: the scope of factors that may be 
considered under the STM Test is broad.  See, FA, para 135 (supra n9). 
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 Supra n1 Pierre Fabre.  See (Mahtani, 2012), p37.  
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 Ibid, Pierre Fabre, para 39. 
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 Ibid, Pierre Fabre para 39.  No further cases can be found linking object with selective distribution 
agreements. 
45
 Ibid, Pierre Fabre, opinion, para 42.  The Court ostensibly followed the AG’s opinion, though 
couched certain elements of the opinion in its own terms, which due to the nuances in language 
involved inevitably leads to an entirely different interpretation.  This is not a lone example of such 
careless law-making. 
46
 The position taken by the CJEU is correct and has precedent, see chapter 2. 
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implies that any legal presumption of anti-competitiveness is capable of being 
rebutted within Article 101(1) TFEU.  Moreover, justification of a restriction of 
competition by object requires a form of balancing between the positive versus the 
negative attributes of an agreement.47  Furthermore, such analysis is based on the 
facts of the particular case in issue in its unique legal and economic context.48  If the 
purpose of an agreement is to improve competition then - particularly in the 
context of selective distribution agreements - so long as certain criteria are met (in 
this instance, the Metro criteria) an agreement will not be held to restrict 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU.  The significance here is that those types of 
agreement do not then require analysis under the effect criterion to determine 
their actual effects.  Therefore the Courts have shown willingness to devise criteria 
to allow what are, ultimately, pro-competitive agreements to come outside Article 
101(1) TFEU entirely.  The fact that the Courts are prepared to do this would 
suggest that they are also prepared to allow other types of restraints in other 
circumstances.  Ultimately, it highlights how limiting the orthodox approach is.  It 
does not cater for these anomalies in the case law.49 
To therefore reflect the so-called ‘balancing’ of the positive aims of an agreement 
under the legal and economic context, the best definition of ‘object’ under MAAP is 
confirmed as the ‘precise purpose’ of the agreement. 
Another case where the Court balances the pro-competitive aspects of an 
agreement despite acknowledging known negative effects on competition (that is, 
the necessary consequence of the agreement) was that of Wouters.50  The CJEU 
held that a national regulation adopted by a body such as the Bar of the 
Netherlands did not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU, since that body could reasonably 
have considered that the regulation, despite the restrictive effects inherent in it, 
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 Supra n1, Pierre Fabre, para 40. 
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 Ibid, paras 39 to 47, in particular para 47. 
49
 Ibáñez Colomo believes AG Wahl in Cartes Bancaires understands the significance of context when 
determining if “an agreement is a plausible source of efficiency gains”, that is, only agreements that 
have no credible redeeming features will restrict competition by object: (Ibáñez Colomo, 2014), 
‘Chapeau bas, Prof Wahl’. 
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 Supra n30, Wouters.  See also (Jones, 2010), ‘Left Behind by Modernisation’, p666. 
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was necessary for the proper practice of the legal profession within the Member 
State concerned.51  Moreover, the Court maintained that “not every agreement 
between undertakings or every decision of an association of undertakings which 
restricts the freedom of action of the parties or of one of them necessarily falls 
within the prohibition laid down in Article 101(1) of the Treaty”.52  This case 
demonstrates perfectly, that an agreement that has known negative effects on 
competition can still fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU entirely if the restraints are 
necessary to support the ultimate aim of the agreement, in this case, to regulate 
the legal profession.  The Court clearly showed how it weighed up the positive 
attributes of the agreement against the negative ones with an eye firmly on a 
Member State’s ability to regulate its legal profession.53   
2.3. Legitimate goals/aims/objectives and objective justifications 
Alongside the idea that a pro-competitive purpose can lawfully allow certain 
restrictions of competition to be contained within an agreement without infringing 
Article 101(1) TFEU, is the concept of an agreement having a ‘legitimate 
goal/aim/objective’.54  The Courts use of these phrases has not always been 
consistent.  Therefore, the overlap with what constitutes a ‘positive aim’ or 
‘purpose’ of an agreement can be considerable, and in many cases probably means 
the same thing.  If there were a distinction between having a legitimate aim versus 
a positive purpose, it could be as follows: the European Courts have said in a 
number of cases that simply having a ‘legitimate goal’ is not enough to bring an 
agreement outside the realms of Article 101(1) TFEU or to escape a finding of 
restriction by object.55  This was aptly demonstrated in BIDS, where the ‘legitimate 
goal’ of the agreement, as argued by BIDS, was to address the overcapacity in the 
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Irish processing industry.56  Hence, the issue was considered at length by AG 
Trstenjak.57 
Her strategy was first to determine if the purpose of the agreement was to restrict 
competition, and if that was found to be the case then to consider whether a pro-
competitive object or unobjectionable primary objective could cast doubt on the 
finding of the existence of a restriction of competition.58  The twist in this strategy 
was that despite agreeing that ‘obvious’ restrictions are not required in order to 
find a restriction by object, she considered that the legal and economic context was 
to be “taken into account only in so far as it can cast doubt on the existence of a 
restriction of competition”.59   
To determine the object of an agreement, the AG found that regard “must be had 
to the content of the agreement in the light of its legal and economic context”.60  
What is more, the AG’s methodology involved assessing the effect on market 
conditions of the agreement’s restrictions on the parties’ independence.61  The AG 
applied the counterfactual to determine this and took account of the effects which 
were the “necessary consequence” of the agreement and the effects which the 
parties intended to achieve through those restrictions.62  Such an analysis cannot be 
described as anything other than detailed.  Having considered, inter alia, the 
counterfactual, the agreement’s effect on market conditions and on the withdrawal 
of players from the market, the effects of overcapacity in that market, levies, 
lessons from “economic science”, and restrictions on use and disposal, the AG 
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reached an “interim conclusion”.63  She found that the agreement’s purpose of 
reducing production capacity, through processors leaving the market, the staging of 
levies and the restrictions on use and disposal had, as a ‘necessary consequence’, 
the restriction of competition.64  This initial conclusion was then subject to the 
consideration of whether the agreements had a pro-competitive or a primary 
objective which could call such conclusion into doubt. 
Surprisingly, the AG gave rather brief consideration to the rebutting factors.  She 
looked at the “aims” pursued by the BIDS agreements.  BIDS argued that the 
restrictions (collection of levies, restrictions on use and disposal) were justified as 
the agreement had a legitimate objective of limiting overcapacity and achieving 
economies of scale.65  The AG reiterated that obvious restrictions are not the only 
types of restriction capable of restricting competition by object and, even if a sector 
is experiencing a structural crisis this does not prevent the application of Article 
101(1) TFEU.66  The AG reasoned that the BIDS situation was different from those 
where an agreement pursues “either a pro-competitive object or an object which is 
neutral from a competition point of view”.67  This is because the “aim of increasing 
the profitability of the processing industry as a whole by reducing the overcapacity 
by 25% inevitably results in a restriction of competition”.68  Therefore, the BIDS 
agreements had the object of restricting competition.   
AG Trstenjak concluded, sagely, that the content of an agreement must always be 
examined against the backdrop of its legal and economic context.  Hence, to 
compare agreements is not always appropriate.  Such an exercise can fail to address 
the question of when a restriction of competition by object exists.69  Ultimately, the 
AG credits the balancing of positive versus negative attributes of an agreement 
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under the object criterion.  This highlights how it is inherently possible for any type 
of restriction to restrict competition by object under Article 101(1) TFEU.   
Conversely, the consideration of an ‘objective justification’ as a means to justify a 
restriction of competition, as opposed to arguing that an agreement had a 
legitimate aim, was considered by the Court in Pierre Fabre.70  The CJEU, however, 
makes little distinction between what constitutes a legitimate objective and an 
objective justification.  The CJEU found that in the absence of an objective 
justification a selective distribution agreement was to be considered a restriction by 
object.71  According to the CJEU, the Court has always recognised that there are 
“legitimate requirements” that may justify “a reduction of price competition in 
favour of competition relating to factors other than price.”72  Such legitimate 
requirements include the maintenance of a specialist trade capable of providing 
specific services as regards high-quality and high-technology products.73  When 
selective distribution systems “aim” at the “attainment of a legitimate goal capable 
of improving competition in relation to factors other than price” such agreements 
can be in conformity with Article 101(1) TFEU.74  In Pierre Fabre, a preliminary 
reference case, the question referred was whether a prohibition on all forms of 
internet selling was capable of being “justified by a legitimate aim” or alternatively 
whether the restrictions of competition “pursue legitimate aims in a proportionate 
manner”.75  The Court, however, chose to limit its frame of reference by 
considering the restrictions in the context of selective distribution agreements 
examined in accordance with the Metro criteria.76  This questions whether the 
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issues raised in Pierre Fabre should be considered outside the realms of selective 
distribution.77   
It is unwise to disregard the Pierre Fabre judgment, however, as the CJEU closely 
considered the application of the object criterion.  It clarified that an aim to 
maintain a brand’s prestigious image does not constitute a ‘legitimate aim’ for 
restricting competition.78  In this case, the agreement required the sale of products 
to be made in the presence of a qualified pharmacist, the result of which was that 
internet sales of those products were banned.  An interesting factor is that the 
agreement did not specifically ban internet sales.  It was inferred from the 
consequences of the requirement that a qualified pharmacist be present at the 
point of sale, hence it was an indirect restriction.  This underlines, again, the 
importance of assessing an agreement’s content and circumstances as well as its 
potential effects.     
Ultimately, the Court found that in the context of selective distribution systems, a 
clause requiring the sale of products to be made in the presence of a qualified 
pharmacist thus resulting in a ban on the use of the internet for those sales, 
amounts to a restriction by object.  This finding relied on an: 
“individual and specific examination of the content and objective of 
that contractual clause and the legal and economic context of which 
it forms a part, and it is apparent that, having regard to the 
properties of the products at issue, that clause is not objectively 
justified.”79  
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It is unclear from the judgment precisely what conditions need be taken into 
account for an objective justification to rebut a finding of object.80  To find an 
answer it is helpful to turn to the opinion upon which the CJEU’s judgment was 
based.  AG Mazák’s opinion provided a clearer and more legally robust discussion of 
the issues.  He was also less concerned to confine his opinion to the realms of 
selective distribution agreements.  Instead, his opinion is relevant to the concept of 
object as a whole.  In particular, he examined the issue of objective justification in 
depth.81   
AG Mazák considered that regulatory obligations would be an objective justification 
for the ban on internet sales (although this was not the case in the case at hand).82  
He acknowledged that there may be certain exceptional circumstances where 
restrictions on internet sales may be objectively justified owing to the nature of the 
goods or the customers to whom they are sold, and therefore a national or 
Community regulation would not be the only source of a potential justification.83  
Restrictions that are justified are then likely to fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU so 
long as they “do not go beyond what is necessary in accordance with the principle 
of proportionality”.84  For AG Mazák, a ‘legitimate objective’ that a party wishes to 
rely on must “be of a public law nature”.85  As such, it must be “aimed at protecting 
a public good and extend beyond the protection of the image of the products 
concerned”.86   
This analysis by AG Mazák is compelling.  First, he confirms that a form of balancing 
can be undertaken within an assessment of the object criterion.  Secondly, he limits 
such justification to one that is of a public law nature, though it does not have to be 
contained within a regulation.  He thereby addresses AG Trsjenjak’s concern that 
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not just any factor should invalidate a finding by object.  Finally, he draws parallels 
with the concept of ancillary restraints: whether restraints are necessary and 
proportionate, but ancillary to the primary purpose of the agreement.  He 
reiterates the need to examine the legal context (in this instance the case-law of 
the Court on selective distribution) and concludes that, as a result of such 
examination, the plaintiff (Pierre Fabre) did not have a sufficient objective 
justification for banning internet sales in order to protect the image of its product.87  
Consequently, whether a restriction is objectively justified depends on the case, its 
context and its purpose or objective.  The correlation between objective 
justifications and the concept of ancillary restraints is particularly thought-
provoking.  The AG stated that to determine whether restrictions are inherent to an 
agreement, such restrictions must not go beyond what is objectively necessary in 
order to carry out the purpose of the agreement.88 
The AG also addressed the question of necessary effect.  He agreed that, “in 
principle”, agreements aimed at prohibiting parallel trade have as their object the 
restriction of competition.89  He qualified this, however, by finding that “the mere 
fact that the selective distribution agreements in question...may restrict parallel 
trade may not in itself be sufficient to establish that the agreement has the object 
of restricting competition”.90  He thus recognised that agreements that restrict 
parallel trade have exceptionally been held to be compatible with Article 101(1) 
TFEU, means that those exceptions “suffice to establish that agreements which 
restrict...parallel trade do not automatically have the object of restricting 
competition...thus a mere appraisal of the terms of an agreement without 
assessing...the legal and economic context in which it was drafted and currently 
operates will not...suffice”.91  Assessing whether a selective distribution agreement 
has a restrictive object must “be carried out in the light of the nature of selective 
distribution agreements and the case-law thereon which forms part of the 
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economic and legal context in which the agreements were concluded and 
operate.”92     
Similar issues regarding legitimate objectives and objective justifications were 
raised in ACF Chemiefarma and IAZ/Anseau.93  The cases saw the parties argue that 
the restraints were necessary due to a shortage of raw materials (a crisis cartel) and 
to protect public health respectively.  Both arguments were dismissed by the Court, 
which took them into consideration, but found that the context of the agreements 
did not justify their restrictive object.   
The question is, therefore, when will an objective justification argument succeed?  
The answer is that it depends on the case and, in particular, whether a legitimate 
goal outweighs the restraints required to achieve it.  Clearly in ACF Chemiefarma 
and IAZ/Anseau, as in BIDS, the Court was not convinced that this was the case.  It 
can be argued that parties to an agreement must adduce convincing evidence that 
proves that any restraints are ancillary and proportionate to the primary purpose of 
the agreement, namely, a legitimate objective (commercial and public) or a pro-
competitive purpose.94  Regardless of whether this method is a form of rebuttal 
mechanism under Article 101(1) TFEU or part of the methodology to determine the 
purpose of an agreement, the legal and economic context (based on the content of 
the agreement) takes centre stage when assessing an objective justification.95  
Goyder supports AG Mazák, contending that only agreements which have public 
policy aims have benefited from objective justification arguments.96  The CJEU, on 
the other hand, is willing to consider commercial justifications of restraints in the 
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pursuit of a legitimate aim.97  It would seem to be unwise to dismiss commercial 
rationale as a basis of objective justification.  It is clear, however, that the raising of 
such a defence is rarely successful.98 
2.4. Object and the ancillary restraints doctrine 
As has been conspicuous in the cases recounted above, the concept of ancillary 
restraints is closely correlated with balancing, legitimate goals and objective 
justifications.  As with legitimate goals and objective justifications, the terms are 
used interchangeably, for instance, where particular restraints are deemed ancillary 
to the purpose of pursuing a pro-competitive goal or a legitimate objective.  The 
question of whether a restriction can be ancillary to the main operation of an 
agreement is historically a consideration when assessing the ‘effect’ of an 
agreement.99  An illustration of this is seen in Andreangeli’s work.  She examines 
the concept of ‘ancillarity’ in relation to Article 101(1) as a whole.100  She contains 
the concept within the framework of restrictions on parties’ freedom to trade.  In 
this sense, she considers that the European Courts have taken a view that in such 
circumstances restraints “that were ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’ to pursue a 
‘legitimate commercial purpose’, as well as...a public interest goal, could be 
regarded as falling outside the remit of Article 101(1) TFEU altogether”.101  She 
regards this more “economics-principled” and realistic approach to Article 101(1) 
TFEU as “a step closer to ‘balancing’ the pro- and anti-competitive effects” of 
agreements in the same way as under Article 101(3) TFEU.102     
The same principles are applicable, however, within the realms of the object 
criterion.  This is notwithstanding that it does not have at its heart the balancing of 
the pro and anti-competitive effects of an agreement, but rather a balancing of the 
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positive and negative attributes of the purpose of the agreement.  What is striking 
about Meca Medina (and Wouters) is that, unlike in BIDS, the Court held that a 
limitation in the freedom of action of an undertaking should not be automatically 
regarded as prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU, without an analysis of the legal and 
economic context.103  Since the agreement in Meca Medina pursued legitimate 
goals (in this case the protection of health of athletes and the integrity of 
competitive sports) and the restraints were limited to what was necessary to 
achieve that objective, the restraints were not found to be incompatible with 
Article 101(1) TFEU.104  Therefore, even though the restraints restricted the 
economic freedom of the parties, the rules were not caught by Article 101(1) TFEU.  
In the case of BIDS, it could be argued that the restraints imposed were not ‘limited’ 
and that, in that instance, the CJEU did not believe the purpose of the agreement 
constituted a legitimate goal.105 
Although not commonly linked, the ancillary restraints doctrine has a clear place 
under the object criterion.  This is because it helps explain why the ‘object’ of an 
agreement is often described by the Courts as the ‘primary purpose’ or ‘precise 
purpose’, and hence why the object concept permits particular agreements 
typically seen as containing hardcore restrictions to fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU 
altogether.106  A hypothetical example can be envisioned as follows: an agreement 
between competitors is designed to improve a distribution channel, which the 
parties currently do not share but could, and such collaboration would potentially 
benefit consumers due to increased efficiencies.  In order for the parties to have 
the incentive to invest in improving the distribution channel, they require various 
short-term territorial protections from each other and market sharing 
arrangements.  Debatably, the primary purpose of the agreement (to improve the 
distribution channel) could be viewed as being pro-competitive or as having a 
legitimate objective.  The restraints could be seen as ancillary to that purpose as 
they are objectively necessary and proportionate to that primary aim.  
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Alternatively, they could be understood to be objectively justified.107  Moreover, to 
determine whether the agreement is ‘sufficiently deleterious’, an analysis of the 
agreement under the STM Test would take those factors into account in order to 
establish whether the ‘precise purpose’ of the agreement is to restrict competition.  
Aspects of such a hypothesis can be seen in E.ON Ruhrgas AG.108  The Commission 
fined E.ON and GDF Suez EUR 553 million on account of agreements relating to 
their joint construction of the MEGAL pipeline to deliver Russian natural gas to 
Germany and France.109  On appeal, the GC specifically linked the idea that the 
parties did not have the object of restricting competition as the agreements were 
ancillary to the overall purpose of the primary agreement.110  Although the GC 
ultimately rejected this argument, it gave the argument credence as it found the 
agreements were not directly related and objectively necessary to the 
implementation of a main operation, which must be proportionate.111  Notably, the 
GC emphasised that the requirement of objective justification does not mean that 
the pro- and anticompetitive effects of an agreement must be weighed.112  This 
observation gets to the crux of the matter.  The seemingly interchangeable notions 
of balancing, legitimate objectives, objective justifications and the doctrine of 
ancillary restraints are not looking specifically to assess the pros and cons of the 
effect of an agreement.  Rather, they are tools used to identify the primary purpose 
of the agreement within its legal and economic context.113   
What is particularly interesting in E.ON is that the GC recognised that the 
assessment of the ancillary nature of the agreement in relation to the main 
operation “entails complex economic assessments”.114  This emphasises how, 
despite an apparently restrictive object (to share markets, which is seen by the 
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Commission as a hardcore restriction), the Court accepted that the doctrine of 
ancillary restraints can and should be considered under, what must be assumed to 
be, the object criterion where appropriate.  Indeed, the Commission itself 
considered the evidence in this regard.115  From this it can be concluded that the 
object criterion has the propensity to find apparently hardcore restraints as being 
ancillary to a pro-competitive purpose, a legitimate objective (which may also be 
pro-competitive) or a purpose that has a neutral effect.  The outcome of such a 
finding would generally bring an agreement outside the realms of Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  How this then impacts on the relationship between object and effect is 
considered in the following chapter.   
This conclusion would be rejected by some commentators.  Nazzini, for instance, 
does not believe there is a separate ancillary restraints doctrine under Article 
101(1) TFEU beyond the balancing of welfare enhancing and welfare reducing 
effects.116  The case law shows that this view is too narrow.  An interesting 
summation is provided by Jebelli.  He claims that the role of the ancillary restraints 
doctrine is to protect an undertaking’s legitimate business interests to ensure a 
more efficient and competitive market and thus enable efficient business 
transactions.117  Protecting legitimate business interests that are not necessarily 
directly pro-competitive, but are objectively necessary is compatible with 
“workable competition”.118   
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As highlighted by AG Trstenjak in BIDS, the ancillary restraints doctrine is not a 
gateway through which every restriction of competition might escape Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  Deringer reminds us that the fact that an agreement pursues other 
objectives is unimportant to a finding of restriction by object.119  The object 
criterion could therefore be described as ascertaining whether an agreement is 
designed to restrict competition.  The ancillary restraints doctrine is another tool 
that can be utilised by parties who wish to convince the authorities their agreement 
is not restrictive by object: whether this is by means of presumption rebuttal or by 
highlighting the agreement’s primary purpose.120  Viewing the application of the 
doctrine as a form of balancing is not necessarily an inappropriate analogy.  Under 
the object heading, any so-called ‘balancing’ involves identifying the aim of the 
agreement.  Thereby certain restraints within an agreement may be ‘necessary’ in 
order to secure, for example, a positive purpose.  Conversely, balancing under the 
‘effect’ criterion relates more specifically to the positive and negative effects of the 
agreement outweighing each other.121  For instance, agreements with a restrictive 
effect which are necessary to enable parties to achieve a legitimate purpose fall 
outside Article 101(1) TFEU, provided they are no more restrictive than is 
necessary.122  By utilising this doctrine within the context of the object criterion, it is 
therefore also possible for agreements to come outside Article 101(1) TFEU, by-
passing an analysis of their actual effects.   
The type of balancing exercise described above has been most commonly used in 
cases concerning export bans.  Such bans have sometimes been viewed as ancillary 
restraints as they were proportionate, necessary and directly related to the 
implementation of the main agreement.123  The question is one of determining, not 
whether: 
                                                     
119
 (Deringer, 1968), paras 130-131. 
120
 This is likely to be dictated by how the Commission approaches the case. 
121
 See cf (Ibáñez Colomo, 2012), pp555-556, 560.   
122
 Ibid, pp558-560.  Agreements leading to substantial transaction cost reductions, and that do not 
go beyond that deemed necessary to achieve these reductions, can be presumed to fall outside 
Article 101(1) TFEU. 
123
 See eg, supra n31 Louis Erauw; Case C-258/78 Nungesser v Commission; Case C-262/81 Coditel SA 
v Cine Vog.  In these cases the export bans were contained in licensing agreements which the CJEU 
Page 173 
“the restriction is indispensable to the commercial success of the 
main operation, but [instead] of determining whether, in the specific 
context of the main operation, the restriction is necessary to 
implement that operation.  If, without the restriction, the main 
operation is difficult or even impossible to implement, the restriction 
may be regarded as objectively necessary for its implementation”.124   
Moreover, such restraints may be seen as furthering a legitimate purpose or being 
objectively necessary in order to penetrate a new market.125  In these 
circumstances, the restraints do not infringe Article 101(1) TFEU by object, but also 
fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU altogether.  Even though the types of cases that 
have succeeded in the application of the ancillary restraints doctrine and objective 
necessity test have involved export bans, there is nothing to prevent the Courts 
from using the same principles for other types of restraint, such as RPM.126 
2.5. Conclusion: legal and economic context 
This section examined the application of the legal and economic context as a means 
to determine the precise purpose of an agreement.  Its scope was seen to be wide 
ranging.  Under the umbrella of the legal and economic context, the following 
factors have been taken into account: the positive attributes of an agreement, 
objective justifications or legitimate aims/goals/objectives and the ancillary 
restraints doctrine.  The legal and economic context thus provides the core to any 
assessment by object based on the content of the agreement.  The facts of the case 
then determine to what extent such assessment is required.127  This assessment can 
lead to three possible outcomes: (i) an agreement is restrictive by object; (ii) it 
comes outside Article 101(1) TFEU altogether; or (iii) it requires an examination by 
‘effect’.  Consequently, the implications of the legal and economic context on an 
outcome are profound, whether by acting as a rebuttal mechanism under the 
                                                                                                                                                      
found to be objectively justified on the basis that they were proportionate in relation to the need to 
protect the right holder’s economic interests.  
124
 Case T-112/99 M6 v Commission, [2001] ECR II-2459, para 109, 58. 
125
 See eg, (Kolstad, 2009), p47. 
126
 Ibid, p51. 
127
 The remit of the legal and economic context means there is potentially greater scope to conduct 
a comprehensive economic analysis of an agreement under Article 101(1) TFEU as opposed to the 
more prescriptive elements that may be considered under Article 101(3) TFEU – see chapter 5 for 
further analysis.   
Page 174 
hybrid approach or assessing an objective justification, objective aim, legitimate 
goal, pro-competitive purpose or ancillary restraint.        
It is notable from this examination of the legal and economic context that the 
effects of an agreement have evidently been considered by the Courts in cases 
seeking to determine an agreement’s object.  This has been seen, in particular, in 
those cases where legitimate objectives, pro-competitive purposes as well as 
objective justifications are appraised.   
3. The role of ‘effects’ under the legal and economic context  
This section examines the extent to which the effects of an agreement are taken 
into account when considering whether an agreement is restrictive by object.  
Accordingly, the judgment in Allianz Hungária is used as a vehicle to demonstrate 
this.128  The judgment signalled the endorsement of the hybrid approach to the 
object criterion by the CJEU, despite underlining the significance of the MAAP’s 
methodology and uncovering the primary purpose of the agreement.  More 
importantly, the judgment emphasises the status of the STM Test.129   
What is more, defining the relevant market, usually closely intertwined in 
determining an agreement’s effect, is unmistakeably now a feature of an object 
assessment.130  For instance, the GC’s judgment in Fresh Del Monte reveals the 
degree to which the GC investigated the market, the market power of the parties, 
the regulatory framework and economic arguments raised by the parties in order to 
determine whether the agreement in contention (a concerted practice) had the 
object of fixing prices.131  The judgment in Cartes Bancaires likewise reaffirms the 
importance of market definition when determining if an agreement is “by nature 
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harmful to the proper functioning of normal competition”, and therefore “all 
relevant aspects” such as the nature of the services, the real conditions of the 
functioning and structure of the markets should be considered.132  However, merely 
determining the relevant market is alone not sufficient to understand whether the 
object of an agreement is to restrict competition as the context of an agreement is 
the key factor in any analysis. 
3.1. Allianz Hungária  
The judgment in Allianz Hungária deserves particular scrutiny, as it largely 
supported the wave of case law emanating from the CJEU since BIDS and addressed 
a number of key themes raised in this thesis.  It was also a preliminary ruling and 
thus gave the CJEU greater scope for legal interpretation.  Moreover, it was a 
controversial judgment.  The Court has been accused of blurring the distinction 
between restrictions by object and by effect.133  If the object concept is understood 
in accordance with the orthodox approach, then the judgment also appears to add 
a new type of restriction to the object category.  The question referred to the CJEU 
was whether agreements that car insurance companies entered into with their 
dealers acting as car repair shops, were restrictive by object as the rate of payment 
the dealers received for repairs was linked to the amount of insurance they sold.134   
On their face such vertical agreements would not appear to be obvious restrictions 
anticompetitive by object.135  Nonetheless, the CJEU held that such agreements 
could amount to restrictions by object.136  The purpose of the agreement was not 
obvious.  Once it was assessed within its legal and economic context taking into 
account its potential effects, however, the fact that its primary purpose was to 
increase the market power of the insurance companies became apparent.137  
Increasing market power is not a hardcore restriction, but the CJEU deemed that 
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such a purpose had the propensity to restrict competition by object.  Reaching this 
conclusion, it closely followed the wording of the STM Test and recounted part of 
the STM Test rarely cited by the European Courts, namely, that the nature of the 
goods affected and the real conditions of the functioning and structure of the 
market should be considered as part of the context.138   
The reliance on STM is somewhat undermined by the notion of categorisation when 
the CJEU insisted on delineating object from effect in the same terms referenced in 
BIDS: that “certain forms of collusion between undertakings can be regarded, by 
their very nature, as being injurious to the proper functioning of normal 
competition”.139  To determine this does, however, require a careful examination of 
the facts.  The CJEU made specific reference to how the link between the two 
services, namely the car repair service and car insurance brokerage, was possible 
because the dealers acted in a dual capacity.140  The CJEU recognised that the 
establishment of such a link “does not automatically mean that the agreement...has 
as its object the restriction of competition.”141  On closer analysis such a link can, 
nevertheless, constitute an important factor in determining whether such 
agreement is “by its nature injurious to the proper functioning of normal 
competition...in particular, where the independence of those activities is necessary 
for that functioning.”142   
Furthermore, the CJEU emphasises how the potential effects of an agreement are 
crucial to an assessment of an agreement’s object by asserting that it is “necessary” 
to take into account whether the agreement is “likely to affect not only one, but 
two markets...and its object must be determined with respect to the two markets 
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concerned”.143  The need for market definition under the object criterion is thus 
reinforced, particularly for cases where a restriction of competition is not 
obvious.144  The court also asserted, however, that agreements “designed to 
partition the market” would “have to be treated as a restriction by object”.145  This 
pays homage to the hybrid approach. 
Notwithstanding the fact that it is not referenced explicitly, the most striking aspect 
of the Allianz Hungária judgment is its clear loyalty to STM.  This is evident when 
the CJEU states that it is necessary to determine whether, by taking into account 
the legal and economic context, the agreement is “sufficiently injurious to 
competition on the car insurance market as to amount to a restriction of 
competition by object.”146  In STM, the CJEU referred to the “effect on competition 
[needing] to be sufficiently deleterious”.147  This was subsequently recounted by 
the CJEU in Cartes Bancaires.148  The significance of this statement in Allianz 
Hungária relates to how the potential effects of an agreement and the context of 
which it forms part helps determine whether it is restrictive by object.  To this end, 
the CJEU cited, inter alia, domestic law requirements and whether the structure of 
the market meant that competition on that market would be eliminated or 
seriously weakened following the conclusion of those agreements.149 
Two things can be inferred from the fact that for an agreement to be found 
restrictive by object it must be ‘sufficiently deleterious’.  One is that agreements by 
object must have the capacity to harm competition.150  Secondly, as found by the 
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CJEU in Cartes Bancaires, the agreement must have the necessary effect of 
restricting competition based on experience.151  The key factor in determining 
whether an agreement is sufficiently deleterious is an assessment of the 
circumstances of the agreement, that is, its context.  For example, in Allianz 
Hungária, the CJEU referred to the expectations of insurance policyholders to 
determine if the “proper functioning of the car insurance market is likely to be 
significantly disrupted by the agreements”.152  The potential effects of the 
agreement will therefore play an integral role in such a finding.  Alternatively, in 
Cartes Bancaires the CJEU found that if the potential effects of an agreement do 
not reveal that it is by its nature harmful to competition, then such agreement 
cannot be restrictive by object.153   
In Allianz Hungária the CJEU stated that an agreement “would” restrict competition 
by object if it is “likely that, having regard to the economic context, competition on 
that market would be eliminated or seriously weakened following the conclusion of 
those agreements”.154  Whether infringements by object can be found absent such 
considerations is moot.  The CJEU reiterated the STM Test when it stated that an 
analysis of the agreements must “in particular” consider the structure of the 
market, the existence of alternative distribution channels and their importance and 
the market power of the companies concerned.155  There is therefore an implication 
that such considerations are not limited to those mentioned.  The key point as 
regards any consideration of the potential effects of an agreement appears to be 
this: potential effects are relevant in determining the agreement’s ‘objective’, but 
are not utilised to carry out an analysis of the ‘effect’ of an agreement.156 
The judgment in Allianz Hungária is significant for a number of reasons: it questions 
the categorisation of the object criterion in view of the restrictions considered by 
the CJEU in that case which are not normally associated with the object criterion; it 
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reaffirms the importance of establishing the object of an agreement based on the 
content of the agreement; it confirms that the aim of an agreement must be 
considered on its merits, its own unique circumstances and with consideration of its 
specific legal and economic context; it highlights the need for market definition, in 
particular in respect of less ‘obvious’ cases; and it serves to highlight how the 
orthodox approach belies the complexity of the object criterion and thus the 
inappropriateness of a generic process of restriction identification.157   
Essentially, the judgment in Allianz Hungária demonstrates that the effects-based 
approach is not the preserve of the effect criterion.  It is utilised also under the 
object criterion when viewed through the lens of the MAAP and indeed the hybrid 
approach.  Thus, criticisms aimed at the Commission for failing to engage with the 
effects-based approach miss the point as when an agreement is assessed in 
accordance with the MAAP such criticisms fall away.158  To circumvent having to 
apply a more economic approach to agreements that may be restrictive by effect, 
the Commission has instead chosen to abuse the object category.  To this end, it 
has expanded the object category, thereby enabling the Commission to engage in a 
limited assessment under the object criterion.159  The Commission has finally been 
taken to task for this by the CJEU.160  Despite the reliance on the STM Test, the CJEU 
in Cartes Bancaires chose to use the concept of necessary effect as the primary 
rationale against widening the category.  This is not entirely reflective of the law.  
When the law is understood under the MAAP, widening the object category is not a 
concern as the standard of proof is raised.  Rather, the focus is on the methodology 
used to determine the precise purpose of the agreement.  The judgment in Allianz 
Hungária does not examine the concept of necessary effect.  Instead, it 
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concentrates on establishing the aim of the agreement and, as such, better reflects 
the law.161  
3.2. Determining potential effects: the capacity to restrict competition 
Examining the potential effects of an agreement to help determine an agreement’s 
object is seen further in cases where the purpose of the agreement could be seen 
to be neutral. In such cases, there is no objective to affect competition at all.  This is 
seen in both E.ON and Protimonopolný, which examine the tricky issue of whether 
an agreement must have the capacity to affect competition in order to be found 
restrictive by object.  This also encompasses a consideration of the counterfactual 
within such assessment. 
An example, which encapsulates how capacity and the object criterion may relate 
to one another, is found in the E.ON Decision.162  As discussed previously, the 
decision pertains to the joint venture entered into by E.ON and GDF to build the 
MEGAL pipeline in order to bring gas into both Germany and France.  The parties 
entered into side letters, which prohibited them from entering each other’s home 
markets.  The Commission found that the agreements restricted competition by 
object and fined the parties accordingly.  In their defence, the parties argued that 
the agreements had no impact on competition as prior to 2000 the gas markets 
were not liberalised and market entry would not have been possible.  The 
Commission rejected these arguments and declared that a counterfactual analysis 
would have been impossible to build and was irrelevant.  For the Commission, the 
mere fact that the parties concluded the agreement, regardless of whether they 
would have entered each other’s markets in the absence of the agreements, meant 
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that Article 101(1) TFEU was infringed.  Participation in the agreement alone was 
seen as sufficient to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.163     
The GC did not wholly support the Commission’s opinion in this regard and partially 
rejected its submissions concerning the question of capacity.164  The parties argued 
that as they were not potential competitors until after 2000, the agreement was 
not subject to Article 101(1) TFEU.  Significantly, the GC agreed that Article 101(1) 
TFEU only applies to sectors open to competition.165  However, to examine the 
conditions of competition requires an assessment of both existing and potential 
competition between undertakings on the market.  Such assessment ascertains 
whether there are real possibilities for the undertakings to compete or for a new 
competitor to enter the market and compete.166  Therefore, the counterfactual is 
relevant in this regard.  The GC found that the burden is on the Commission to 
determine whether an undertaking is a potential competitor by assessing what the 
situation would be had the agreement not applied: in those circumstances would 
there have been a real, concrete possibility for the parties to enter the market and 
compete.167  Moreover, the GC held that a potential competitor can be labelled as 
such if it has the ability to enter the market: whether it is precluded from doing by a 
monopoly derived from national legislation is irrelevant to such an assessment if 
there is a theoretical possibility.168  The GC found that the Commission had not 
shown sufficient evidence that there was in fact potential competition on the 
German market between 1980 and 1998.169  Hence, the agreements were not 
subject to Article 101(1) TFEU during that period.  The GC held that “the system of 
competition established by Articles 81 EC and 82 EC [was] concerned with the 
economic consequences of agreements, or of any comparable form of concertation 
or coordination, rather than with the their legal form.”170   
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The judgment in E.ON is a reminder that the parties to an agreement must have the 
capacity or the ability to restrict competition, which seemingly requires the parties 
to be potential competitors.  It is therefore understandable that undertakings 
would endeavour to argue such a position in order to take their agreements 
containing ‘hardcore’ restrictions, as in the case of E.ON, outside the remit of 
Article 101(1) TFEU.171  To determine such capacity requires consideration of the 
counterfactual as demonstrated in E.ON.   
Under the MAAP, the counterfactual forms part of the STM Test.172  As such, its use 
may be relevant in determining an agreement’s precise purpose.  Certainly, to 
assess what the situation would have been absent the agreement helps explain why 
certain restraints are seen as necessary, justifiable or ancillary to a pro-competitive 
purpose.173  The judgment in E.ON showed how using the counterfactual is also 
relevant when determining the capacity of the agreement to restrict competition.  
This potentially means that agreements that aim to restrict competition may not be 
found to restrict competition by object and thereby fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU 
altogether if the parties lack the capacity to affect competition.  In the case of E.ON, 
this was because the undertakings were not potential competitors during particular 
periods.  This finding brings to the fore the issue of whether an agreement can be 
found to be restrictive of competition by object even when it is impossible for it to 
have an effect on competition.  The answer is not straightforward and is ostensibly 
linked to the fact that an agreement does not have to be successful to be found 
restrictive by object.  
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The complexity of this issue is highlighted in Protimonopolný. In a short judgment, 
the Court answered the question of whether an agreement that has no effect on 
competition can still be found restrictive by object in the affirmative.174  In this case, 
the CJEU held that the fact that an undertaking was allegedly operating illegally 
(Akcenta) on the relevant market at the time the agreement was concluded, had no 
impact on whether the agreement restricted competition by object under Article 
101 (1) TFEU.  The facts involved several banks who colluded to terminate, in a 
coordinated manner, current and future contracts that the banks had with Akcenta.  
As Akcenta did not have the requisite licence to carry out its business, the banks 
argued it was operating illegally and could not therefore be regarded as a 
competitor.  Hence, the agreement did not have the object of restricting 
competition.  The CJEU disagreed and found the object of the agreement between 
the banks to be the restriction of competition as the agreement was intended to 
eliminate a competitor.175  It noted that Akcenta was adversely affected by the 
agreement. 
The judgment bears some scrutiny.  On one hand, it could be seen to strengthen 
the orthodox approach as the CJEU refuted the need to prove the capacity of the 
agreement to do harm (that is, cause a potential effect).  If the parties exclude a 
player who has no right to be in the market at all, then it is arguable that the 
agreement is not capable of having any effect on competition.  This undermines the 
necessity of assessing the agreement in its legal and economic context as there is 
no need to prove the capacity of an agreement to do harm, or indeed investigate 
whether the economic context explains that capacity.  On the other hand, the case 
strengthens the philosophy underpinning the more analytical approach: whether 
Akcenta was acting illegally does not mean that the agreement was not capable of 
having an effect on the market as the parties aimed to restrict competition by 
eliminating Akcenta (their competitor regardless of whether Akcenta was acting 
illegally or not).  On the facts, Akcenta was operating in the market, albeit illegally, 
but was nonetheless having a measurable impact on the market to the extent that 
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the banks wished to eliminate it.  If the correct counterfactual was that Akcenta 
would be able to continue operating illegally on the market absent the agreement, 
then the agreement restricted competition.176   
It is submitted that the CJEU was correct to reject the argument that the agreement 
did not restrict competition because Akcenta was acting illegally.  The banks 
colluded with the purpose of excluding a player in the market and were unable to 
rebut this.  This rationale was enough to satisfy the CJEU of that object based on its 
assessment of the specific legal and economic context.  This principal operates in a 
similar way to the success of an agreement being irrelevant to a finding by object, 
which is why actual effects do not need to be demonstrated.  Entering an 
agreement with the purpose of restricting competition as determined under the 
STM test is restrictive by object.177  The legal and economic context is thus 
fundamental to this determination.  In Protimonopolný, the CJEU stated that the 
agreement “specifically had as its object the restriction of competition” and the 
question of illegality was not enough to refute this.178  A similar point was made in 
E.ON where the GC held that GDF’s monopoly was meaningless as this did not 
preclude the fact that the aim of the agreement (the prohibition of supply of gas) 
was to circumvent possible legal and factual changes during the lifespan of the gas 
pipeline.179  Hence, the concept of necessary effect alone is not sufficient when 
determining the capacity of an agreement to restrict competition or whether an 
agreement has an effect. 
In summation, Protimonopolný demonstrates that arguments relating to an 
undertaking operating illegally were irrelevant to the consideration of the legal and 
economic context when determining the object of the agreement.  Arguably, the 
appropriate place for considering whether an anti-competitive agreement can be 
                                                     
176
 The question of capacity to restrict competition is a complex issue and is discussed further in 
chapter 5 in conjunction with the de minimis doctrine. 
177
 See Case C8/08 T-Mobile [2009] ECR I-4529: for an agreement to be found to be restrictive by 
object it is “sufficient that it has the potential to have a negative impact on competition...that it be 
capable in an individual case of resulting in the...restriction of competition...”. 
178
 Supra n174, Protimonopolný, para 19. 
179
 Supra n106, E.ON para 135. 
Page 185 
justified by the fact Akcenta acted without a licence, is Article 101(3) TFEU.180  The 
CJEU was correct to find that the undertakings should have reported Akcenta to the 
authorities as opposed to taking it upon themselves to eliminate a competitor.  
Should the banks have jointly reported Akcenta to the authorities, then there would 
not have been a restriction of competition in those circumstances.  Instead, the 
banks agreed between them to terminate their contracts with Akcenta, which 
meant that it was unable to carry out its business and therefore was eliminated 
from the market.  The moral compass surrounding whether undertakings should be 
allowed to protect their industry is thus immaterial to Article 101(1) TFEU.       
3.3. Conclusion: The role of effects under the legal and economic context 
This section considered the extent to which the effects of an agreement are taken 
into account when determining whether an agreement is restrictive by object.  The 
judgment in Allianz Hungária was examined, and it was demonstrated how the 
legal and economic context was used as a means to determine whether the 
agreement was designed to restrict competition.  This encompassed the need for a 
definition of the relevant markets, the market structure, and the position of the 
parties on those markets in order to uncover the true aim of the agreement.  
Whether every case requires such an in-depth assessment of its context depends 
on the facts, but it is the plaintiff’s burden to discharge.  Taking into account an 
agreement’s effects also helps determine whether an agreement is sufficiently 
deleterious, as the concept of necessary effect is not solely relevant in this 
regard.181   
The effects of an agreement are also relevant in determining whether an 
agreement has the capacity to restrict competition or has no effect on the market 
whatsoever and thereby circumvents a finding by object.  The counterfactual is 
invaluable in this regard, though whether it needs to be applied in every contextual 
                                                     
180
 This is analogous with cases such as BIDS where the parties attempted to argue that the 
agreement was necessary to preserve the beef industry. Additionally an undertaking’s charitable 
status does not prevent it from being subject to the competition rules. 
181
 Note, the definition of the ‘legal context’ includes previous case law, therefore precedent is 
relevant in such determination.  Also, taking effects into account is different from having to prove 
effects (actual or potential) under the ‘effect’ heading. 
Page 186 
analysis under the MAAP is open to interpretation.  What is clear is that these 
issues are complex.  The answer to the question of whether the capacity of an 
agreement to restrict competition should be a bar to a finding of object is far from 
straightforward.  In E.ON, the Court agreed that, during particular periods of time, 
the parties were unable to compete due to the structure of the market (it was not 
liberalised).  However this did not mean that the undertakings were able to 
continuously flout the competition rules.  Likewise, undertakings which are 
potential competitors and have the capacity to restrict competition can be found to 
restrict competition by object, even if the agreement is not implemented or is 
unsuccessful or a party is operating illegally.  How these factors are then 
distinguished from the notion of appreciability and the related issue of market 
power requires careful thought.182   
4. Commentator rationale: explaining the anomalies without abandoning 
categorisation 
In the wake of recent court decisions, there has been a spate of scholarly papers 
concerning the object criterion.  These papers articulate disparate attempts to 
rationalise the case law.  The increased debate and analysis surrounding the object 
criterion is a welcome development.  It shows no sign of abating.183  How scholars 
interpret the law on the application and function of the legal and economic context, 
in particular, deserves scrutiny.  Many commentators now acknowledge the 
anomalous case law, but have tended to retain a focus on the categorisation 
approach to the object criterion.184  For instance, Jones argues that it is hard to 
rationalise when, as she terms it, the object category is expanded or narrowed.185  
She argues that the anomalous cases have arisen in two main areas, namely where 
horizontal price or output restraints are essential to the attainment of the pro-
competitive goals of a joint venture, and where absolute territorial protection (ATP) 
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is necessary to the distribution or licensing arrangement.186  She has examined 
Wouters finding that when an agreement is designed to achieve a legitimate 
objective, even if it involves a severe horizontal restraint, then such restraint may 
not breach Article 101(1) TFEU at all.187  Jones suggests that the circumstances in 
which restraints are objectively necessary are very limited, and are connected to 
the nature of the product in issue.  This indicates to Jones that ATP for the 
distributor is “inherent or necessary to the success of the distribution 
arrangement”.188  This view is supported by the CJEU’s judgment in GSK where the 
CJEU reinforced the narrow nature of the exception.  Jones points out that the GC 
had “taken a different view”, holding that “the Commission had been wrong to 
characterise Glaxo’s distribution agreements designed to restrict parallel trade... as 
restrictive by object simply by relying on the clauses of the agreement without 
reference to the legal and economic context”.189   
This is an important point, and it is submitted that the GC’s judgment was correct in 
this regard.  The GC was highlighting the fact that based on the particular facts of 
the case the presumption of anticompetitive effects did not apply.  Furthermore, 
the CJEU did not reject this element of the GC’s judgment.190  In fact, the AG in GSK 
endorsed the GC’s understanding of the legal and economic context.191  What the 
CJEU rejected was the GC’s subsequent requirement that such an agreement must 
restrict competition to the detriment of the final consumer.192  For Jones, the 
answer to how and why the object category is expanded or narrowed is not clear, 
but she considers that cases such as BIDS, GSK and T-Mobile:  
“suggest categorisation is not simply a presumption that can be set 
aside by establishing that consumer harm or anticompetitive effects 
are not likely (or have not occurred) on the facts of the case.  Cases 
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such as Erauq-Jacquery and Wouters indicate, however, that 
hardcore restraints inherent in, or reasonably necessary to achieve, 
legitimate, pro-competitive objectives of an agreement may fall 
outside Article 101(1) altogether.”193  
This view endorses the position that the potential or actual effects of an agreement 
ultimately do not bear on whether an agreement is anti-competitive by object.  This 
ties in with the rule that an agreement does not need to succeed or produce effects 
to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU.194  Consequently, her opinion credits the 
proposition that the role of effects in any analysis of the legal and economic context 
is best suited to understanding whether an agreement has a primary purpose of 
restricting competition and its restraints are necessary and ancillary to such, most 
commonly, pro-competitive purpose.  That is, they can be balanced.  
Alternatively, Mahtani makes a bold attempt to explain the anomalies and to clarify 
the case law.  He too recognises that there are cases where the outcome predicted 
by an application of the orthodox approach has not resulted in the identification of 
an object restriction.195  He divides the cases into two groups identifying those 
cases where an apparent object restriction exists, but the agreement did not breach 
Article 101(1) TFEU by object and, secondly, those cases where a breach of the 
object criterion was established by an analysis that was beyond merely identifying 
the object restriction.  Like Jones, he limits the circumstances in which the object 
assessment has not resulted in the outcome predicted by the orthodox approach 
due to the analysis conducted.196  Using FA as an example, Mahtani notes that the 
CJEU stated that ATP may not breach Article 101(1) TFEU by object if “other 
circumstances falling within its economic and legal context justify the finding that 
such an agreement is not liable to impair competition”.197  For Mahtani, the case of 
Pierre Fabre highlights that the context (or circumstances) of the agreement can 
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justify a prima facie breach by object and that such analysis is not defined by 
abstract principles.198  Nevertheless, Mahtani plays down the role of the legal and 
economic context by stating that merely a “number of cases” make reference to the 
context.199  This is wrong.  The vast majority of case law, in particular more recent 
case law, reaffirms the prominence of the legal and economic context in any 
assessment by object. 
Overall, Mahtani disagrees with Jones’ position that the exceptions to the orthodox 
approach should be viewed as a narrowing of the object category of agreements in 
certain circumstances.200  Instead, he considers that the object category as 
delineated by the object box is never narrowed, rather: 
“in certain circumstances the category approach is disapplied.  To 
seek to codify those circumstances within the object box (as 
refinements or narrowing) could be overly prescriptive.  Nor do we 
necessarily need to consider such situations as exceptional as such, 
but part of the framework of Article 101(1) TFEU.”201   
Mahtani believes that the case law reveals that an object analysis involves two 
stages: (i) a review of the clauses of an agreement to determine whether a prima 
facie object restriction exists; and (ii) a deeper consideration of the purpose and the 
context.  Though the context is limited to the commercial purpose of the 
coordination and the means used to achieve that purpose:202   
“this analysis involves the identification of such a legitimate 
commercial purpose to the restriction and an assessment of whether 
the restriction goes not further than necessary to achieve that 
purpose.  If the commercial purpose is legitimate and the prima facie 
object restriction is a necessary and proportionate means of 
achieving that purpose, no breach of the object aspect of Article 
101(1) is occasioned.”203 
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Further, Mahtani also recognises that in addition to those occasions where 
judgments appear to create “exceptions” to the object box, there are also instances 
where a breach of the object aspect is found without direct reference to a category 
of object restrictions.204  He acknowledges that in these instances there is a desire 
for the object criterion to operate more flexibly then the object-as-category 
understanding.205  Moreover, he recognises that these cases have explicitly rejected 
the premise that the object criterion operates narrowly, limited to a short list of 
‘hardcore restraints’.  He considers BIDS and T-Mobile demonstrate that the CJEU 
“identified coordination which breached the object aspect of Article 101(1), not by 
reference to precedent or to the existence of specific restraints, but by examining 
whether the coordination as a whole had the consequence of directly restricting 
rivalry between competitors.”206  Mahtani also accepts that in cases such as BIDS, 
the analysis was specific to the factual circumstances of the case.207  Mahtani’s 
rationale is simply to say these types of cases operate outside the object 
category.208 
Mahtani acknowledges that the common factor in all these cases is the presence of 
the legal and economic context.  For him, the legal and economic context has been 
invoked inconsistently and used to “do too much and to do so in an unstructured 
way”.209  This is not an unfair criticism.  Instead of adjusting the parameters of the 
object category or using the legal and economic context to mitigate its harshness, 
Mahtani’s solution is for us to “recognise the object aspect of Article 101(1) TFEU as 
encompassing a structured, multi-layered assessment, which includes, but allows 
more than, the mere identification of a restraint belonging to an established 
category of such restraints”.210  He bases this recommendation on the opinion of 
AG Trstenjak in GSK.211  He recognises that the AG’s methodology requires that the 
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legal and economic context must always be considered under the object 
criterion.212  For Mahtani, however, the primary role of the legal and economic 
context is simply to cast doubt on a prima facie breach by object.  
Mahtani recognises the presence of the three approaches put forward in this thesis.  
He concludes that object can be established in one of three ways, namely: (i) the 
categorisation of object drawn from precedent; (ii) by considering the aim or 
purpose of the parties to the restriction; and (iii) by an abridged analysis of the 
expected effects of the restriction (the presumption of restrictive effects).213  
Mahtani thus acknowledges that there is a ‘rebuttal mechanism’ within the object 
criterion and cites the AG Trstenjak in BIDS as the authority for the ways in which 
the object of an agreement can be rebutted.214  Specifically, he argues there are 
three ways this can happen: first, where a limitation on commercial freedom has no 
anticompetitive effects as the parties are not competitors or there is insufficient 
competition that can be restricted by the agreement (Mahtani refers to this as a 
form of the counterfactual); secondly, where an agreement is ambivalent in terms 
of its effects on competition, and so has - for example - a pro-competitive purpose 
and the restrictions required are ancillary, and thirdly, where ancillary restraints are 
necessary to pursue a primary objective, which is neutral as regards competition or 
promotes competition and the ancillary restraints are necessary to achieve that 
objective.  Mahtani likens the second and third scenarios to situations where the 
prima facie object is to restrict competition and is being balanced against a 
legitimate commercial purpose and the conduct is necessary to achieve that 
purpose.215  This results in what Mahtani terms the “Two-stage Object Analysis”:216   
Breach by object established by: Prima facie breach capable of rebuttal by: 
 
the existence of a specific restraint identified by 
reference to a category of restraints—limited 
factual assessment required 
 
evidence that no competition exists absent the 
restriction; or 
a legitimate commercial purpose and restrictions 
proportionate to that purpose 
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an abridged analysis of negative effects on competition— 
broad factual assessment required 
 
evidence that no competition exists absent the 
restriction; or 
a legitimate commercial purpose and restrictions 
proportionate to that purpose 
 
a specific collective purpose to bring about 
negative effects on competition—broad factual 
assessment required 
 
no rebuttal possible 
 
Mahtani’s arguments certainly support many of the issues and findings raised in 
this thesis, in particular, his examination justifies the detail in which the various 
aspects and facets of the object criterion are discussed in this chapter.  Despite 
having much sympathy for a number of the points made by Mahtani, however, the 
continued focus on Whish’s ‘object box’ in a comprehension of the object criterion 
is unsatisfactory.  The object box interpretation of the law lacks credibility in the 
eyes of the European Courts.217  Instead, understanding the law in accordance with 
the MAAP is, in one sense, a simpler means of explaining how the Courts have 
tackled the object criterion, in particular as it is framed around STM.218 
Goyder also supports the continued categorisation of the object criterion.  Her view 
is that there is an object restriction where a restriction of competition is the 
“necessary consequence” of the content of the agreement, regardless of the actual 
intentions of the parties.219  She recognises that a subjective intention to restrict 
competition is relevant, but a restriction may have an anticompetitive object even if 
the parties also have legitimate objectives.220  She agrees that is “not sufficient, in 
order to establish an object restriction, to identify a restriction as a type that has 
been found to be ‘by object’ before...a ‘prima facie’ object restriction.  The case law 
requires that the analysis go further than an examination of the actual terms of the 
agreement in question”.221  This entails a consideration of the economic and legal 
context, which may result in the negation of the “presumption of infringement 
arising because the type of clause in question appears to be an object restriction”.  
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Then any possible “objective justification” must be examined, and if an agreement 
is de minimis it will fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU as it does not have an 
appreciable effect on competition.222  Goyder agrees that, in exceptional 
circumstances, a restriction of the type that is normally classified as being by object 
can, once considered within its legal and economic context, be found not to be 
anticompetitive by object.  An objective justification or the application of the de 
minimis principal may also negate what is prima facie an object restriction.223  
Goyder separates the legal and economic context from objective justifications and 
the de minimis doctrine.224  It is submitted that the legal and economic context in 
fact encompasses all the various elements that may cast doubt on a presumption of 
object.  Moreover, it is not simply a rebuttal mechanism.  Ultimately, Goyder 
highlights that there are no magic formulae when considering the application of the 
object criterion.  She concurs that the EU framework is significantly more flexible 
than, for example, the US framework at dealing with unusual cases.   
Andreangeli provides an alternative interpretation of the CJEU’s approach to the 
object criterion, which supports both the more analytical approach and hybrid 
approach.225  She recognises that the CJEU has applied some of the elements 
“characterising the more flexible and ‘economics-principled’ approach hitherto 
relevant for ‘by-effect’ cases to the assessment of prima facie restrictions by 
object”.226  Moreover, as was found in chapter 2, she recognises that although the 
CJEU continues to rely on the dichotomy between object and effect restrictions, it 
has scrutinised the goals and content of agreements by taking into account their 
actual context.  This has been carried out in a similar pattern of analysis to that of 
“less serious” infringements.227  As a result, she proposes that the Court now 
adopts an approach to Article 101(1) TFEU better characterised as a “continuum” 
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between more and less serious infringements than by a relatively stark alternative 
between ‘by-object’ and ‘by-effect’ restrictions of competition.228  This, she argues, 
is demonstrated by the Court’s framework for appraisal, which reserves 
intervention only for those agreements inherently incompatible with Article 101 
TFEU or result in actual impairment of competition.229   
Andreangeli illustrates this using the AG’s opinion in the BIDS case.230  She considers 
that even though AG Trstenjak recognised that the agreement was pursuing a pro-
competitive primary objective, the fact the agreement imposed, inter alia, 
production cuts, the exiting of competitors from the industry and the imposition of 
levies, resulted in the agreement restricting competition by object as the restraints 
stifled potential competition by erecting barriers to entry.231  She acknowledges 
that the CJEU cemented this approach by referring to the market share of the 
parties to the agreement, which aimed as a result of the agreement to increase its 
concentration.232  As such, the parties were unable to engage in competitive rivalry.  
Industrial policy considerations were relegated to consideration under Article 
101(3) TFEU.233  Moreover, crucially, she confirms that the Court rejected any 
attempt to read an exhaustive list of ‘serious infringements’ into Article 101(1) and 
thus concluded that the BIDS arrangement breached Article 101(1) TFEU by object. 
In this vein, Andreangeli supports many of the conclusions identified in this thesis.  
The fact that the Court is assessing the potential (and in some cases) actual effects 
of an agreement within its appraisal of the object of an agreement is significant.  
Indeed, Mahtani’s interpretation of the case law places little emphasis on this 
phenomenon.  The one-dimensional portrayal of the object criterion under the 
orthodox approach is again exposed.  Andreangeli also recognises the important 
question of how the concept of a ‘restriction of competition’ should be construed 
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under any assessment by object.  For the MAAP, this question is pivotal to an 
appraisal of the object of an agreement.234  However, Andreangeli’s overall 
interpretation of BIDS does have some distinctions.  For instance, she places much 
emphasis on the fact that the Court distinguished between object and effect by 
considering the “seriousness of each infringement on the basis of the experience of 
its impact on competition”.235  For her, the Court drew a line between very 
damaging practices for the competitive process and those that were less 
deleterious.236  Consequently, the former will, due to their nature, be presumed to 
have anticompetitive effects without the need to enquire into their impact on the 
market.  The latter will require a closer examination to determine whether they 
have in fact resulted in an appreciable restriction of competition.237  
Despite this, Andreangeli recognises that BIDS suggests the possibility, through the 
application of the “in-context” and more “economics-principled” pattern of 
analysis, that the presumption of anticompetitive effects by reason of an 
agreement’s object can be rebutted under Article 101(1) TFEU.238  Moreover, 
whether an agreement falls within the ‘by object’ or ‘by effect’ category is not 
based on an “exhaustive list”, and therefore each agreement has to be determined 
by way of an examination of its content and purpose against its legal and economic 
context.239  Despite her understanding of the BIDS case, she compares it to the GC’s 
judgment in ENS.240  In the light of ENS, she considers that the judgment in BIDS is 
not consistent with the pre-existing stark dichotomy between object and effect as 
suggested in ENS.241  For her, the Court had not simply considered the “hardcore 
nature of the restraints that the BIDS deal entailed”, but rather chose to conduct a 
close scrutiny of the agreement’s individual clauses against their legal and 
economic context.  Through this latter method, the Court found that the agreement 
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restricted competition by object.242  On this basis, Andreangeli finds that the 
pattern of analysis carried out by the Court suggests that it wished to extend some 
aspects of the more ‘economics-guided’ approach already adopted in by-effect 
cases to more serious object cases.  Furthermore, it also took into consideration 
issues previously reserved for the application of Article 101(3) TFEU.243 
The case law analysis undertaken in chapter 2 does not wholly support such an 
interpretation.  The CJEU had already been applying a methodology to the object 
criterion since STM that had the scope to be applied in a more ‘economics-guided’ 
way.  Certainly, the STM Test has the capacity to tolerate an ‘effects-based' 
analysis.  Consequently, the effects-style analysis carried out by the Court in BIDS 
was not particularly ‘new’, and the Court did not go a step beyond its existing case 
law.244  Rather, the flaw in Andreangeli’s argument is her reliance on ENS.  It is ENS 
that is the anomaly in the case law, and it is ENS that misinterpreted the case law of 
its superior court.  This is evident from the GC’s rejection of its own methodology in 
cases such as GSK.245  The judgment in BIDS simply re-emphasised the analysis 
advocated by the more analytical approach.  The main issue with BIDS is the Court’s 
choice of wording when explaining the distinction between restrictions by object 
and those by effect: it is this aspect of the judgment that ensures the orthodox 
approach continues to enjoy some legitimacy.246  Therefore, the advent of a ‘hybrid 
approach’ to the object criterion has dawned. 
Andreangeli does go on to modify her initial stance, but remains of the opinion that 
BIDS is the turning point in the jurisprudence.247  She believes that it is preferable to 
consider the CJEU’s “current approach” as “one akin to the idea of a continuum, as 
a result of which the type of assessment should be framed in light of the practice’s 
nature and inherent seriousness as well as the inherent features of the market”.248  
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Prima facie infringements of Article 101(1) TFEU must, however, be assessed in the 
legal and economic context and that this is not limited to specific categories of 
agreements, but also encapsulates any practice suspected of being anti-
competitive.249  She thus recognises, like Paul Lasok QC, that it “could” be argued 
that the analysis in the initial stages would be the same for all types of 
anticompetitive agreements as such analysis would concentrate on its “content and 
purpose”.250  As a result, if the agreement was seen to be so pernicious that it was 
almost inevitable to harm consumer welfare it will infringe Article 101(1) TFEU 
without the need to determine its actual impact on competition in the relevant 
market.251  Conversely, if such initial enquiry does not reveal such harm then its 
lawfulness must be tested under the ‘effect’ criterion and will only be prohibited it 
can be shown competition has been distorted as a result of it.252  Essentially, her 
rationale follows the judgment in STM. 
From this, Andreangeli argues that the CJEU has moved away from a strictly literal 
and categorical approach to Article 101(1) TFEU and towards a legal standard for 
analysing the content and purpose of any agreement.  Such analysis “focuses more 
on the inherent seriousness rather than on their formal characteristics”.253  As a 
result, Andreangeli believes that in accordance with BIDS, the question to be 
considered is whether an agreement’s content and purpose is compatible with the 
objectives of Article 101 TFEU (namely, economic efficiency for the purpose of 
promoting consumer welfare) as opposed to whether the agreement belongs to a 
formalistic category as cases such as ENS suggest.254  Therefore the type of inquiry 
required for a particular agreement depends on its nature and seriousness.  
Andreangeli’s arguments are extremely persuasive, but she places too much 
emphasis on BIDS.  BIDS did not progress the law as such, rather it cemented 
principals the CJEU had already established. 
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4.1. Analysis of the commentary 
On the whole, the commentary recounted above seeks to explain the anomalous 
case law fairly cautiously.  The position advanced in this thesis is less cautious.  The 
review of the case law in chapter 2 brought into sharp focus the divergent ways in 
which the European Courts have tackled the object criterion.  It is not denied that 
the jurisprudence is confusing and at times unclear.  Nevertheless, there are 
unambiguous paths which the CJEU has taken and varying paths which the GC has 
taken over the years.  The advent of modernisation and increasing reliance on 
economic coherence has meant that the test originally devised in STM has taken on 
a renewed significance and role.255  The prospect of a more analytical approach has 
always been present within the jurisprudence, but this was put in the shadow by 
the Commission’s more formalistic approach to the object criterion as highlighted 
in its Article 81(3) Guidelines and in many of its decisions.  The Commission’s 
approach is evolving, however, although its goal is different from that of the Courts.  
The Commission must police the competition rules and therefore devise policies 
(for itself, undertakings and national competition authorities) to follow in this 
regard.  As such, undertakings and NCAs must take note of the Commission’s 
predilection.  The tension, therefore, between the approach of the Commission and 
the European Courts is evident.   
The ordering of the case law and the development of a framework under which 
object should be applied undertaken by commentators such as Mahtani is 
admirable.  Such a ‘multi-layered structured methodology’ is complicated, however, 
and does not reduce the possibility that, in the future, other types of situation may 
arise that do not fall neatly within the various categories advocated.  It thus seems 
almost futile to attempt to identify precise scenarios where exceptions to the 
general rule advocated by the orthodox approach may be granted.  The truth is that 
there is likely to be no single ‘correct’ answer.  As so many commentators have now 
established, the case law is not consistent.  The Courts have not used consistent 
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terminology in relation to the object criterion, have not provided a clear cut 
definition of object or of the various terms utilised in connection with it, nor have 
always followed a set methodology when applying ‘object’ to cases.256  Even leading 
commentators such as Jones and Whish are unable adequately to ‘rationalise’ the 
case law.  Therefore, an entirely alternative approach is needed.   
Bright lines in law are clearly important, but rigid lines are not always appropriate.  
Even the US Courts have had to adapt their per se approach to accommodate 
situations that they had not legislated for with the ‘quick look rule of reason’.  The 
approach advocated herein is that, while it is of course useful to understand and 
recognise the situations in which any presumptions of anti-competitiveness by 
object can be rebutted, it is not then appropriate to limit such circumstances.  
Instead, a more fluid approach to the object criterion is required.257  Therefore, the 
so-called anomalies in the case law should be viewed from the perspective that the 
role of the object criterion is simply to determine whether the precise purpose of 
the agreement is to restrict competition.   
That assessment must be undertaken within the legal and economic context of the 
particular facts pertaining to the agreement in question.  Given the influence of the 
concept of necessary effect, this is a factor that should be taken into account within 
the legal context (though it is not the defining factor or the starting position).  Even 
though it may be extremely difficult to rebut a presumption of harm,258 the fact 
remains it is possible to do so.  Chapter 2 demonstrated the circumstances where 
such rebuttal has been achieved.  In future, different types of scenario may justify a 
rebuttal, or be seen to have a pro-competitive purpose or legitimate objective, and 
thus tolerate certain restraints ancillary to that primary purpose.  The defining 
factor is the analysis of the facts of each case: the concept of object is flexible and 
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case-specific.  Overall, the dichotomy between by object and by effect restrictions 
as portrayed by the Commission and in cases such as ENS requires refinement.  Any 
restraint is, in principal, capable of restricting Article 101(1) TFEU by object; hence 
the ability of any so-called ‘category’ to expand.259  Therefore, the reliance on the 
concept of ‘necessary effect’ to delineate the dichotomy is erroneous: rather, it 
rests on the nature of the agreement itself.  If its purpose is not to restrict 
competition, then either it falls outside Article 101(1) TFEU or its actual effects must 
be determined.  
5. Conclusion 
This chapter was tasked with investigating the application of the object criterion 
under the MAAP.  The sheer scale of this undertaking demonstrates that the object 
criterion is nuanced and complex.  There is also increasing consensus among 
commentators regarding the multifaceted nature of the object criterion.  
Nevertheless, attempts to rationalise the case law have proved difficult for many 
commentators who continue to subscribe to the notion that the object criterion 
involves a form of categorisation as advanced under the hybrid approach.  
Supporting the hybrid approach ensures, however, that the significance of the legal 
and economic context is at least recognised.  Consequently, there is agreement that 
the concept of object cannot be dismissed as a simplistic, formalistic or abstract 
formula. 
The MAAP provides an alternative, though persuasive, explanation of the apparent 
anomalies in the case law (that is, the deviations from the orthodox approach).  
However, the European Courts and indeed the Commission currently follow the 
hybrid approach.260  Hence, reliance on the categorisation of the object criterion 
has not abated.  The legal and economic context was seen to play the central role in 
every assessment of an agreement’s object whether under the MAAP or hybrid 
approaches.  Its purpose under the hybrid approach, however, is not just to 
                                                     
259
 As shown in supra n1, Pierre Fabre. 
260
 Though, notably, the Article 81(3) Guidelines follow the orthodox approach more closely than the 
hybrid approach, which creates a conflict between the Commission’s practical application of the law 
in decisions such as Lundbeck and its interpretation of the concept within its various Guidelines. 
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determine the agreement’s aim, but also to provide a mechanism under which the 
effects of an agreement can be rebutted.  The AG in BIDS proposed that particular 
elements of an agreement’s legal and economic context may draw into question 
the preliminary labelling of an agreement as restrictive by ‘object’.  This can occur 
when: (i) the restriction does not produce relevant effects on competition; (ii) the 
agreement has ambivalent effects on competition and is intended to promote 
competition; or (iii) the restriction is ancillary to the broader agreement.  AG 
Trstenjak has been proved correct as regards the consideration of such elements, 
but it is submitted that such factors are not merely used to rebut presumptions of 
harm.  Rather, they serve to determine if the purpose of the agreement is to restrict 
competition.  This is an open-ended enquiry, but does not imply that every 
agreement can be found restrictive by object.  The emphasis on legal context will 
ensure past precedent is relevant, but not a defining factor in this regard.  
Most recently, the CJEU has suggested that the object concept is not open-ended, 
but rather is reserved for those types of coordination that by their nature harm 
competition due to their known necessary effect.261   The merits of these 
arguments are considered more closely in the next chapter.  Focusing on the 
necessary effect of an agreement is limiting the usefulness of the object criterion as 
a tool under Article 101(1) TFEU.  Additionally, it implies that new types of 
restrictive practice cannot be found to be anticompetitive by object.262  Moreover, 
such an understanding proposed by the CJEU does not accurately reflect the law as 
discussed in this chapter.  It is therefore submitted that, in accordance with the 
case law of the European Courts, the MAAP is the best interpretation of the object 
criterion.  The following chapter will examine the impact of this finding on Article 
101 TFEU as a whole. 
                                                     
261
 See supra n1, Cartes Bancaires.  Though the CJEU did not then define the contents of such 
category. 
262
 On the basis of the judgment in Cartes Bancaires, the Commission should lose the appeal in 
Lundbeck as it found an agreement restrictive by object, which had not previously been found to do 
so.  Given the Commission cannot expand the object category (unlike the European Courts), the 
reasoning of the Court is eagerly anticipated. 
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Chapter 5: The implications of adopting the more analytical approach 
on Article 101 TFEU 
1. Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the implications for Article 101 TFEU as 
a whole of finding that the best legal interpretation of the object criterion is in 
accordance with the MAAP.  It therefore seeks to determine whether the MAAP fits 
well within the framework of Article 101 TFEU and thereby justifies the conclusion 
that it is the better rationalisation of the law.  To this end, the chapter focuses on 
four key aspects of Article 101 TFEU that are directly affected by the examination of 
the object concept undertaken in chapters 2, 3 and 4.  These aspects are pertinent 
also to the ‘effect’ criterion.  First, the relationship between the object criterion and 
the application of the de minimis doctrine is tackled.  Chapter 3 found that a neutral 
effect or the capacity of the parties to affect competition may have a bearing on the 
outcome when determining an agreement’s object.  This section thus addresses the 
MAAP’s response to the impact of market power on any analysis of an agreement’s 
object and questions whether an agreement restrictive by object must be 
appreciable.  Next, this chapter addresses the objectives of Article 101 TFEU and 
the relationship between such objectives and the object criterion.  The correlation 
between the concept of a ‘restriction of competition’ and the object criterion is 
pertinent in this regard.  Next the distinction between restrictions of competition 
by ‘object’ and by ‘effect’ is assessed, and the criticism that the two concepts 
become blurred under the MAAP is addressed.  Finally, it investigates what the 
MAAP means for the availability of an Article 101(3) TFEU exemption as well as its 
relationship with Article 101(3) TFEU.  
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2. De Minimis: How appreciable is object? 
2.1. Introduction 
This section examines the relationship between the object concept and appreciable 
effects.  This relationship is also pertinent to an understanding of the object/effect 
dichotomy.  AG Kokott has argued that when examining whether a restriction by 
object is appreciable, this does not mean it should be measured against the same 
thresholds (such as market share thresholds) applied when examining the 
appreciable effect of restrictions of competition by effect: “otherwise the 
fundamental difference between restrictions of competition ‘by effect’ and ‘by 
object’ would become blurred”.1 
The nature of the relationship between the object concept and appreciable effects 
has been thrown into uncertainty by the recent suggestion that the de minimis 
doctrine is not applicable to the object criterion at all.  The uncertainty flows from 
the CJEU’s controversial judgment in Expedia, which has since been preserved by 
the Commission in its revised De Minimis Notice and accompanying guidance.2  In 
Expedia, the CJEU held that an “agreement that may affect trade between Member 
States and that has an anticompetitive object constitutes, by its nature and 
independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an appreciable restriction on 
competition”.3  The Commission recounted this verbatim in its Notice and 
interpreted it to mean that the object criterion cannot benefit from the de minimis 
doctrine.4  Hence, the revised Notice does not cover agreements that have as their 
object the restriction of competition.5 
                                                     
1
 Case C-226/11, Expedia Inc v Autorité de la concurrence, 13 December 2012, nyr (Expedia), AG 
Kokott, para 54. 
2
 Ibid, Expedia; 2014/C 291/01, Communication from the Commission — Notice on agreements of 
minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 101(1) of the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (Revised De Minimis Notice); C(2014) 4136 final, Guidance 
on restrictions of competition "by object" for the purpose of defining which agreements may benefit 
from the De Minimis Notice - 25.6.2014.  
3
 Ibid, Expedia, para 37. 
4
 Revised De Minimis Notice, point 2.  Note the Commission has always maintained this position, but 
now cites legal authority for its contention. 
5
 Ibid. 
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Such an approach challenges the widespread belief that any restriction of 
competition must have an appreciable impact on the market.6  The de minimis 
doctrine provides the rationale behind the belief held, by many commentators, that 
a quantitative component to any object analysis is only necessary when 
determining if an agreement has an appreciable impact on competition.  This is in 
view of the rule that there is no need to prove anti-competitive effects for 
agreements restrictive by object.7  Moreover, the significance of the de minimis 
doctrine is that if a restriction of competition by object is not appreciable it could 
fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU.8  Hence, the ruling by the CJEU in Expedia merits 
careful reflection. 
In the following paragraphs, therefore, the relationship between the object 
criterion and the de minimis doctrine is probed in more depth in light of the 
judgment in Expedia.9  This is a complex area, the analysis of which centres on two 
key issues.  The first is whether restrictions by object should be deemed 
automatically appreciable.10  The second concerns the appropriateness of the link 
made by the CJEU in Expedia between restrictions by object and the effect on trade 
requirement under Article 101(1) TFEU.  This section demonstrates that it is 
questionable whether the Commission is entitled to conclude that “by definition” 
anti-competitive agreements by object have “an appreciable impact on 
competition” and cannot be considered as minor.11  Arguably, the Commission has 
failed adequately to address the complexity of the issues involved, and has ignored 
established case law.12  It is therefore imperative that the rationale and application 
of the de minimis doctrine are understood.  To this end, the Expedia judgment is 
used as a basis to explore these issues and to determine how the MAAP rationalises 
the law.  
                                                     
6
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), pp120, 140-144.  The de minimis doctrine was established in Case C-5/69 
Völk v Vervaecke [1969] ECR 295, 5/7, 302. 
7
 (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p120. 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 The De Minimis Notice thus only links restrictions by ‘effect’ with the de minimis doctrine. 
10
 For instance, what is the role of market power in any ‘by object’ assessment. 
11
 See Commission press release IP/14/728 dated 25 June 2014. 
12
 Supra n6, Völk, p302; see (King, 2013). 
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2.2. Expedia: background to the case 
A French transport regulator had levied a fine on SNCF and Expedia for an 
agreement they had entered to create an online travel agency for the sale of train 
tickets.  The regulator found that the “object and effect” of the agreement was to 
restrict competition.13  Further, it found that as the parties were competitors in the 
market for on-line travel agency services, their market share was more than 10% as 
stipulated in the former De minimis Notice, and therefore the de minimis rule was 
not applicable.  The parties appealed the fine and argued that the market shares 
had been overestimated, though they did not dispute the finding that the 
agreement had an anticompetitive object.  It was in this light that the Cour de 
Cassation made a reference for a preliminary ruling.  It requested clarity on 
whether NCAs were precluded from applying Article 101(1) TFEU to an agreement 
that does not reach the thresholds specified by the Commission in its De Minimis 
Notice.14  
Both the 2014 and 2001 De Minimis Notices set out the Commission’s guidance on 
the concept of appreciable effect under Article 101(1) TFEU.15  It is well 
documented that following the judgment in Völk, an agreement - whether by its 
object or effect - that has only an ‘insignificant effect’ on the market will fall outside 
the remit of Article 101(1) TFEU and therefore not restrict competition.16  The 
Commission did not fully endorse the judgment in Völk in its 2001 De Minimis 
Notice, as it refused to exempt restrictions by object from this rule.17  According to 
Jones and Sufrin, however, that does not mean that those types of agreement will 
                                                     
13
 Supra n1, Expedia, para 8. 
14
 Ibid, paras 12 and 13.  Note that the De Minimis Notice referenced in Expedia was to its previous 
incarnation of 2001.  It has been revised following the Expedia judgment.  Together referred to the 
as ‘De Minimis Notices’. 
15
 Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance OJ [2001] C 368/13.  It prescribes that if the aggregate 
market share held by undertakings at a horizontal level is less than 10% and for undertakings at a 
vertical level the aggregate market share is less than 15%, those agreements will not fall within the 
scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. This notice has now been superseded by the Revised De Minimis 
Notice. 
16
 Supra n6 Völk; Joined Cases T-68/89 etc Società Italiana Vetro SpA v Commission [1992] ECR II-
01403; and Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, paras 16 and 17.  See also (Whish & Bailey, 
2012), p120; (Jones & Sufrin, 2011), pp171, 172-177. 
17
 Supra n15, para 11; and (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p142.  Jones and Sufrin take a more nuanced 
stance to the Commission’s position (Jones & Sufrin, 2011), p176.   
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never fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU: an agreement may still be considered of 
“minor importance” if the market shares are significantly lower than those 
contained in the Notice.18  Consequently, the more serious the restraint, the more 
insignificant the position of the parties to the agreement must be.19  This stance 
was espoused by AG Kokott in Expedia, who delivered an opinion that deserves 
further scrutiny.20  
2.3. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott 
The opinions of AG Kokott are often compelling and influential, if sometimes 
contentious.  She has clear ideas on how the law concerning the object criterion 
should be interpreted for the future.  Her views are not, it is submitted, always 
faithful with the case law.21  The Expedia case is an excellent example of an instance 
in which AG Kokott shifted boundaries and moulded the law into a form that she 
wished it to take.22  She advocated the hybrid approach to the object criterion, 
though she has a clear vision of the role that she wishes the object concept to 
perform based on the concept of necessary effect and the promotion of legal 
certainty.23  For AG Kokott, the reply to the question referred would determine the 
scope that NCAs would have in the future when applying Article 101 TFEU.24  She 
also saw the case as providing an opportunity for “further clarification of the 
requirements for a finding of restrictions of competition by object at both Union 
and national level”.25 
                                                     
18
 (Jones & Sufrin, 2011), p176. 
19
 (Jones & Sufrin, 2011), p172, 176-177 citing (Faull & Nikpay, 2007), 3.159-3.161. 
20
 Supra n1, Expedia, paras 48-50, 54-56. 
21
 As evidenced in her opinion in Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands and others [2009] ECR I-4529.  
See (Whish & Bailey, 2012) for commentary on her opinions: pp118-119.  AG Kokott approves of the 
idea that the object concept is there to create legal certainty and therefore moves towards positions 
that support that interpretation (see (Bailey, 2012), p560, ft 9).  However, she also understands that 
agreements are assessed on the basis of their own contexts and this tension with her support of a 
more orthodox understanding of the object concept is not always reconciled in her opinions. 
22
 See similar issues raised by Pablo Ibáñez Colomo in relation to AG Kokott’s interpretation of 
copyright in the Greek decoders case: (Ibáñez Colomo, 2011). 
23
 Supra n21, T-Mobile, opinion, para 43. 
24
 Supra n1, Expedia, para 5. 
25
 Ibid. 
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One theme in AG Kokott’s opinion was that de minimis market share thresholds are 
irrelevant for assessing agreements between undertakings with an anti-competitive 
object.26  Specifically, she asked whether an appreciable effect on competition may 
be presumed where an anti-competitive object is being pursued, but the de minimis 
thresholds under the De Minimis Notice are not reached.27  Acknowledging that the 
De Minimis Notice is not legally binding on NCAs, she recognised that the 
prohibition under Article 101 encompasses “only appreciable restrictions of 
competition”.28  She cited case law such as Völk and STM to support this, and 
proceeded to state that restrictions of competition must be appreciable for both 
restrictions by object and by effect.29  Her citation of STM at this juncture was 
curious. She later used the case to illustrate where the CJEU had not required 
restrictions by object to be appreciable.30   
According to the AG, the requirements concerning proof of an appreciable effect 
differ dependent on whether the agreement concerns restrictions by object or 
effect.31  This, she concluded, manifests itself as a result of the dichotomy between 
restrictions by object and by effect: that restrictions by object do not require actual 
anti-competitive effects to be proved.32  All that must be shown in an object case is 
that the agreement is “actually capable” of restricting competition.33   
Accordingly, “these different requirements regarding proof arise from the fact that 
restrictions ‘by object’ are regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the 
proper functioning of normal competition” as they have harmful consequences for 
                                                     
26
 Ibid, paras 44-57. 
27
 Ibid, para 45. 
28
 Ibid, para 30, 39, 47.  Though see para 38 where she adds NCA’s should not ignore Notices due to 
their duty of sincere cooperation. 
29
 Ibid, para 47. 
30
 Ibid, para 55.  Though this is not necessarily because the CJEU merely presumed appreciability for 
restrictions by object.  This is discussed below. 
31
 Ibid, para 48. 
32
 Ibid, paras 49-50. 
33
 Ibid.  This is in-keeping with the Article 81(3) Guidelines, though not with the judgment in STM 
which requires agreements to be sufficiently deleterious. 
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society.34  Moreover, they can “hardly be regarded as de minimis infringements”.35  
More philosophically, AG Kokott contended that it must be presumed that 
undertakings “always intend” an appreciable effect on competition, irrespective of 
their market power when they enter into agreements that have an anti-competitive 
object.36  Although providing no citation, she would seem to have drawn from 
Odudu’s contention, though itself now somewhat modified, that subjective 
intention is proof of a restrictive object.37  AG Kokott argued that the non-
application of the de minimis market share thresholds to anticompetitive 
agreements by object makes sense in law and in terms of competition policy.38  This 
is because undertakings with market shares below the thresholds would otherwise 
be encouraged to engage in anticompetitive behaviour.39  It follows that market 
share thresholds as set out in the de minimis notice are irrelevant when 
determining whether restrictions of competition by object are appreciable.40   
AG Kokott explained that the judgment in Völk supports the proposition that Article 
101(1) TFEU is not applicable to agreements that have an anticompetitive object if 
the agreement has an “insignificant effect” on the market, taking into account the 
weak position of the parties on the relevant market.41  This is significant as it 
amounts to confirmation that restrictions by object can fall outside Article 101(1) 
TFEU if they have an insignificant effect.  Moreover, AG Kokott stressed that this 
does not then mean that “the appreciable effect of restrictions of competition ‘by 
                                                     
34
 Ibid, para 50 citing BIDS and T-Mobile.  How the CJEU recounts the distinction between object and 
effect is troublesome as the statement originally made in BIDS provides no legal citation, but yet has 
subsequently been cited in judgments such as T-Mobile, Pierre Fabre, Expedia. 
35
 Ibid, paras 50-51.  This statement clearly supports the Commission’s position which specifically 
omits the safety net of the de minimis thresholds for hardcore restrictions.  Such understanding of 
the law begs the question, why should restrictions by object need to be appreciable at all if this is 
how the Court interprets the object criterion?  Notably in Cartes Bancaires, despite the CJEU 
upholding the object/effect distinction set out in BIDS, it found how the object of an agreement is 
determined turns on whether the analysis reveals the agreement is sufficiently deleterious (as per 
the STM Test).   
36
 Ibid, para 50.  
37
 (Odudu, 2001), ‘The Object Requirement Revisited’.  See also Case C-209/07 BIDS [2008] ECR I-
8637, paras 44-46 of the opinion, which also support Odudu’s interpretation.  See also (Odudu, 
2006), p114 and chapter 3 of this thesis. 
38
 Supra n1, Expedia, opinion, para 52.   
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid, para 53. 
41
 Ibid, para 54. 
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object’ must be measured by reference to market share thresholds and still less by 
reference to the same thresholds as those used when examining the appreciable 
effect of restrictions of competition ‘by effect’”.42   
In the light of her reasoning, AG Kokott reached the conclusion that the 
requirements concerning proof that restrictions of competition by object are 
appreciable, should not be more stringent than the requirements concerning proof 
of an appreciable effect on trade between Member States.43  She did not explain 
why she made that link, though she did comment by way of a footnote that an 
“appreciable effect on trade” can be found from a market share that is normally 
around 5%.44  She concluded that if it is established that an agreement that is 
“anticompetitive by object is capable of appreciably affecting trade between 
Member States, it may be readily inferred that the agreement is also capable of 
appreciably restricting...competition”.45  This suggests that for by-object restrictions 
appreciable effects need only be potential and not concrete.46  A similar link was 
made in Völk, whereby the Commission submitted that the same reasons why the 
agreement in question did not have the object of restricting competition were 
applicable to why the agreement did not affect trade between Member States.47   
In answer to the preliminary reference, AG Kokott proposed that a Member State 
may impose penalties on undertakings on the grounds that the agreement they 
have entered is anti-competitive and does not reach the thresholds set out in the 
De Minimis Notice, provided that the NCA has taken account of the Notice and 
proves in another way that the object or effect of the agreement is an appreciable 
restriction of competition.48  Furthermore, the Notice should be interpreted to 
                                                     
42
 Ibid.  Emphasis added. 
43
 Ibid, para 56. 
44
 Ibid, para 58, ft 57. 
45
 Ibid, para 57 
46
 This aspect is not expanded upon in the opinion. 
47
 Supra n5, Völk, p301 (g).  Though notably this is not the same as saying the requirements of proof 
are identical when determining appreciability for the effect on trade criterion and when establishing 
whether there is a restriction of competition.  
48
 Supra n1, Expedia, para 58(1). 
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mean that the market share thresholds are irrelevant when determining whether 
agreements with an anti-competitive object are appreciable.49   
Though much of the opinion is valuable and sensible, it is problematic.50  For 
instance, AG Kokott did not sufficiently address the relationship between the object 
concept and the requirement that it be appreciable,51 or its relationship with the 
jurisdictional function of the effect on trade criterion and the associated test 
establishing an effect on trade.  Ostensibly, AG Kokott agreed that the object 
concept must be appreciable (though to a lesser degree than under the effect 
concept), and that exclusive reliance on market shares is not the only means to 
measure or prove appreciability.  Her reasoning, however, does not give any real 
indication why she supports the position that object should be appreciable at all.  
This is especially pertinent given that the majority of her opinion aims to show why 
the de minimis thresholds in the De Minimis Notice are irrelevant to restrictions by 
object.52  Nonetheless, her opinion is more nuanced and considered than the 
subsequent judgment of the Court. 
2.4. Judgment of the Court 
At first sight, it would appear that the CJEU agreed with much of AG Kokott’s 
opinion.  The CJEU responded to the question referred by the Cour de Cassation by 
stating: 
“Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 3(2) of [Regulation 1/2003] must be 
interpreted as not precluding a national competition authority from 
applying Article 101(1) TFEU to an agreement between undertakings 
that may affect trade between Member States, but that does not 
reach the thresholds specified by the European Commission in its [de 
minimis notice], provided that the agreement constitutes an 
appreciable restriction of competition”.53 
                                                     
49
 Ibid, para 58(2). 
50
 See infra section 2.5. 
51
 Supra n1, Expedia, paras 53-57 (particularly 55).   
52
 Note that STM requires restrictions by object to be “sufficiently deleterious”. AG Kokott does not 
allude to this.   
53
 Supra n1, Expedia, Operative part. 
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Seemingly, the Court is merely reiterating that a Notice issued by the Commission is 
only binding on the Commission.  In this regard, the Commission binds itself over 
the exercise of its own powers as it is constrained in applying EU competition law 
within the parameters of its own guidance.54   
In its judgment, the CJEU correctly reasons that an agreement will come outside 
Article 101(1) TFEU if it has only an “insignificant effect” on the market.  It notes 
that both agreements by object and agreements by effect must “perceptibly” 
restrict competition, and must also be capable of affecting trade between Member 
States in accordance with Article 101(1) TFEU.55  It also recounts how a restriction of 
competition should be assessed by reiterating the conditions set out in the STM 
judgment (although it did not directly cite that case).56  As well as recounting the 
judgment in Völk, the Court recognised that the position of the parties on the 
market is not the only basis upon which an agreement may have an appreciable 
effect.57  The CJEU also agreed with the AG that the Commission’s De minimis Notice 
is not binding on Member States: NCAs may take into account the thresholds in the 
Notice, but are not required to do so.58  It found that such thresholds are one of 
several factors that enable an authority to determine whether a restriction is 
appreciable when examining the actual circumstances of the agreement.59  In view 
of the anticompetitive object of the agreement, the CJEU subsequently made the 
point that the concrete effects of an agreement do not need to taken into account 
once it appears that it has as its object the restriction of competition.60  The Court 
then described the now familiar distinction between infringements by object and 
infringements by effect, arising from the fact that “certain forms of collusion 
                                                     
54
 This ensures the adherence to principles of equal treatment and the protection of legitimate 
expectations. 
55
 Supra n1, Expedia, paras 16-17. 
56
 Ibid, para 21. 
57
 Ibid, para 22, citing Bagnasco and Others, para 35. 
58
 Ibid, para 31.     
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid, para 35. 
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between undertakings can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to 
the proper functioning of normal competition”.61    
Despite the logical build up to the ratio decidendi of the judgment, the CJEU then 
used the distinction between object and effect as the basis for the statement that 
an “agreement that may affect trade between Member States and that has an 
anticompetitive object constitutes, by its nature and independently of any concrete 
effect that it may have, an appreciable restriction on competition”.62  This implied 
that if an agreement affects trade between Member States (which must be 
appreciable) and is also determined to be a restriction by object it will automatically 
be an appreciable restriction of competition.  That is, ‘object’ means ‘appreciable 
restriction of competition’.  If that is the CJEU’s intention, then the judgment is 
ground-breaking. 
On its face, this ruling reflects the link made by AG Kokott between the satisfaction 
of the effect on trade criterion with an anticompetitive object, which ‘may’ imply 
that an agreement is capable of appreciably restricting competition.63  The CJEU has 
made the link more definite however.  The significance of the statement therefore 
necessitates reflection as the CJEU is potentially overruling its previous case law.64  
The questions raised by this statement are numerous: is the object concept now 
intrinsically linked with the satisfaction of the effect on trade criterion, and if so, 
why?  Is that then an appropriate test to determine whether an agreement has an 
appreciable effect on competition, and what would this mean for the relationship 
between object and appreciability? 
The judgment has been interpreted by a number of practitioners as stipulating that, 
“an agreement that has an effect on interstate trade and an anticompetitive object 
constitutes an appreciable restriction on competition per se”.65  Also, that the CJEU 
                                                     
61
 Ibid, para 36.   
62
 Ibid, para 37. 
63
 Ibid, opinion, paras 56-57. 
64
 See supra n6, Völk: that any agreement must have an appreciable impact on competition to 
infringe Article 101(1) TFEU regardless of its object or effect. 
65
 (Stibbe, 2013). 
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has “simplified the case law by ruling that agreements with the object to restrict 
competition that have an effect on trade between Member States will always 
constitute a violation of Article 101 TFEU”.66  Hence, the suggestion is that the CJEU 
does not require the object criterion to be appreciable, which gives rise to the 
possibility of a return to a more formalistic understanding.  In this vein, there is no 
quantitative component to the object criterion; if one follows the orthodox 
approach it is clear that certain restrictions automatically harm competition and do 
not require separate assessment to determine if they have an appreciable effect.  
Akman considers the judgment to declare that “any object agreement which has an 
appreciable effect on trade between Member States has an appreciable effect on 
competition”, and therefore that object agreements that have an effect on trade 
can no longer make use of the de minimis doctrine.67   This means that for 
restrictions by object there is a presumption that they will have an appreciable 
effect on competition.68  For Akman, the judgment in Expedia has thus over-turned 
the judgment in Völk.69   
Re-enforcing that position, the Commission has adopted the stance that the CJEU 
has “now established that the concept of a non-appreciable impact on competition 
(de minimis) does not apply when the agreement in question contains a so-called 
‘by object restriction’”.70  Hence, it appears to affirm that there is no need to prove 
appreciability for the object criterion as it is automatically appreciable per se.   
Whether such an interpretation is correct is not categorical given both the CJEU’s 
statement that agreements must “perceptibly” restrict competition, and its actual 
answer to the question referred.71  The propensity for confusion and lack of clarity 
regarding the object criterion, despite subsequent judgments such as Allianz 
                                                     
66
 Ibid.  This was said to be in contrast to the Völk judgment where any restriction whether by object 
or effect will fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU if it only has an insignificant effect on the market, taking 
into account the weak position of the parties on the relevant market. 
67
 (Akman, 2013).  
68
 Ibid. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Commission, Public Consultations, Revision of the De Minimis Notice, Objective of the 
consultation, July 2013. 
71
 Supra n1, Expedia, paras 20, 38. 
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Hungária and Cartes Bancaires which advocate a more analytical approach, has thus 
been heightened.  
If the Commission is right, the implications of the judgment are profound as it 
seemingly reinforces the orthodox approach.  Such an understanding of the 
judgment could have consequences that the CJEU did not intend.72  The most 
obvious consequence has been the Commission’s tendentious interpretation of the 
judgment and its influence on the revised De Minimis Notice.73  AG Kokott gave 
clear reasoning as to why the De Minimis Notice thresholds are not applicable to 
restrictions by object, but she did not then reject the idea that the object criterion 
requires some form of appreciable impact.   
2.5. Analysis of the judgment 
Contrary to the views expounded above, the CJEU did not in fact announce a new 
position in law, particularly in the light of its concluding statement and the context 
of its judgment.74  The Court does not, moreover, readily proffer contentious 
judgments.  Rather, in Expedia it was merely stating the obvious: that agreements 
that affect trade and have an anticompetitive object will normally appreciably 
restrict competition.  To have actually determined the object of an agreement 
would have required the Court to assess an agreement within its legal and economic 
context.  Therefore, whether the agreement was appreciable would have already 
been assessed at that juncture.   
Alternatively, the CJEU was asserting that satisfaction of the effect on trade criterion 
will also satisfy the requirement that the object of an agreement is appreciable.  
This latter interpretation is more problematic as the CJEU did not disclose how the 
concepts should be linked.  Furthermore, it could be misinterpreted as suggesting 
that when assessing the object of an agreement any analytical component is now 
redundant if the effect on trade criteria has been satisfied.  Chapters 2 and 3 
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demonstrate that if this were the case the CJEU would have been turning its back on 
decades of case law.  Moreover, at no point does the Court state that the object 
criterion cannot benefit from the de minimis doctrine as coined in Völk.  On the 
contrary, the CJEU reaffirms the fact that restrictions by object must be 
perceptible.75   
What is unfortunate about the judgment is that it has allowed inferences to be 
drawn that have ultimately been preserved by the Commission in its revised De 
Minimis Notice.  The scope for misinterpretation of the law and its misapplication is 
therefore significant.  The revised De Minimis Notice and accompanying guidance 
document brings the Commission back to a more orthodox approach despite 
subsequent judgments in Allianz Hungária and Cartes Bancaires, which support a 
more contextual analysis.76  Rather than recasting the law, Expedia raises pertinent 
questions regarding the role of de minimis in any assessment of the object of an 
agreement.77  It is this relationship and its appropriateness that is considered next.   
2.5.1. Appreciable effects 
The requirement that restrictions of competition under Article 101(1) TFEU need be 
appreciable is not a requirement of the Treaty.  Therefore, demonstrating the 
existence of market power is not a pre-requisite for a finding of a restriction of 
competition.78  Rather, the European Courts have determined that an agreement 
must restrict competition to an appreciable extent and that Article 101(1) TFEU is 
not concerned with agreements that have an insignificant effect on the market.79  
Moreover, the case law shows that even agreements containing hardcore restraints 
can fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU should they have an insignificant effect.80  What 
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the case law does not tell us is what constitutes an ‘insignificant effect’, or whether 
the measure changes depending on the nature of the restraint.  Neither does it 
explain in the context of the object criterion whether that effect need be an actual 
or potential effect on competition.  Moreover, the case law does not explain 
whether the effect of agreements-by-object should be appreciable and, if so, 
whether that is at all appropriate. 
The judgment in Expedia succeeds in further fudging the essence of the object 
criterion.  This is due to the interplay between the MAAP and the orthodox 
approach, which are both advocated in the judgment.81  It is unclear whether the 
CJEU was reiterating AG Kokott’s conclusion in its own terms and thus approving 
the link she established between proof of effect on trade and proof of appreciable 
effect.  The practical implications of this are ambiguous.82  Moreover, a concern is 
whether then proving the object of an agreement requires any meaningful 
quantitative component, particularly as concrete effects do not need to be proven 
(or indeed, if the Commission is believed, potential effects).83 
It is submitted that Expedia does not counsel the abandonment of any quantitative 
component.  The CJEU still expressly stipulated that to assess whether a restriction 
under Article 101(1) TFEU exists, recourse to the content of the agreement, its 
objectives and the legal and economic context is necessary and must perceptibly 
restrict competition.84  Whether proving an effect on trade provides a short cut to 
the assessment of whether an agreement restricts competition by object is 
dubious.  It is not correct that the only quantitative component when determining if 
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an agreement is restrictive by object arises when assessing its appreciability.85  This 
is due to the increasingly recognised role of the ‘legal and economic context’.86   
The Court was right to affirm that the Commission’s thresholds in its De minimis 
Notice may be disregarded by the NCAs “provided that the agreement constitutes 
an appreciable restriction of competition”.87  This is because whether an agreement 
is appreciable or not depends on the facts of the case, and thus on its own legal and 
economic context.  It axiomatic that certain agreements that come under the de 
minimis thresholds could still, in principal, have an appreciable effect.  The 
thresholds are the Commission’s enforcement policy choice: these are essential 
tools for the Commission to carry out its work, but are not necessarily upheld by 
law.  They give undertakings a degree of certainty that the Commission will not 
investigate agreements below the threshold.   
The relationship between the object criterion and the de minimis doctrine is 
abstruse.  The necessity to prove actual appreciable effects in an effect analysis was 
first raised in STM.88  Even though the Community Courts have consistently upheld 
the de minimis doctrine since Völk,89 it is still not altogether unambiguous.  This will 
undoubtedly be exacerbated by Expedia.90 Whether appreciability makes sense for 
restrictions by object requires reflection.  This is because restraints by object do not 
require the plaintiff to prove the agreement actually has a restrictive effect on 
competition.  Furthermore, the success or implementation of an agreement is 
irrelevant to a finding by object.  Others believe that a detailed analysis of 
appreciability would undermine the distinction between object and effect.91  It is 
also argued that those undertakings with extremely low market shares would 
almost be “invited to refrain from effective competition with each other and to join 
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together in restraint of trade”.92  There is certainly case law that could be seen to 
endorse the position that appreciability is not a requirement for satisfying the 
object criterion.93  Appreciability is almost viewed as a step removed from the 
process of determining the object or effect of an agreement, as if it is a separate 
requirement.   
It is proposed that, contrary to being a separate component, the requirement of 
appreciability should be seen, when determining restrictions of competition by 
object, as part of the overall assessment as to whether an agreement has the object 
of restricting competition.  This is drawn from a consideration of the legal and 
economic context.  It is clear from the judgment in Völk that restrictions by object 
can benefit from a form of appreciability as the Court held that, with reference to 
the actual circumstances of the agreement, an agreement may fall outside Article 
101(1) TFEU if the effect on the market is insignificant.94  The Court did not specify 
at what level the effect is considered ‘insignificant’, nor did it specify that to 
determine such effect required knowledge of the parties’ actual market shares.  
Rather, it referred to “the weak position which the persons concerned have on the 
markets of the product in question”.95  The STM test upholds this notion as it 
requires that when assessing the precise purpose of the agreement (that is, the 
object), if an analysis of the clauses of the agreement does not reveal the “effect on 
competition to be sufficiently deleterious” then the consequences (the actual 
effects) of the agreement should be considered to determine whether competition 
has in fact been restricted to an appreciable extent.96 
Determining whether the effect on competition is sufficiently deleterious would 
arguably involve an understanding that an agreement had some form of 
appreciable effect.  It does not necessarily warrant, however, a determination of 
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actual appreciable effect.  Rather, that it is capable or has the potential of having a 
negative impact on competition.97   In STM, the Court stipulated that to decide 
whether a restriction is prohibited by its object or effect, it is appropriate to take 
into account, inter alia, the nature and quantity of the products covered by the 
agreement and the position and importance of the supplier and distributor on the 
market for the products concerned.98  This requirement was repeated in Allianz 
Hungária, Expedia and Cartes Bancaires, though in some cases the citations made in 
support were inaccurate and moreover the pertinent authority for this, STM, was 
omitted.99  That aside, the case law review in chapter 2 highlights that each case 
should be assessed on its own merits and facts.100  As such, it would depend on the 
agreement at what point it would be ‘sufficiently deleterious’.101  This point was 
picked up on by the CJEU in Cartes Bancaires where it referred to the need for the 
agreement to reveal a sufficient degree of harm.102  Determining whether an 
agreement reveals a sufficient degree of harm to competition necessitates an 
analysis of the agreement’s legal and economic context, which involves taking 
account of the nature of the goods and the real conditions of the functioning and 
structure of the market/s in question.103  Hence, the parties’ market power may be 
an important factor in such analysis when determining if an agreement’s purpose is 
to restrict competition.104 
The judgment in Völk stated that an agreement falls outside Article 101(1) TFEU 
when it has:  
“only an insignificant effect on the markets, taking into account the 
weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of 
the product in question.  Thus an [exclusive dealing] agreement, 
even with absolute territorial protection, may, having regard to the 
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weak position of the persons concerned on the market in the 
products in question...escape the prohibition laid down in Article 
[101]”.105  
This passage is taken to mean that the weak position of the parties to the 
agreement on the product market in question should be taken into account when 
assessing the actual circumstances of the case for agreements whether by object or 
effect.  Therefore, the legal and economic context is key.  This assessment goes 
hand in hand with an assessment of the effect on trade criterion, which too must be 
satisfied.106  The Court’s judgment in Völk follows its rephrasing of the question 
referred as: “whether, in deciding whether [exclusive distribution agreements] fall 
within the prohibition set out in Article [85](1) of the Treaty, regard must be had to 
the proportion of the market which the grantor controls or endeavours to obtain in 
the territory ceded”.107   
Consequently, it would appear that where the parties have a market share between 
1% and 5% the effect on competition is insignificant.108  From an economic 
perspective, it is hard to see where the economic harm might be if two 
undertakings with no market power colluded.  This view is upheld by Akman who 
considers it to be unacceptable to suggest that an agreement where the parties 
have a market share of 2% will have an appreciable effect on competition.109  That 
said, parties that aim to restrict competition should not benefit from a rule that 
allows their agreements to fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU per se as a result of their 
low market shares.110  However, this depends on what the parties are seeking to 
achieve and is context driven.111  For instance, it is less plausible that horizontal 
agreements would be seen to be de minimis as opposed to vertical ones.112  The 
thresholds set out by the Commission in its revised De Minimis Notice may well not 
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apply to restrictions by object, but that is not to say that there is no place for 
consideration of market shares and an agreement’s potential impact on 
competition.   
The judgment in Expedia does not overturn Völk.  Rather, it illustrates how the CJEU 
does not always enunciate the subtleties of Article 101(1) TFEU and can thus 
confuse rather than clarify.  The phraseology used by the CJEU is unhelpful: 
arguably there is an innate finding of appreciable effects when the object of an 
agreement is determined within its legal and economic context.  This resolution of 
the law is, however, contentious.  For example, there is a question over whether 
determining appreciability is a separate element from determining the object of an 
agreement.  In Ziegler SA v Commission, the GC found that agreements that restrict 
competition by object infringe Article 101(1) TFEU only if they have an appreciable 
effect on competition and on trade between Member States.113  This suggests 
appreciability is assessed after a finding of object, and that it seemingly must 
measure an actual effect on competition.  Whether the determination when 
appreciability is assessed makes any material difference to the eventual outcome 
for a restriction by object is moot.  To perceive appreciability as part of the legal 
and economic context as well as the appraisal of the circumstances of the 
agreement would surely be more sensible.  This is partly because it would then 
discourage the idea that there is no quantitative component to the object criterion.  
The fact of the matter is, the impact of agreements that are restrictive by object 
must be appreciable, but at what point they become appreciable is debatable.114  
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That even a tiny market share could potentially result in a finding of an 
infringement by object is therefore not in question, although it is doubtful.  The 
more pertinent issue is whether anything else other than market shares could 
satisfy the requirement that agreements are perceptibly restrictive of competition.  
Whish and Bailey suggest that market power can be influential where the parties 
hold a tiny proportion of the market for a particular product, but have an important 
position on the market generally.115  They also suggest that the case law shows 
agreements have been found not to be appreciable, not because of the parties’ 
market power, but because the restriction is insignificant in a qualitative sense.116    
In summation, STM highlights that each case is decided on its merits, hence the 
consideration of the position of the parties on the market within the analysis of the 
legal and economic context.  The judgment in Völk concurs with this as the outcome 
of whether an agreement comes outside Article 101(1) TFEU depends on the 
“actual circumstances” of the agreement.117  Bailey argues – correctly – that what 
constitutes appreciability under the object criterion is different from that under 
effect: that actual appreciable effects do not need to be proved under the object 
criterion, rather that “the potential effects on competition of the conduct are 
inherently likely to be significant”.118  Otherwise, it would undermine the 
object/effect dichotomy.119  Bailey asserts that the de minimis doctrine is based on 
the idea that “the risk of competitive harm is too small for the law to be concerned 
with”.120  Therefore the de minimis doctrine only applies to cases of real economic 
insignificance.121  Consequently, it is not inconceivable that parties to an agreement 
with a tiny market share (below 5%) may, within the agreement’s context, be found 
to restrict competition by object.122  Ultimately, the outcome depends on the 
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purpose of the agreement.123  For instance, Völk concerned a vertical agreement 
(exclusive dealing).  Whether the same conclusion would have been reached if the 
case had concerned a horizontal price fixing cartel is doubtful.124   
AG Kokott was aware of these issues concerning the frailty of the relationship 
between appreciability and the object concept; hence, her suggestions that the 
level of proof differs when establishing the object of an agreement.  In addition, she 
marked out as significant the fact that appreciability can also be proved without 
recourse to market shares, a point also picked up by the CJEU in its judgment.125  
For the Commission, the de minimis doctrine plays a different role.  Drawing on the 
Commission’s De minimis Notices, appreciability refers to whether the effects on 
competition are sufficient to warrant the EU’s intervention under Article 101(1) 
TFEU.126   
Whether the de minimis doctrine is appropriate for the object concept is, 
nonetheless, debatable.  It is submitted that the doctrine is suitable as it cannot be 
truly said that an agreement aims to restrict competition if the potential effect on 
competition is insignificant.127  This should be determined when examining the legal 
and economic context of an agreement: is an agreement so unimportant, that 
despite the anticompetitive purpose of the agreement it should still fall outside the 
realms of Article 101(1) TFEU altogether as its potential effect on competition in 
that market is inconsequential.  STM refers to the “precise purpose” of an 
agreement, which denotes the over-arching purpose of the agreement and, 
secondly, that the effect on competition be “sufficiently deleterious”.128  This 
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alludes to the balancing act that can take place under the object criterion when 
determining what the true purpose of the agreement is.  The complicating factor 
resulting from Expedia is whether, in respect of the object criterion, the CJEU 
intended to link satisfaction of the effect on trade criterion with satisfaction of an 
appreciable effect on competition.   
2.5.2. Effect on trade  
The most important aspect of the effect on trade criterion is that, unlike the 
substantive test which determines whether an agreement restricts competition, it is 
a jurisdictional test.129  It determines whether an examination of an agreement or 
conduct is warranted under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU.130  Article 101 TFEU requires 
that it is applicable only to agreements that “may affect trade between Member 
States”.  The requirement ‘may affect trade’ relates to the fact that is possible to 
foresee with a sufficient degree of probability that the agreement “may have an 
influence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the pattern of trade between 
Member States”.131  Therefore it is necessary that an agreement is capable of 
having an effect, but it is not necessary to prove it will do so.132  Whether the 
pattern of trade is influenced it is merely necessary to show that trade has been 
influenced by means of a reduction or, indeed, an increase in trade.133  Given the 
wide remit of the notion ‘may affect’, it highlights that the jurisdictional reach is 
extensive.134  Moreover, an agreement containing a so-called ‘hardcore restriction’ 
may circumvent the remit of Article 101(1) TFEU if it does not satisfy the effect on 
trade requirement.   
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The effect on trade must be appreciable.135  To assess appreciability, the 
Commission looks to the market position of the parties to the agreement.  The 
larger the market share, the more likely that trade will be affected.136  According to 
the Commission, not only is an undertaking’s market share relevant, but also the 
value of its turnover.137  Moreover, the assessment should be undertaken within 
the legal and economic context.138  Arguably, this aspect of the test is similar to that 
required when assessing the object of an agreement in accordance with STM.  What 
is more, the Commission states that appreciability, in the context of effect on trade, 
is satisfied when the parties aggregate market share is above 5% and their turnover 
is below 40 million EUR.139  This test differs from that set out in the De Minimis 
Notices.  It is this distinction that is drawn upon by AG Kokott in Expedia.140   
It is submitted that the outcome of the effect on trade test should not 
autonomously satisfy whether an agreement restricts competition by object, nor 
that the functions of the jurisdictional and substantive tests be merged.  The 
jurisdictional test and substantive test pursue different goals.141  The ruling by the 
CJEU in Expedia has had the unfortunate consequence of bringing into question the 
relationship between the jurisdictional and substantive elements of Article 101(1) 
TFEU.  Consequently, there will be speculation over whether a satisfaction of the 
effect on trade test will automatically satisfy the requirement that restrictions by 
object are appreciable.142  As stated above, some commentators have interpreted 
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this as removing any analytical component from the object concept.143  It is 
proposed that the CJEU did not necessarily intend such conclusion.144 
It is not denied that there are superficial factors that connect the effect on trade 
criterion and the substantive test under Article 101(1) TFEU: factors used to 
determine whether there is an effect on trade will often have similarities to those 
used to determine whether there is a restriction of competition.  For instance, a 
consideration of the nature of the products and the position and importance of the 
parties on the market will be relevant in both cases.145  It would therefore not be 
inappropriate to surmise that these were the reasons why AG Kokott deemed it 
suitable to link those lesser thresholds under the Effect on Trade Notice with the 
satisfaction of the requirement that restrictions by object can be inferred as being 
appreciable.146 
Aside from the fact the effect on trade requirement is a jurisdictional test, however, 
there are crucial differences.  An effect on trade is determined on the basis of 
whether an agreement may have “an influence, direct or indirect, actual or 
potential, on the pattern of trade between Member States”.147  Therefore the test 
relates to a determination of the ‘pattern of trade’, not whether there is a 
‘restriction of competition’.  Fundamentally, the goals of the requirements are 
different.  Linking the satisfaction of the jurisdictional test with the substantive test 
can only result in confusion.148  The results of the jurisdictional test should not form 
the basis for an automatic irrebuttable presumption that an agreement found to 
have a restrictive object is appreciable.149  To blur the lines between the 
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jurisdictional and substantive assessments under Article 101(1) TFEU undermines 
the body of case law, which rightly separates the two requirements.   
Whilst the outcome and methodology applied when determining if the 
jurisdictional test has been satisfied may be a helpful basis upon which to 
determine if the object of an agreement is appreciable within its legal and 
economic context, it cannot be depended upon.150  Rather, the substantive test 
would need to reaffirm whether the object of an agreement was to restrict 
competition appreciably.  This is also because the test to satisfy the requirement 
that an agreement affects trade is a broad one, and it is of no consequence whether 
the pattern of trade is potentially reduced, restricted or even increased.151   
2.6. Conclusion: not a landmark judgment 
The judgment in Expedia is unhelpful in terms of the impact it may have on the 
interpretation of the object criterion.  The judgment forms the basis of the 
Commission’s stance for its exclusion of restrictions by object to its de minimis 
thresholds in its revised De Minimis Notice.  AG Kokott, whose opinion seems to 
have influenced the CJEU, is wrong to state so categorically that if an agreement 
with an anti-competitive object is capable of appreciably affecting trade between 
Member States it can be inferred that the agreement is also capable of appreciably 
restricting competition.152  At the very least, such inference must be rebuttable.  It 
is perhaps true that the effect on trade criteria demands lower thresholds to prove 
an appreciable effect on trade and that it could be closely seen to mirror a form of 
substantive analysis.  That said such rationale undermines the determination of 
restrictions by object.  The judgment in Expedia gives a false impression that there 
is a short cut to the more analytical approach advocated in STM and confirmed in 
subsequent cases such as Allianz Hungária.  There are indeed arguments in favour 
of having a far lower de minimis threshold for restrictions by object, but that is not 
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to say that the consideration of appreciability is redundant.  The treatment of the 
de minimis doctrine by the CJEU in Expedia has been damaging and it is submitted 
that, although AG Kokott makes salient points regarding infringements by object, 
she ultimately would prefer to follow her normative vision of what constitutes the 
object criterion rather than a faithful reading of the case law. 
AG Kokott’s reasoning is flawed by her linking of the jurisdictional and substantive 
elements of Article 101(1) TFEU.  If she had simply concluded that the requirements 
concerning proof of an appreciable restriction by object should be no more onerous 
than the requirements for proof of an appreciable effect on trade, such reasoning 
would have made more sense.153  In her attempt to simplify the law and to highlight 
the distinction between restrictions by object and by effect she has, however, 
evoked uncertainty.  She by-passed the subtleties of the law regarding the object 
criterion sketched out above.  Certainly, the Commission believes that the CJEU 
intended to reflect her opinion when stating that agreements that may affect trade 
between Member States and that have as their object the restriction of 
competition constitutes an appreciable restriction of competition.154     
The conclusion drawn in this thesis is that the CJEU did not necessarily intend to be 
contentious by changing the law.  Notably, the CJEU continues to uphold the 
requirement that restrictions by object must be “perceptible”.155  The Expedia 
judgment has therefore not overturned Völk.156  Whether the effect on trade 
analysis can satisfy the requirement for an appreciable restriction of competition by 
object is unclear.  The CJEU is not explicit enough in this regard.157  Instead, the 
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CJEU has succeeded in perpetuating confusion.158  This is exacerbated by its 
subsequent and comprehensive judgment in Allianz Hungária.159   
3. The impact of the MAAP on the objectives of Article 101 TFEU  
3.1. Introduction 
The judgment in Expedia raises a number of themes concerning the relationship 
between the object criterion and particular elements of Article 101 TFEU as a 
whole, such as the de minimis doctrine and the effect on trade criterion.  These 
features raise the broader question of the objectives of EU competition law.  This 
section examines how the object criterion, when interpreted in accordance with the 
MAAP, complements the changing objectives of Article 101 TFEU.  In particular, it 
examines the close relationship between the object concept and the notion of a 
‘restriction of competition’.  This in turn enables the distinction between ‘object’ 
and ‘effect’ to be scrutinised.  This section will demonstrate that the object 
criterion is able to fit comfortably within the framework of Article 101 TFEU when 
understood in accordance with the MAAP. 
3.2. The objectives of Article 101 TFEU: what is a restriction of competition 
According to Bork, it is not possible to “frame a coherent body of substantive rules” 
until the goals of competition law are understood.160  He considers that competition 
law policy cannot be understood unless we know what the normative purpose of 
the law is.161  Bork’s point is pertinent, though would require an unchanging set of 
aims.162  The history of the development of EU competition law reveals that the 
goals of EU competition law vary over time and, in conjunction, there will continue 
to be a body of substantive rules.163  More specifically, in relation to the object 
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criterion, aside from the Commission’s stance in its Article 81(3) Guidelines, there is 
no clear consensus from the European Courts as to the precise role of the object 
concept.  Despite this, the law relating to the object criterion has continued to 
develop and evolve and, in the background, the objectives of EU competition law 
have also changed, which in turn shape the direction of the law.164    
This section is not concerned with undertaking an in depth investigation into the 
goals of EU competition law.  Rather, it seeks to gain a more basic understanding of 
how the objectives behind Article 101 TFEU help shape the application and role of 
the object criterion, as interpreted under the MAAP, when applying Article 101 
TFEU to agreements.  Such an exercise helps put the object concept into context 
when assessing its pivotal role within Article 101 TFEU: the concept of object relates 
directly to our understanding and assessment of what is a ‘restriction of 
competition’.  The power of the object concept to determine this therefore 
depends largely on the characterisation of a ‘restriction of competition’.  What 
comprises a restriction of competition in turn depends on how the goals of EU 
competition law are perceived.  The goals and objectives of Article 101 TFEU have, 
unsurprisingly, been the source of intense debate in recent years, particularly as a 
result of modernisation.165   
On a more practical level, the Commission is responsible for devising EU-wide 
competition policy and polices its enforcement.166  Thus, the Commission has a 
huge influence on the orientation of the EU’s competition policy and dictates its 
enforcement priorities.  Nonetheless, the European Courts have the ultimate power 
in interpreting the law.  As the Courts’ views on the objectives of EU Competition 
law are not always consonant with those of the Commission, this creates tension.167  
It has been argued that the European Courts have become less tolerant of the 
Commission’s policy-driven approaches.  Monti points out that policy can guide the 
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evolution of law, but only within reason.168  Furthermore, legal language cannot be 
stretched so far as to deprive it of meaning in order to reach a desired end.169  This 
proposition is particularly pertinent for the MAAP, which closely follows the 
wording of the Treaty, and contradicts the orthodox approach, which imposes its 
own extraneous meaning on the object criterion. 
To understand what the main objectives of EU competition law are, it is necessary 
to look at numerous sources, such as the treaties, legislation, jurisprudence as well 
as policy documents.170  Motta asserts that the main objectives are “most probably 
economic efficiency and European market integration”.171  Conversely, Monti 
contends that the core values of EU competition law are market integration, 
economic freedom and economic efficiency.172  These core values shift in 
importance and interpretation over time depending on current influences such as 
politics, economics and institutions.173  This assessment must be correct: the law 
does not operate in a vacuum.  A system of competition law naturally includes both 
the law (that is, a body of legal rules and standards) and policy, which together 
regulate and enforce EU competition law and ensure the maintenance of 
competitive markets.174    
What is understood to constitute the goals of EU competition policy also differs 
depending on whether lawyers or economists are consulted.175  Consumer welfare 
is now at the heart of competition law policy for the Commission,176 though the 
CJEU still holds a torch for ordoliberal principles, public policy aspirations, and 
market integration goals as demonstrated in cases such as GSK, Pierre Fabre and FA 
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(Premier League).177  EU competition law and policy has moved towards a 
neoclassical model and away from the maxim that every agreement that restricts 
economic freedom is a restriction of competition.178  The current focus on the 
economic concept of consumer welfare and economic efficiency (the effects-based 
approach), has again recast the objectives of EU competition law.179  Hence, the 
debate as to the objectives of Article 101 TFEU and the meaning of ‘competition’ 
remain.180 
This serves to illustrate the shifting sands of EU competition law objectives.  
Nevertheless, such objectives continue to be relevant in judgments, in particular, in 
the context of determining an agreement’s object.181  The judgment in E.ON 
Ruhrgas AG demonstrates how these objectives permeate the outcome of the case 
law.  In that case, the GC took account of its understanding of the Community’s 
objectives when determining whether the object of an agreement was to share 
markets.182  The Court referred to the CJEU’s desire to unite national markets in a 
single market, which was an “essential object of the Treaty”.183  The object of the 
agreement under scrutiny could not be said to be neutral as it was concluded at a 
time when the liberalisation of the energy markets could be reasonably 
envisaged.184  The judgment in E.ON Ruhrgas AG is a useful point of reference as it 
not only depicts non-economic goals being considered by the GC within Article 
101(1) TFEU, but evinces that the single market objective was taken to be part of 
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the consideration of the ‘economic context’ of the agreement.185  Similarly, in BIDS 
a deciding factor in the judgment was the freedom of the undertakings 
independently to determine their own commercial policy.186   
It is contended that the MAAP is far better placed than more formalistic 
alternatives to react flexibly to such changing objectives of EU competition law, not 
least changing policy objectives.187  As the object criterion is based on 
understanding whether an agreement’s purpose is to restrict competition, this 
enables considerations relating to competition law goals to be balanced within the 
legal and economic context.  For instance, the orthodox approach automatically 
prohibits ATP, and conversely experience dictates the type of restriction 
automatically condemned by object.188  Hence, in those cases where the CJEU has 
found certain restraints justifiable or has newly found others to infringe Article 
101(1) TFEU by object, they would be seen as anomalous.189  This is illustrated by 
the Lundbeck decision where the Commission struggled to adapt the orthodox 
approach to its changing policy objectives.  Under the MAAP, however, specific 
economic circumstances may justify such restraints and the agreement is not then 
found to restrict competition by object.190  Conversely, the hybrid approach is 
founded on categorisation based on experience (if the judgement in Cartes 
Bancaires is believed) so is less able to accommodate the changing goals of 
competition law than the MAAP, but unlike the orthodox approach, any 
presumption of harm would be rebuttable within Article 101(1) TFEU.     
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3.2.1. Conclusion: the relationship between the object concept and restrictions of 
competition 
The MAAP is able to adapt to the changing objectives of EU competition law due to 
the relationship between the object criterion and what constitutes a ‘restriction of 
competition’.  Like the objectives of EU competition law, what constitutes a 
restriction of competition will evolve depending on the economics and political 
influences present at a given time.191  Therefore, its meaning is heavily influenced 
by the goals of EU competition law.  The Treaty itself provides a list of examples of 
‘restrictions’ in Article 101(1)(a)-(e) TFEU.192  Nazzini concludes that it means “anti-
competitive effects”.193  He finds that Article 101 TFEU “prohibits collusive 
behaviour that reduces, or is likely to reduce, consumer welfare through restricting 
output and raising prices or through partitioning the common market”.194  For 
Monti, the evolving role of a ‘restriction of competition’ is evident as he believes it 
has transformed from meaning a “substantial interference with economic freedom” 
to a “restriction of economic freedom [that] now serves only to establish a 
presumption that the agreement reduces efficiency to the detriment of consumers, 
a presumption which can be aided when the firms have market power”.195  The 
influence of economics on such an understanding of what constitutes a restriction 
of competition is however questionable.196  Monti argues that following the 
drafting of Article 101 TFEU a restriction of competition must have a non-economic 
meaning as, if there is efficiency (as found under Article 101(3) TFEU), then there is 
no restriction of competition.197  
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So what does this mean for the object concept?  Under the MAAP, if object is 
understood as ‘purpose’ then it is well placed to adapt flexibly to whatever is 
deemed to entail a restriction of competition.198  Such purpose is assessed within its 
own particular context.  The jurisprudence demonstrates that if a type of 
agreement has been previously identified by the European Courts as being 
restrictive by object this does not then denote that it will in future automatically be 
found to contravene Article 101(1) TFEU.  Moreover, both object and effect serve 
the same purpose, to establish whether competition is restricted.199  This is 
underpinned by STM which underlines how the elements share a basic 
methodology.200  The orthodox approach, on the other hand, imparts less 
significance to the notion of a ‘restriction of competition’.201  Instead, it is 
constrained by the concept of necessary effect.202   
It has been seen that the European Courts have expanded the object category, a 
fact that undermines the rationale supporting the orthodox approach (the 
contention that the category of agreements-by-object should be narrowly 
construed).  Furthermore, the CJEU often uses vague language when finding that 
particular restrictions may restrict competition by object depending on the 
circumstances of the case, particularly its legal and economic context.203  This also 
challenges the straightforwardness of the orthodox approach on the basis that it 
“eradicates the need to prove, at cost, the adverse consequences of provisions 
which are in practice likely to lead to inefficiency and are unlikely to have any 
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redeeming justification”.204  SA Binon is a good illustration of a case in which the 
CJEU did not automatically link particular (hardcore) restrictions with the object 
criterion, instead finding that certain provisions in an agreement simply amounted 
to restrictions of competition.205  The Court held that provisions fixing prices 
“constitute, of themselves, a restriction on competition”, particularly as these types 
of agreement are listed in Article 101(1) TFEU.206  This cannot be interpreted to 
mean the object criterion is synonymous with particular restraints.207   
It is contended that the MAAP therefore makes better sense of the functioning of 
Article 101(1) TFEU as a whole.  If ‘object’ was used as a more limited analytical tool 
when determining whether an agreement restricts competition by focusing on its 
‘aim’ or ‘purpose’, then the ‘restriction of competition’ element of Article 101(1) 
TFEU would more clearly centre around the examples in Article 101(1)(a) to (c) 
TFEU as types of agreements that can harm competition.  Included in such 
definition of what constitutes a ‘restriction of competition’ are other restrictions 
which the Courts have held to be ‘obvious’, ‘serious’ or indeed just ‘restrictions of 
competition’, as well as novel types of restrictions.  The object criterion would then 
be used to clarify whether the agreement indeed has the aim or primary purpose to 
restrict competition by, for example, fixing prices or sharing markets.  The 
agreement’s success in this regard is irrelevant as is its non-implementation.     
Moreover, it is increasingly accepted that the object concept is not limited to an 
object box: not every hardcore restriction will be a restriction of competition by 
object and vice-versa.208  This establishes - in the case of hardcore restrictions in 
particular - a rebuttable presumption of anti-competitiveness.  The value of 
categorisation is therefore questionable.  For this reason, as with the orthodox 
approach, the merits of the hybrid approach as a methodology are not promoted in 
this thesis.  What is needed is an alternative vision of the law.  This is found in the 
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MAAP.  An interesting example where the MAAP could be more effectively 
deployed is that of RPM.  RPM is a form of vertical price fixing, which many 
economists and lawyers believe should not be a restriction of Article 101(1) TFEU 
per se.209  The orthodox approach risks over enforcement when it finds RPM is 
always restrictive by object.  It is not inconceivable that the MAAP (with its focus on 
an agreement’s specific legal and economic context) could find that, despite 
containing a form of RPM, an agreement does not have the precise purpose of 
restricting competition.  The agreement would then need to be considered under 
‘effect’ to determine if it did in fact restrict competition to an appreciable extent.  
In such a scenario, there is a possibility that either the agreement would be found 
not to restrict competition by effect, or would be able to benefit from an exemption 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.   
4.  The distinction between restrictions by object and by effect 
With its focus on the legal and economic context an obvious criticism of the MAAP 
is that the distinction between restrictions by object and by effect is ambiguous, 
which thereby diminishes the role of ‘effect’.210  This criticism is seemingly 
exacerbated by cases such as Allianz Hungária.211  It can be rejected, however, as 
the research does not support such a criticism.  Rather, understanding the object 
concept in accordance with the MAAP enhances and explains the relationship 
between the two substantive elements.  They complement each other, and have 
divergent roles in the determination of whether a given agreement restricts 
competition.212   
The roles of object and effect are thus distinct.  The object concept looks to identify 
whether the purpose, indeed the rationale behind the agreement, objectively 
determined, is to restrict competition. The effect concept looks to confirm that an 
agreement does in fact restrict competition (whether actually or potentially) if the 
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object of an agreement cannot be determined.  Furthermore, under the MAAP, the 
object criterion does not require the actual effects of the agreement to be 
determined, which is not due only to the necessary consequence of the agreement, 
but because the agreement aims to harm competition.213 
Over time, many commentators have considered that it was only when determining 
the effect of an agreement that the “whole economic context” need be taken into 
account (that is, defining the relevant market and the parties’ positions on it, as 
well as examine the counterfactual).214  From this perspective, it was unnecessary 
when examining an agreement’s object to carry out such a detailed examination. 
The Article 81(3) Guidelines, for example, are “unequivocal on the point”.215  This 
has been proven to be inaccurate.  That the initial assessment process for both 
object and effect is similar under the MAAP is not to be seen as a flaw, but rather as 
a positive factor.  The MAAP raises the standard of proof on the part of the claimant 
or regulator.  This is crucial given the tendency for the Commission to frame all 
Article 101(1) TFEU cases in object terms thereby exploiting the object concept to 
avoid an in-depth effects analysis.  That approach incontrovertibly does mean a 
reduced role for ‘effect’.216  Moreover, the levels of fines imposed on undertakings 
infringing Article 101(1) by object justify a more robust assessment under that 
criterion.217  The decisive factor, however, is the re-emergence and 
acknowledgment of STM as a leading case on the object concept.   
From an economic perspective, it has been argued that the dividing line between 
restrictions by object and restrictions by effect is whether restraints found in an 
agreement can be “plausibly explained on efficiency grounds”.218  When 
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determining an agreement’s object, the CJEU concentrates on whether an 
agreement lacks redeeming virtues as opposed to its potential to restrict 
competition.219  For Ibáñez Colomo, a given restraint will only restrict competition 
by object where “it is not a plausible source of efficiency gains”.220  Utilising the 
MAAP methodology, he argues that:  
“The true question does not seem to be whether the restraint...can 
be presumed to have anti-competitive effects, or whether it bears a 
particular form; but whether, in the light of the nature of the 
agreement, and the context in which it is concluded, it is a 
convincing means to enhance efficiency and not simply a means to 
extract wealth from customers or suppliers...the crucial factor is not 
that the agreement can be presumed to deteriorate the conditions 
of competition on the relevant market(s), but the fact that it cannot 
be expected to improve them”.221 
Therefore it is only where the particular restraint has “no redeeming virtues” (such 
as naked price fixing) that ‘anti-competitive intent’ can be presumed.222  Hence, 
where the agreement cannot be reasonably explained on efficiency grounds or 
where, for example as in BIDS, there is no clear link between the efficiency claims 
and the restraint, it can be assumed that the primary motivation of the parties is to 
restrict competition.223  Ibáñez Colomo believes that the CJEU does not see the 
notion of restriction by object as a presumption of the likely effects of the 
agreement.  Instead, the CJEU views the object concept as enabling the Court to 
understand the agreement’s genesis, whereas the effect criterion establishes the 
likely (negative) effects of an agreement on the market.224 
This reasoning is persuasive and compliments the methodology of MAAP.  The 
economic arguments presented by Ibáñez Colomo are untested for the purposes of 
this thesis, but the explanation is an interesting one and would seem to fit neatly 
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with the understanding of the law postulated herein.  Ultimately, he finds that an 
increase in market power is not determinative when assessing whether an 
agreement restricts competition.225  He recognises that there is an innate flexibility 
with which Article 101(1) TFEU has been interpreted.226  The crucial distinction in 
the argument advanced in this thesis is that what is proffered is a legal explanation 
as opposed to an economic one.  First and foremost, judges apply the law, not a 
series of economic models.  In that vein, under the MAAP the object concept is 
concerned with determining the agreement’s purpose in its legal and economic 
context and the effect concept is concerned with its actual effect on competition.  
In contrast, the orthodox approach makes little sense from an economic 
perspective as it is unable to react to nuances or changing economic circumstances, 
which is why an improved dichotomy is needed.227       
It is therefore proposed that viewing the dichotomy in a different light is of more 
benefit given the limitations of categorisation, its proven anomalies and the 
prominence of the legal and economic context in any assessment by object.  Using 
the object criterion as a more powerful and flexible legal tool means that ‘effect’ is 
reserved for those agreements that cannot truly be said to be restrictive by object 
and therefore require a full market analysis in order to reveal their concrete 
effects.228  The CJEU attempted to address the dichotomy in its judgment in Cartes 
Bancaires.229  It appears that the CJEU wanted to reinforce the point that the object 
concept is not a gateway to allow any type of coordination to be found restrictive 
by object.  Otherwise, “the Commission would be exempted from the obligation to 
prove the actual effects on the market of agreements which are in no way 
established to be, by their very nature, harmful to the proper functioning of normal 
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competition”.230  To this end, the CJEU relied heavily on the concept of necessary 
effect, but supported this with the requirement that such agreements must 
demonstrate a “sufficient degree of harm to competition” determined in 
accordance with the STM Test.231  Hence, the CJEU continues to keep the hybrid 
approach alive.232   
There is no doubt that the object concept should be interpreted restrictively.  
Under the hybrid approach (as interpreted under Cartes Bancaires), this stems from 
the concept of necessary effect.  From the perspective of the MAAP, it is because 
the agreement lacks the precise purpose to restrict competition.  Moreover, 
applying the STM Test ensures that an agreement’s context supports that 
assessment, which - as the CJEU emphasises - must demonstrate a sufficient degree 
of harm.  It is submitted that if the CJEU insists on relying on STM, then it should do 
so absolutely.  STM does not support categorisation.  The hypothesis that there 
should be a narrow category of agreements restrictive by object is unworkable in 
practice owing to the case law of the European Courts.  This is exacerbated by the 
CJEU’s continued use of nebulous wording.233  Instead, it is more prudent to work 
with the case law than against it.  Therefore the distinction between restrictions by 
object and by effect needs to be recast as suggested under the MAAP.  
Andreangeli uses the US antitrust rules to help demonstrate her explanation of the 
dichotomy.234  As discussed in chapter 4, she postulates that the CJEU has moved 
away from a stark distinction between infringements by object and by effect and 
instead has embraced a concept of ‘restriction of competition’ that forms a 
continuum or spectrum ranging from more serious to less obvious infringements.235  
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‘Serious’ restrictions refer presumably to hardcore restraints.236  The type of inquiry 
would therefore depend on the nature and seriousness of the agreement in hand: 
“the more serious the prima facie breach is, the more likely it will be for it to have 
anti-competitive effects and, consequently, to justify ‘early antitrust intervention’ 
by way of the application of a presumption of anti-competitive impact”.237 The 
position adopted herein is that the CJEU has always had an in-context approach to 
the object criterion and has rarely been as formalistic as the Commission.   
This leads to the following conclusion: the dichotomy between restrictions by 
object and by effect does not encapsulate a stark distinction as proffered in ENS.  
The case law is unequivocal on this point.  Moreover, understanding the object 
concept as applying to ‘serious’ restrictions, depends on how ‘serious’ is defined.  
Andreangeli does not define ‘serious’, though she suggests that it encapsulates 
more than classic ‘object box’ restrictions and uses the premise of ‘experience’ as a 
guide.  If the Courts were to adopt the MAAP as opposed to the currently favoured 
hybrid approach, then there is better scope to utilise the object concept in a more 
economically orientated way.  Thus, serious restrictions would be those agreements 
that aim to restrict competition ‘sufficiently deleteriously’, which are objectively 
determined based on their content and context.  Experience would continue to be 
an important feature of such assessment, but would not be the only denominator.  
The effect criterion would then ensure that those agreements that do not have 
such an aim, but which in fact result in anti-competitive harm are also caught.  
Moreover, the role of the object criterion is enhanced as it has the ability to cast 
certain agreements outside Article 101(1) TFEU altogether.238  
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5. Article 101(3) TFEU: the legal exception 
5.1. Introduction 
The enhanced role envisaged for the object criterion under the MAAP in contrast to 
its orthodox function raises questions regarding the impact on the scope of Article 
101(3) TFEU.239  This section discusses the relationship between the object concept 
and Article 101(3) TFEU, and the implications for Article 101(3) TFEU that would be 
generated by the consistent application of MAAP.  It may be that the application of 
Article 101(3) TFEU would be reduced on account of two factors.  On one hand, a 
more thorough assessment of an agreement’s object would be undertaken within 
Article 101(1) TFEU,240 while on the other hand, the object assessment may remove 
agreements outside the remit of Article 101 TFEU altogether.  However, this does 
not mean the death of Article 101(3) TFEU, merely that the emphasis shifts back to 
Article 101(1) TFEU as is proper following modernisation and in view of the 
extensive case law adopting a more economic and analytical approach when 
establishing whether an agreement restricts competition.  Furthermore, the 
application of Article 101(1) TFEU is more flexible than the more rigid provisions 
requiring satisfaction under Article 101(3) TFEU: this is also exemplified by the 
continued debate over whether aspects aside from economic arguments can be 
considered under Article 101(3) TFEU.241     
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5.2. The relationship between restrictions by object and Article 101(3) TFEU 
Article 101(3) TFEU is the legal exception and allows for agreements found to be 
restrictive of competition under Article 101(1) TFEU to be exempted on the grounds 
such agreements satisfy four strict conditions.  Historically, the role of applying 
Article 101(3) TFEU was the exclusive preserve of the Commission, though the 
burden of proof is placed on the defendant.  This monopoly ended with the advent 
of Regulation 1/2003.  However, the legacy of Regulation 17 of 1962 still remains 
given the continued existence of block exemption regulations (BERs) that fall within 
the remit of Article 101(3) TFEU.  Provided undertakings ensure their agreements 
meet the conditions set out in the relevant BER such agreements are exempted 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.  Whether BERs should still be framed in terms of Article 
101(3) TFEU post-modernisation is debatable in view of the increased economic 
assessment of agreements under Article 101(1) TFEU.  This is an important issue.  If 
the effects-based approach is truly adopted under Article 101(1) TFEU it is then 
hard to reconcile the favourable economic arguments made in various BERs under 
the umbrella of Article 101(3) TFEU, which would be better placed under Article 
101(1) TFEU at the point of determining whether an agreement restricts 
competition.242   
It is well-documented that despite the availability of Article 101(3) TFEU for all 
restrictions of competition by object, the truth of the matter is that agreements 
containing such restrictions are rarely permitted.243  This is because such a strong 
presumption has been created that agreements containing restrictions by object, 
particularly hardcore restrictions, will not satisfy Article 101(3) TFEU.244  This is due 
in part to the lack of availability of the BER’s for agreements containing ‘hardcore 
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restrictions’.245  More significantly, the advent of Regulation 1/2003 has 
exacerbated this presumption: the exemption process was abolished, hence there 
is scant jurisprudence providing clarification on when agreements containing 
hardcore restraints will satisfy Article 101(3) TFEU.  Moreover, the Commission has 
not issued any non-infringement decisions since 2004, which it has the power to do 
under Regulation 1/2003.246   
The scope of Article 101(3) TFEU has also been narrowed by the Commission in its 
Article 81(3) Guidelines.  Jones contends that the Article 81(3) Guidelines 
“significantly raised the bar for those seeking to rely on Article 101(3)”.247  
According to the Commission, Article 101(3) TFEU is intended “to provide a legal 
framework for the economic assessment of restrictive practices and not to allow 
the application of the competition rules to be set aside because of political 
considerations”.248  This exposes a tension with the jurisprudence interpreted by 
scholars such as Monti and Townley.249   
Therefore given the Commission’s clear message that agreements containing 
hardcore restrictions are unlikely to satisfy the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU 
coupled with the lack of jurisprudence providing guidance on the application of the 
provision, “firms have been unwilling to take the risk of inserting hardcore 
restraints into agreements, especially as the consequences of getting the 
assessment wrong might be a significant fine from the Commission or a NCA”.250  
That the Commission finds few salvaging features for agreements containing 
hardcore restrictions cannot be underestimated in terms of the impact this may 
have on how undertakings conduct their business.  In particular, to have to apply 
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Article 101(3) TFEU means that an agreement would have already been found to be 
restrictive of competition.  Hence, if the criteria under Article 101(3) are not 
satisfied then undertakings cannot exclude the possibility that they may be heavily 
fined.   
To be able to conduct a wider ranging economic analysis of an agreement under 
Article 101(1) TFEU in accordance with the MAAP could, therefore, be an attractive 
alternative for businesses. Furthermore, as a result of applying the MAAP, aside 
from a finding that the agreement is restrictive by object, the agreement will either 
fall outside Article 101(1) TFEU entirely or be found not to restrict competition by 
object and therefore be required to be assessed by its ‘effect’.  Should the 
agreement be deemed to be restrictive by effect, then the availability of an Article 
101(3) exemption may not seem as unrealistic.  The point is that, particularly owing 
to the direction of recent case law confirming the application of a more in-depth 
methodology when assessing the object criterion, the Commission must work 
harder to discharge its burden of proof under Article 101(1) TFEU.  It must look far 
more closely at factors that it previously may have given scant attention to, such as 
economic rationale and potential effects, or which it reserved for assessment under 
Article 101(3) TFEU.251   
Firms may therefore be inclined to take more commercial risk if they consider that 
their agreements - which they genuinely believe do not aim to restrict competition, 
but which under the orthodox approach may be seen automatically to restrict 
competition by object - at least have a possibility of being considered only 
restrictive by effect, if at all, when assessed in accordance with the MAAP.  Given 
the lack of case law concerning Article 101(3) TFEU, this could be an attractive 
option.252  Despite the CJEU now being at pains to point out that restrictions by 
object can benefit from Article 101(3) TFEU, until concrete judgments are handed 
                                                     
251
 See eg Case C-32/11 Allianz Hungária. 
252
 (Svetlicinii & Sad, 2011) make a similar point though argue the judgment in Pierre Fabre 
introduced a type of Article 101(3) assessment when determining whether the object of an 
agreement is to restrict competition under Article 101(1) TFEU.  They argue this may help parties 
“seeking to exempt their otherwise ‘hardcore’ agreement at an early stage, before the full-scale 
uncertainty of the Article 101(3) TFEU assessment”.   
Page 247 
down there is little real certainty as to the availability of an Article 101(3) TFEU 
exemption.253  Notably, the Commission, perhaps in recognition of the CJEU’s 
stance, is modifying its tone on the availability of Article 101(3) TFEU.254 
5.2.1. Application: division of labour between Articles 101(1) and (3) TFEU 
For commentators such as Nicolaides, Article 101(3) TFEU permits only restrictions 
that are necessary for the agreement to generate the claimed efficiency gains: 
known as the indispensablilty requirement.255  Conversely, Article 101(1) TFEU:  
“seeks to determine the overall, actual, potential and inter-temporal 
effect of an agreement on competition.  By contrast...Article [101](3) 
asks whether an agreement with an overall anti-competitive effect 
should be allowed to go ahead, because it generates sufficient gains 
for consumers.  In other words, Article [101](3) evaluates the 
desirability of the agreement from the point of view of 
consumers.”256 
The tension between the acceptability of arguments under Articles 101(1) TFEU and 
contrarily under Article 101(3) TFEU is not new.  This was highlighted by Korah who 
criticised the Commission for finding that restrictions were indispensable under 
Article 101(3) TFEU, while considering them simultaneously to be restrictive of 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU.257  Therefore an agreement found to restrict 
competition under Article 101(1) TFEU could be found to be lawful if the 
“efficiencies relevant under Article 81(3) outweigh the negative effects the 
restriction of competition has on competition and allocative efficiency”.258  Kolstad 
calls it a “balancing test” as the allocative efficiency loss through reduced 
competition must be quantified: by applying Article 101(3) TFEU it is therefore 
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necessary to assess the concrete effects on competition of agreements that restrict 
competition by object.   
This is a pertinent point: the apparent benefit of applying ‘object’ under Article 
101(1) TFEU is that actual effects do not need to be demonstrated thus easing the 
administrative burden and cost.  The burden of proof is on the plaintiff, which is 
usually the Commission.  Conversely under Article 101(3) TFEU the burden of proof 
is on the defendant.  However, the Commission (or plaintiff) would still need 
appropriately to consider economic arguments raised (it has been criticised by the 
European Courts for not doing this in the past) by the defendant under Article 
101(3) TFEU.  Therefore, it is arguable that all the administrative savings made in a 
finding of ‘by object’ under Article 101(1) TFEU would be lost.  This would not apply 
if the defendant chose not to seek exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU.  If the 
MAAP was applied under Article 101(1) TFEU, then it is debatable whether 
defendants would still seek to apply Article 101(3) TFEU given that a form of 
‘balancing’ has already occurred under Article 101(1) TFEU as economic arguments 
are taken seriously.  Article 101(3) TFEU could then be reserved for those cases 
concerning arguments that are not necessarily as appropriately considered under 
Article 101(1) TFEU.259  Ibáñez Colomo argues that despite the Commission’s prima 
facie approach of rejecting non-economic considerations under Article 101(3) TFEU, 
the very fact that the analytical framework revolves around efficiency means that 
“the supposed peculiarities” of such situations are captured.260  This is because 
consideration of non-economic factors can be seen as a proportionate response to 
a particular market failure and therefore not to be in conflict with allocative 
efficiency.261        
It is submitted that applying the object criterion in accordance with MAAP would 
help allay a number of criticisms raised, simply because there is scope better to 
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consider economic arguments under Article 101(1) TFEU.  Criticism levelled at the 
Commission by scholars such as Korah was not misplaced when Article 101(1) TFEU 
was formalistically applied to agreements which restricted commercial freedom.  
However, with the more economics-based interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU, 
economic arguments historically considered by the Commission under Article 
101(3) TFEU should instead be relevant and appraised under Article 101(1) TFEU.262   
Another point of debate is whether the criteria in Article 101(3) TFEU are applied 
more strictly to agreements found to be restrictive by object.  Kolstad argues not.263  
He recognises that it will be more difficult to prove that the Article 101(3) TFEU 
criteria are satisfied in respect of restraints by object.264  This is evident as 
agreements restricting competition by object generally have a greater potential for 
anti-competitive harm, so will tend to be detrimental to competition.265  For this 
reason, he argues that it would explain why agreements that restrict competition 
by object will normally have little chance of realising the type of production 
efficiencies needed under Article 101(3) TFEU.266  Moreover, as such agreements 
have greater potential for anti-competitive harm as a result the efficiencies must be 
rather substantial in order for the Article 101(3) TFEU criteria to be fulfilled.267  
Therefore, it will only be in rare cases that agreements restricting competition by 
object will satisfy Article 101(3) TFEU.268 
This interpretation can be contrasted with the position adopted by Andreangeli.269  
In her paper, Andreangeli assesses the consequences of her “continuum” approach 
on the legal assessment of Article 101(3) TFEU.  The outcome of her research 
highlights the need for a different appraisal depending on the seriousness of the 
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infringement under Article 101(1) TFEU.  She recognises that the adoption by the 
Courts of a more flexible and economics-based approach to Article 101(1) TFEU 
raises issues for the scope of Article 101(3) TFEU and its application.270  Up until the 
judgment in Metropole,271 she contends that the legal analysis under Article 101(1) 
TFEU focused more formalistically by ascertaining if an agreement was restrictive 
by reason of its object or effect rather than in accordance with her “continuum” 
concept.272  The function of Article 101(3) TFEU here was to “gauge the extent to 
which the practice, despite its harmfulness, nonetheless enhances the competitive 
process.  Gains in terms of ‘allocative’ as well as of ‘productive’ efficiency would 
have to be taken into account and weighed against its anticompetitive effects”.273      
For Andreangeli this traditional understanding of Article 101(3) TFEU does not 
provide a complete picture.274  This is because Article 101(3) TFEU has been used to 
consider objectives that are not plainly economic efficiency arguments.  Townley 
and Monti have both argued how other factors, such as environmental, social and 
political issues, have played a part in exempting agreements under Article 101(3) 
TFEU.275  In view of this, Andreangeli proposes a solution that depends on the 
nature of the agreement in accordance with her continuum.  Accordingly, she 
differentiates the application of Article 101(3) TFEU between serious and less 
serious breaches as opposed to by object and by effect infringements.276  For less 
serious restraints, the role of Article 101(3) TFEU is limited to an inquiry into the 
extent to which the practice furthers productive efficiency and seeks to achieve 
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specific public policy goals.277  Given the ability for Article 101(1) TFEU to engage in, 
as Andreangeli sees it, a limited degree of balancing for less serious restraints, 
Article 101(3) TFEU would be confined to assessing the benefits of such agreements 
for instance technological advancement or the ultimate goals of the Treaty, even 
those “less obviously” economic in nature.278 
Conversely, Andreangeli contends that if a restraint is found to be a serious one 
under Article 101(1) TFEU, the prohibition clause must then consider a wider range 
of issues than less obvious restraints.279  Not only would productive efficiency and 
public policy arguments be assessed, but also any allocative efficiency benefits.  
Thus such inquiry would look at any types of ‘gains’ arising from the agreement and 
must therefore be viewed as more probing.280  Andreangeli dismisses criticism that 
her approach would contradict the logic of her continuum, as her approach would 
ostensibly demand a more in-depth inquiry into serious restrictions of competition 
and vice versa for less serious restraints.281  Her justification is that the Commission 
has argued that a “pressing justification” would be needed in order to apply Article 
101(3) TFEU to serious infringements, hence the need for a more extensive inquiry 
in those circumstances.282  Then for less serious infringements, given they would 
have already been subjected to an in-depth assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU, 
the focus on only public policy and productive efficiency-related objectives would 
be justified.  The fact such restraints were already subject to a probing analysis of 
their actual effects under Article 101(1) TFEU means they would “be less likely to be 
inconsistent with the objectives” of the EU competition regime.283              
Andreangeli’s arguments have merit and are logical if the continuum approach is 
supported.284  It is submitted that what Andreangli’s position underlines ultimately 
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is a simple point: that when applying Article 101(3) TFEU it is done on a case by case 
basis, which mirrors the position of Article 101(1) TFEU as expressed in accordance 
with the MAAP.  The influence of considerations other than economic ones is not in 
doubt and this thesis does not support Odudu’s pure economic interpretation, as 
the case law does not uphold such an understanding.  However, it seems rational 
that the application of Article 101(3) TFEU to restrictions by object as understood in 
accordance with MAAP should be more demanding or wider in scope depending on 
the nature of the restraints.  The case itself therefore determines the type of 
enquiry needed under Article 101(3) TFEU.    
As to the precise delineation between Articles 101(1) TFEU and 101(3) TFEU, the 
following points can be considered.285  Given MAAP supports a raft of economic 
arguments, including pro-competitive benefits of an agreement, it is difficult to see 
what Article 101(3) TFEU could bring to the table.  This is because agreements that 
do fall foul of Article 101(1) TFEU when assessed under the MAAP and are found to 
be restrictive by object must be serious indeed.  Therefore an in-depth assessment 
as postulated by Andeangeli for more serious restraints could be justified as it 
would be difficult to see what other economic arguments could salvage the 
agreement.  As such, the focus on factors other than economic ones is a more 
appealing role for Article 101(3) TFEU.  The points raised by Kolstad ring true.  If an 
agreement is restrictive by object in accordance with MAAP it will be more difficult 
to prove the Article 101(3) TFEU criteria.  This is not to say, however, that economic 
factors would not be pertinent under Article 101(3) TFEU, rather that the economic 
benefits gauged thereunder would rarely, if ever, outweigh the harm on 
competition.  Hence, the delineation between Articles 101(1) and 101(3) TFEU will 
arguably turn on the specific case in issue. 
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5.2.2. The practical implications and practice of applying Article 101(3) TFEU 
It is notable, however, that the Commission has not always refused to exempt all 
apparent hardcore restrictions from Article 101(3) TFEU.286  It is therefore possible 
to envisage scenarios when Article 101(3) TFEU would be relevant.  For example, 
the Commission has been willing to exempt crisis cartels.287  More recently, the 
CJEU was fairly encouraging about the use of Article 101(3) to justify a reduction in 
capacity in order to rationalise the beef industry in Ireland.288  The Commission 
submitted written observations to the Irish High Court regarding how it would 
approach the restructuring under Article 101(3) TFEU.289  It would seem that the 
Commission does support the idea that certain types of coordinated industry 
reorganisation in particular markets could be capable of satisfying Article 101(3) 
TFEU, and has provided limited guidance on how the requirements under Article 
101(3) TFEU could be satisfied.290   
The Commission has also been more lenient when regarding multilateral 
interchange fees (MIF) for card payment systems.  There were a number of cases 
where, despite a finding that Article 101(1) had been infringed, the Commission 
exempted the agreements.291  What is so interesting about MIF is that it relates to 
horizontal pricing practices, usually an immediate classification of restriction by 
object under the orthodox approach.  Hence, it is an anomaly in the Commission’s 
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enforcement and description of the object criterion under its Article 81(3) 
Guidelines.  The Commission’s position has now modified following its decision in 
Mastercard, though in that case it could not quite bring itself to condemn the 
agreement as restrictive by object despite clearly veering towards that conclusion, 
and instead found the agreement was restrictive by effect.292  The Commission then 
chose not to exempt the MIF, and subsequently brought proceedings against Visa 
Europe.293   
Examples of where the Courts have shown a willingness to exempt agreements 
found to be restrictive by object by the Commission have included agreements 
containing ATP, restraints on parallel trade and RPM provisions.294  Notably, the 
Courts did not in fact exempt the agreements, but made clear that they were 
capable of meeting the exemption criteria.295  The Courts have also been willing to 
criticise the Commission for its application of Article 101(3) TFEU, even when it had 
sole jurisdiction under pre-modernisation.  In GSK, the GC criticised the Commission 
for rejecting evidence and arguments that appeared to be credible and relevant.296  
Overall, the “case law indicates that the parties must put forward convincing 
evidence and arguments showing that the conditions of Article 101(3) are met”.297   
The Commission has answered some of the criticism that it should move in line with 
progressive economic thinking and recognise, for instance, that in certain 
circumstances even hardcore restraints as being indispensible within the 
parameters of a vertical arrangement.298  It therefore conceded in its 2010 
Guidelines on Vertical Restraints that it would “assess substantiated efficiencies of 
hardcore restraints against the negative impact under Article 101(3)”, and that in 
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particular circumstances parties could plead an efficiency defence to justify ATP and 
price restraints.299  The Commission has even recognised the need for RPM for a 
limited amount of time in order to introduce a new product to the market.300  
However, the appropriateness of these concessions by the Commission under 
Article 101(3) TFEU is questionable.  Such arguments could also be made within the 
legal and economic context.  Moreover, real efficiencies brought about as a result 
of an agreement cannot be said truly to be aimed at restricting competition within 
the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU.   
5.2.3. A new order? 
In his speech at the Fordham Competition Law Conference in September 2013, the 
Director General for Competition, Alexander Italianer, gave an enlightening insight 
into the Commission’s approach to the Article 101(1)/101(3) division.301  As well as 
confirming that any restriction by object is never irretrievably unlawful nor the “end 
of the story”, he highlighted what he considered was the important distinction 
between Article 101(1) TFEU and Article 101(3) TFEU.302  He reiterated the standard 
line that the contextual analysis under Article 101(1) TFEU for both object and 
effect “never goes as far as balancing the anti- and pro-competitive effects.  It only 
aims at gauging the negative consequences of the restraint for the process of 
competition...in other words, the analysis under Article 101(1) deals exclusively 
with identifying competitive harm.”303  This means that “the balancing between 
competitive harm and redeeming virtues is made exclusively under 101(3).”304  This 
summation may not tally entirely with the evidence of what the Courts, let alone 
the Commission, have considered within the legal and economic context under 
Article 101(1) TFEU assessments.  Nonetheless it is a salutary lesson in how the 
Commission has not entirely moved on in its thinking, despite the significant 
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advances made by certain sectors of the Commission in its understanding of 
restrictions by object.305   
Italianer stressed how parties seeking to apply Article 101(3) TFEU need to provide 
“sufficient and verifiable evidence that a restraint is ultimately pro-competitive and 
beneficial for consumers.”306  He was at pains to point out how the availability of 
Article 101(3) TFEU is not dead in respect of restrictions by object.  He used the 
decision in the Star Alliance case to highlight how restrictions by object may satisfy 
the legal exemption.307  The decision involved an “innovation in the way [the 
Commission] looks at efficiencies under Article 101(3)” as it accepted “out-of-
market efficiencies” for the first time.308  This means the Commission looked at 
efficiencies generated on a market other than the market which entailed 
competitive concerns.  The Decision in Star Alliance broadens the general test set 
out in the Article 81(3) Guidelines, though does not replace it.309  As a result of the 
new test the Commission was able to allay its concerns over the negative effects to 
consumers stemming from the cooperation between the airlines.310  For Italianer 
this new test demonstrated how Article 101(3) TFEU is still alive and available to 
restrictions by object and that the Commission is willing to review its policy under 
Article 101(3) TFEU “where this is justified and appropriate”.311  This is positive, but 
also highlights how undertakings are firing into the dark with efficiency arguments 
as it is unlikely that the Commission will often be willing to change its policy, and it 
does not specify the circumstances in which it will do so.312   
Given the increased economic enlightenment of the Commission post-
modernisation, any concessions by the Commission are to be welcomed.  
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Moreover, some of the considerations that the Commission sees as belonging to 
the realm of Article 101(3) TFEU assessments could, if not should, just as easily be 
considered under Article 101(1) TFEU within the ‘legal and economic context’.  It is 
this proposition that gives rise to a certain panic amongst some commentators 
regarding the death of Article 101(3) TFEU.  Such worry is misplaced or, perhaps, 
incorrectly elucidated.  Moreover, it is unwarranted as Article 101(3) TFEU is highly 
specific.  That a more measured role for Article 101(3) TFEU might come about 
cannot be a bad thing in view of the Commission’s previous monopoly over its 
application.  The function of Article 101(1) TFEU has evolved into a more 
economically orientated provision and therefore it should be unsurprising if the 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU were also to adapt in view of this.  This does not 
indicate the death of Article 101(3) TFEU, merely its reincarnation.   
The precise role of Article 101(3) TFEU will continue to be debated.  Arguments 
regards ‘balancing’ have skewed matters: it is predominantly a labelling exercise as 
it is unquestionable that the European Courts and indeed the Commission have 
engaged in a form of balancing of effects under Article 101(1) TFEU.313  Overall, 
opinions regarding the role of Article 101(3) TFEU are divided.  For instance, 
González claims the enquiry under Article 101(3) TFEU focuses on whether “the 
agreement objectively produces pro-competitive benefits that outweigh its 
(previously established) anti-competitive impact, and in light of which a general 
exemption from the general prohibition can be obtained at all.”314  Odudu suggests 
that Article 101(3) is concerned with productive efficiency whilst Townley and 
Monti have argued that other non-competition factors have and should come into 
play.  Italianer is correct in the sense that Article 101(1) TFEU is concerned with 
identifying restrictions of competition or as he puts it “competitive harm”. 
A more pertinent question may be whether Article 101(3) TFEU is hampered by 
what happens under Article 101(1) TFEU.  It is not.  Article 101(3) TFEU specifically 
asks for positive factors to be demonstrated that would counter the negative 
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finding under Article 101(1) TFEU.  Article 101(1) TFEU, on the other hand, deals 
with the determination of whether competition is restricted, which in itself may 
require positive attributes of an agreement to be considered.  That does not then 
mean that similar or even the same arguments cannot be raised again under the 
exemption provision if an agreement is found to be restrictive by object or effect.    
Jones raises the point that despite the various gestures by the Commission towards 
progressive economic thinking, the fact remains that there is insufficient guidance 
as to when parties could be sure of raising a convincing efficiency argument and a 
restraint be considered indispensable.315  This is the major hindrance to the 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU.  More importantly, in relation to the contentious 
area of RPM, she considers that the structure of Article 101(3) TFEU does not allow 
the argument that RPM imposed by a manufacturer lacking market power for the 
purposes of increasing dealer services and sales would not cause anticompetitive 
effects.316  This is because anticompetitive effects are already presumed under 
Article 101(1) TFEU, though doubtless also because an agreement has already been 
found to be restrictive by object or effect.  This is why such economic arguments 
are better utilised under Article 101(1) TFEU and why presumptions should be seen 
to be rebuttable.   
Overall, it remains a “daunting task” to justify an infringement by object on 
efficiency grounds under Article 101(3) TFEU.317  The success rate for exempting 
restrictions by object is pretty rare.318  Given that the Commission had a monopoly 
over the application of Article 101(3) TFEU for so long, its legacy will be hard to 
shift.  Further, the Commission was able to mould its application as it desired.  The 
Commission does not have the same level of control over Article 101(1) TFEU.  
Rather than rely on a judgment for clarification, Bailey observes that it would be 
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more useful for the Commission to adopt a decision under Article 10 of Regulation 
1/2003, which would show how the criteria under Article 101(3) TFEU are satisfied 
for different types of situation.319  This is unlikely to happen soon.  Therefore any 
clarification may be a long time coming.     
5.3. Conclusion: the death of Article 101(3) TFEU? 
The lack of clarity between the division of labour between paragraphs (1) and (3) 
still rings true.320  That the bifurcation of Article 101 TFEU is the “original sin” of EU 
competition law remains a valid point.321  As such, few may mourn the arguable 
demise of Article 101(3) TFEU if the trend for object-only cases under Article 101(1) 
TFEU continues in light of the Commission’s enforcement priorities.322  For authors 
such as Ibáñez Colomo, the fact that balancing of the pro- and anti-competitive 
effects of an agreement is conducted “in some form” under Article 101(1) TFEU 
does not then mean that Article 101(3) TFEU is devoid of purpose.323  Contrast this 
with the judgment in Métropole whereby the GC was categorical that it was only 
within the framework of Article 101(3) TFEU that the pro- and anticompetitive 
aspects of a restriction could be weighed.324  Otherwise, if such balancing were to 
occur under Article 101(1) TFEU, Article 101(3) would lose much of its 
effectiveness.325   
Ibáñez Colomo believes that Article 101(3) TFEU allows undertakings to quantify 
efficiency gains explicitly and to show that the agreement is pro-competitive on the 
whole.326  This is in contrast to Article 101(1) TFEU where efficiency gains are not 
expressly quantified.  By this understanding of the relative scope of the two 
provisions, one can see the arguments in favour of using Article 101(3) TFEU.  
Ibáñez Colomo submits that Article 101(3) TFEU would come into its own where it is 
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necessary to quantify efficiency gains because an agreement “creates or 
strengthens market power beyond a certain degree” or where the context in which 
an agreement is concluded “suggests the negative impact on prices and output may 
weigh more than the allocative efficiency gains achieved”.327  Alternatively, Article 
101(3) TFEU would be a useful forum in which to investigate whether restraints go 
beyond what is deemed necessary to achieve the gains identified.328 
It is submitted that the greatest, albeit misplaced, concern is that Article 101(3) 
TFEU will have no function if the assessment under Article 101(1) TFEU has a 
greater emphasis on economic analysis.  Moreover, the European Courts have been 
accused of applying a light standard of review in respect of Article 101(3) TFEU, 
because they consider it “too complex and abstract”.329  Arguably, this then aided 
the Commission’s control over Article 101(3) TFEU.  Perhaps more concerning are 
different factors, which have impacted on the so-called demise of Article 101(3) 
TFEU.  Modernisation has meant that the Commission shifted its priorities to 
serious infringements of competition, which tend to be those restrictive by object 
in the context of Article 101(1) TFEU.  La Madrid and Petit illustrate how this meant 
cases where Article 101(3) TFEU would be more applicable were left to the NCAs 
and national courts to determine.330  As a result, chiefly due to the difficulty and 
uncertainty in applying Article 101(3) TFEU and the perception (amongst NCAs and 
national courts in particular) that an effects-based assessment is only relevant in 
‘effect’ cases under Article 101(1) TFEU, has meant that very few Article 101(3) 
TFEU assessments are undertaken.   
There is a greater problem.  Not all NCAs and national courts have caught up with 
the developments in the case law regarding the object criterion and instead rely 
heavily on the Article 81(3) Guidelines, and thus on the orthodox approach.  This is 
evident in submissions made to the Community Courts and in national decisions.331  
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This indicates that developments in the application or understanding of the law 
take time to “trickle down”, which could ultimately lead to a divided approach not 
only to the object criterion under Article 101(1) TFEU, but also to the application of 
Article 101(3) TFEU.332  This undermines the entire ethos behind the modernisation 
process. 
If the MAAP were consistently adopted by the Commission and European Courts 
then some of the concerns should fall away.  It is clear that arguments traditionally 
reserved for Article 101(3) TFEU are relevant under Article 101(1) TFEU. This means 
the role of Article 101(3) TFEU would need to adapt and evolve.  By doing so its role 
will become less vital if undertakings are able to come up with strong reasoning for 
their ostensibly restrictive agreements under Article 101(1) TFEU.  The uncertainties 
surrounding the application of Article 101(3) TFEU would thereby be somewhat 
alleviated and non-economic arguments could then play a clearer role.333  The 
application of Article 101(3) TFEU would therefore be seen to be case specific.  It is 
thus apparent there is no perfect answer to the bi-furcation of Articles 101(1) and 
101(3) TFEU and the division of labour.  However using the MAAP is one solution 
that is able to address the concerns facing Article 101 TFEU.     
Overall, this chapter demonstrates that the MAAP, despite its shortcomings, makes 
better sense of our understanding of Article 101 TFEU as a whole within a 
modernised EU.  This is due to a number of factors, including in particular the 
legitimacy it derives from the case law of the CJEU.  Furthermore, it is more 
adaptable to the general trend for an ‘effects-based’ approach to Article 101 TFEU 
and is able to respond to the need for deeper economic assessment where 
required, as it is not constrained by categorisation.  As such, the MAAP is a flexible 
legal tool that is able to react to economic developments and fits intelligently 
within the framework of Article 101 TFEU as a whole. 
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Conclusion: The function of the object criterion under Article 101(1) 
TFEU 
1. Introduction 
This thesis established the legal essence of the object criterion under Article 101(1) 
TFEU based on a careful assessment of the jurisprudence of the European Courts.  
Consequently, it found that the Commission’s approach to restrictions by object set 
out in its Article 81(3) Guidelines does not fully reflect the case law.  Instead, the 
analysis of the case law revealed three key tests that the Courts have applied to 
assess the object of an agreement, namely:   
1. The orthodox approach: a class or category of agreements 
that by ‘their very nature’ restrict competition.1  There is an 
irrebuttable legal presumption that those types of 
agreements automatically harm competition and thus 
infringe Article 101(1) TFEU given their serious nature. 
2. The more analytical approach: focuses on whether the aim or 
purpose of the agreement is to restrict competition 
determined in its legal and economic context.2  Ostensibly 
any restriction of competition could therefore have the 
object of restricting competition under Article 101(1) TFEU. 
3. The hybrid approach: a combination of the orthodox 
approach and the MAAP.  The concept of object is still limited 
to those restrictions that by ‘their very nature’ restrict 
competition, but the agreement is assessed in its ‘legal and 
economic context’ in accordance with the STM Test.3  As 
such, the legal presumption of harm is apparently rebuttable 
under Article 101(1) TFEU.   
It was shown how the case law falls in to one of these three approaches, though the 
precise parameters of these approaches are not stark.  Chapter 1 focused on the 
orthodox approach, whereas chapter 2 found that historically the jurisprudence 
predominantly supports the MAAP and that a hybrid approach has also evolved.  
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Chapters 3 and 4 probed the features comprising the legal structure of the object 
criterion in more depth in order to reveal its true meaning and application.  By 
reference to the case law, the best interpretation of the object criterion was found 
to be that which accords with the MAAP.  The implications of adopting the MAAP 
for Article 101 TFEU as a whole were also considered.  It was found that the MAAP 
fits comfortably within the framework of Article 101 TFEU: it helps make sense of 
the wording of Article 101 TFEU, is able to adapt to the changing objectives of EU 
competition law and so is compatible with a move towards an effects-based 
approach.   
However the story of the object criterion does not end there.  The practical 
implications of this research bear some reflection.  It has been shown that the 
Commission applies the object criterion irrationally.  Together, the Commission and 
the European Courts have produced anomalous decisions and judgments that have 
little resemblance to the outcome predicted under the orthodox approach set out 
in the Article 81(3) Guidelines.  The Commission’s decisional practice demonstrates 
that it sometimes treats similar cases differently using diverse reasoning.  Hence, 
there is an inequality between the cases.4  The orthodox approach is thus not 
strictly followed, nor indeed overwhelmingly supported, by the law.  This creates a 
tension between the case law, the Commission’s decisional practice and its 
guidance.      
This thesis addresses this tension by highlighting the availability of an alternative 
approach to the object criterion supported by the case law: the MAAP.  That 
approach accurately reflects not only the meaning and application of the law 
ascribed by the leading case, STM, but also explains how the context of a particular 
case may generate a different outcome from that predicted under the orthodox 
approach. 
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Nonetheless, the practical consequence of the status quo is that the Court and 
indeed the Commission are currently applying versions of the hybrid approach.5  
The hybrid approach recognises the categorisation of object agreements, but 
focuses on a contextual analysis which permits any presumption of harm to be 
rebutted within Article 101(1) TFEU.  It is therefore constrained by categorisation in 
the same way as the orthodox approach, and has the propensity to be expanded by 
the Courts or indeed by the Commission in its Guidelines and BERs. 
The problem with this apparent resolution is that despite enjoying better judicial 
support than the orthodox approach, the hybrid approach is not accurately 
reflected within the Article 81(3) Guidelines.6  Hence, the legal application of the 
category of object agreements is inconsistent.  Moreover, the practical limitations 
of having a category of agreements that are restrictive by object has been shown to 
be problematic given the difficulties with object classification and the increasing 
expansion of the so-called ‘object box’.  The impact that this status quo has on 
NCAs and NC’s, and indeed on undertakings, is a live issue.7  This is particularly the 
case in view of the recent appeal of the Lundbeck decision and the subsequent 
warning call issued by the CJEU in Cartes Bancaires coupled with the requirement of 
consistency under Regulation 1/2003.8  This situation is unacceptable.  A key 
question is therefore how best to move forward from this point. 
One way would be to explore more closely the optimum function of the object 
criterion under Article 101(1) TFEU.9  What the function of the object criterion 
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ought to be can be approached in a number of ways.  For instance, it could be 
assessed from the perspective of what makes good law or from the angle of 
effective enforcement.  It is an important normative question.  It has been argued 
that within the constraints of the law, the MAAP provides a workable solution that 
is able to overcome anomalous case law, developments in economic thinking, 
whilst still respecting presumptions of harm and raising the standard of proof.  
Nevertheless, having articulated the law and proposed that the MAAP is the best 
legal interpretation, a key factor is whether this outcome is then compatible with 
the object concept’s optimum function.  If not, in light of that function, which of the 
three tests fits best?   
For the purposes of this concluding chapter, the role that the object criterion ought 
to play from an enforcement perspective has been selected.10  How the object 
concept could be used as a tool for effective enforcement is a pressing issue given 
the limited resources of competition authorities throughout the EU.11  This 
concluding chapter therefore provides an outline of whether the optimum role of 
the object criterion is indeed best served by the MAAP from an enforcement 
perspective.  While the advantages of the MAAP have been advocated throughout 
this thesis, it does have some weaknesses.  It is susceptible to the criticism that it 
blurs the line between object and effect and increases the administrative burden in 
terms of enforcement costs, resources and time.  Conversely, its application 
reduces Type I and II errors; it follows the wording of the Treaty and is supported by 
the case law.  In particular, it applies the STM Test and hence is not constrained by 
the problems with categorisation.  The following sections will address, first, the role 
ascribed to the object criterion by the Commission and the Courts, and then 
consider what function it ought to play in that light. 
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2. The role of the object criterion: Commission and Courts 
The role the object concept plays within Article 101(1) TFEU has been threaded 
throughout this research.12  According to the Article 81(3) Guidelines, the 
Commission bases its view of the object criterion on the concept of necessary 
effect; restrictions of competition by object are deemed those that by their very 
nature have the potential to restrict competition given their known negative effects 
on competition.13  Hence, there is no requirement to demonstrate actual effects 
given the legal presumption that a category of particular restraints always harm 
competition.14  Merely identifying a particular restraint in an agreement is 
ostensibly all that is required.  This view is comparable with the speed limit analogy.  
This thesis has been critical of this view in light of the case law.15   
The CJEU on the other hand has been less transparent regarding its perception of 
object’s role.16  Despite setting out its interpretation of the distinction between 
object and effect in BIDS, it was not until its judgment in Cartes Bancaires that it 
revealed that such belief is based largely on the hypothesis that experience shows 
that certain types of collusion harm competition.17  Nevertheless, it has not 
                                                     
12
 For instance, when considering the relationship between object and effect in chapter 5 and the 
definition of object of chapter 3. 
13
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, paras 20-21.  It has been noted that the use of the phrase ‘by its very 
nature’ is problematic as it has rarely been defined, for instance, does it mean the rationale of the 
agreement or presumption of effects. 
14
 Article 81(3) Guidelines, paras 20-21.  This view is endorsed by AG Cruz Villalón in Case C-32/11 
Allianz Hungária, para 65. 
15
 Ibáñez Colomo claims the notion that the object category captures agreements that can be 
presumed to have anticompetitive effects is problematic, because it contradicts the principle that an 
agreement may restrict competition by object irrespective of the effects it produces: there is a 
distinction between assessing the nature of an agreement (that is its rationale) versus assessing its 
effects: (Ibáñez Colomo, 2014), ‘Chapeau bas, Prof Wahl!’ and (Ibáñez Colomo, 2014), ‘More on AG 
Wahl’. 
16
 Though the AG’s have been more forthcoming: see AG’s Kokott and Trstenjak in T-Mobile and BIDS 
(supra n3).  Both AG’s likened the object criterion to an inchoate/risk offence.  NB: an inchoate 
offence is a criminal offence whereby an action or agreement prepares for an even bigger 
infringement.  Thus a substantive offence may not have come to completion, but nevertheless an 
offence has been committed because the actions or agreements are in preparation for the 
substantive offence.   
17
 Case C-491/07 Cartes Bancaires, 11 September 2014, nyr, paras 50-52, 58.  Bailey suggests 
experience is derived from economic theory, empirical research, comparative experience and policy 
judgment: (Bailey, 2012), p565.  The Commission has, however, interpreted the judgment to mean 
that novel restrictions can still be found restrictive by object, but that a deeper assessment of an 
agreement’s legal and economic is needed: (Italianer, 10 December 2014). 
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expanded upon the precise parameters of such a category, merely concluding that 
the types of agreement covered by Article 101(1) TFEU do not constitute an 
exhaustive list of prohibited collusion.18  This thesis has also raised concerns with 
this interpretation of the law.19  As to determine whether such collusion “reveals a 
sufficient degree of harm” requires an examination of the “objectives” of the 
agreement based on its content and its legal and economic context.20   
The reliance on categorisation may prove desirable from a normative perspective, 
but in light of the jurisprudence it has proved problematic.  The contents of the 
category have proved fluid.  The case law demonstrates that the types of hardcore 
restraint identified by the Commission in its Article 81(3) Guidelines have not 
always been found to be restrictive by object by either the Courts or the 
Commission.  Conversely, agreements not typically seen as hardcore have been 
found to restrict competition by object.  The jurisprudence thus limits the 
effectiveness of categorisation, which in turn undermines the value of precedent 
and reduces legal certainty.21  The rebuttal mechanism afforded by the application 
of the legal and economic context strengthens this assessment.22  In light of the 
case law, it is questionable whether categorisation is workable from an 
enforcement perspective.   
3. The ought question: effective enforcement 
Numerous commentators have proffered views on what function the object 
criterion ought to play within Article 101(1) TFEU.23  A popular view that supports 
                                                     
18
 Ibid, Cartes Bancaires, para 58.  It is unclear whether the CJEU refers to formal categories such as 
price-fixing or market sharing or agreements based on experience and economic analysis. 
19
 For instance, categorisation ignores factors such as an assessment under the object criterion can 
result in an agreement coming outside Article 101(1) TFEU altogether.  An interesting discussion on 
this issue took place in the comments section of the ‘chillingcompetition’ blog (Ibáñez Colomo, 
2014), ‘Chapeau-bas Prof Wahl’. 
20
 Supra n17, Cartes Bancaires, para 53. 
21
 The jurisprudence also shows that not all object cases are ‘obvious’ or ‘serious’ (depending on its 
definition).  See (Gerard, 2013), pp29-32 for an informed discussion. 
22
 Though the legal and economic context is not just concerned with rebutting any presumptions of 
harm: see chapters 3 and 4. 
23
 Such as, (Gerard, 2013); (Bennett & Collins, 2010); (Bailey, 2012), p562-570; (Kolstad, 2009); (King, 
2011), p270.  Howard asks “Is the object test an anachronistic legalistic device to facilitate the 
evidential burden on claimants and prosecutors who have asymmetric information and limited 
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the orthodox approach is that the object concept should be based on a narrow 
category of agreements presumed to restrict competition by their very nature due 
to their known serious harm to competition.24  What is more, disregarding the need 
for a deep contextual analysis under the object criterion is convenient for bringing 
prosecutions with limited administrative resources.25  It is clear, however, that the 
Article 81(3) Guidelines do not reflect the reality of the case law, which shows that 
object and effect are not quite so disparate.  Furthermore, increasingly 
sophisticated business relationships mean “plain vanilla cartels” are no longer the 
norm.26  For example, price fixing and market sharing arrangements often form part 
of vertical relationships between non-competitors.  Therefore, using such labels to 
conclude that a particular collusion is restrictive by object is overly simplistic as 
there may well be wider commercial reasons for sharing information or allocating 
areas of responsibility between business partners.27  Moreover the outcome of 
“complex collaborative arrangements [between businesses]...has become 
increasingly difficult to predict.”28  The crux is that businesses need to be able to 
innovate, and if strait-jacketed into a constrained category then the concern is they 
will be more reluctant to do so.29  Moreover, the objectives of competition law also 
come into play: what the law is seeking to protect may influence how the function 
of the object criterion is perceived.  Whether effective enforcement is a greater 
priority than commercial freedom is moot.30     
Additionally, it may be that application of the object criterion should be compatible 
with the burden and standard of proof required in quasi-criminal proceedings by 
                                                                                                                                                      
resources?  Or does it still serve a useful purpose in securing infringements that are clearly 
motivated by anti-competitive intent, even if they are inchoate and may only amount to an 
attempted infringement?”: (Howard, 2009). 
24
 See (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013), pp131-156.  Such application of the law may generate Type I 
errors, but is arguably justifiable given the serious harm such restrictions cause. 
25
 See (Howard, 2009).   
26
 (Howard, 2009). 
27
 Ibid. See also (Ibáñez Colomo, 2014), ‘Chapeau-bas Prof Wahl’, who considers such labels are 
arbitrary.  
28
 (Gerard, 2013), p30. 
29
 The nature of global markets and ability for companies to compete on a level playing field is 
important in this regard. 
30
 The advent of the effects-based approach recognised the importance of commercial transactions 
and the benefit of economic analysis to determine whether an agreement did indeed harm 
competition. 
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the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms 1950:  
“If the law presumes that certain types of behaviour amount to a per 
se infringement with limited room for objective justification there 
are nagging doubts about the respect for the presumption of 
innocence and the right to a full hearing under art 6 of the 
Convention”.31   
In view of the serious level of fines that can be imposed on undertakings that 
infringe the competition rules coupled with criminal sanctions imposed in some 
Member States, competition law is seen by some to be of a criminal nature.32  
Notable also is the fact that the shifting landscape of enforcement has led to an 
increased emphasis on negotiated procedures such as leniency, settlement and 
commitments (which perhaps do not respond so well to concrete by-object 
categories).  In light of this, the consequences of infringing Article 101(1) TFEU and 
the enforcement and procedural mechanisms in place to support such findings are 
of crucial significance.   The role of the object criterion is a central part of this 
process. 
3.1. How the object criterion should be delineated: criticising the effects-based 
approach 
Having set out the features that influence the background to the normative 
question, this section sketches out those factors that make for effective 
enforcement.  Cost-benefits are clearly important in this regard: if a particular 
agreement of a type is very rarely beneficial, it may not be worth incurring the 
enforcement costs needed to identify them.33  One rationale for an easily 
identifiable object category that operates in relation to only the most serious 
infringements, which experience shows display significant harm to consumers and 
                                                     
31
 (Howard, 2009).  Though in the UK, the Competition Appeal Tribunal held that the Human Rights 
Act 1998 does not require the criminal standard of proof ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ to be 
applied, rather the civil standard ‘balance of probabilities’, though the imposition of a fine would 
increase the standard of proof: (Whish & Bailey, 2012), p400 citing Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings 
Ltd v Director General of Fair Trading, Case No 1000/1/1/01 [2002] Cat 1. 
32
 (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013), p137; cf (Forrester, 2010). 
33
 (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013), pp152-157; (Posner, 2001), (ix); (Bailey, 2012), pp562-570. 
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can be presumed illegal, is that it reduces the costs of enforcement and increases 
legal certainty.34  It is an administrable approach as actual effects are not required 
to be proven and increases the deterrence factor.35  Waelbroeck and Slater argue 
that strong presumptions of harm based on past experience justify the reversal of 
the presumption of innocence.36   
Conversely, such an approach can be heavily criticised as being liable to generate 
errors of all types and is unable to deal with the greater sophistication of the 
competitive analysis of agreements.37  Hence, the introduction of the effects-based 
approach to EU competition law sought to redress this by increasing the 
effectiveness of competition law and thus its predictability.38  This move was 
captured under the guise of modernisation.39 
An effects-based approach to the object concept under Article 101(1) TFEU does 
have its opponents.40  This is because it “reduces the precedential value of 
decisions which, combined with a scarcity thereof and the parallel development of 
negotiated procedures, tends to reduce legal certainty and to compel businesses of 
relying increasingly on abstract categories and guidance.”41  The effects-based 
approach also increases enforcement costs for both the authorities and 
companies.42     
                                                     
34
 (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013), p151.  Such category must be narrowly defined based on solid 
empirical and theoretical foundations so that it provides the requisite level of predictability to justify 
the imposition of criminal sanctions; pp152-156. 
35
 (Bailey, 2012), 568-570.  Ibid, Waelbroeck and Slater argue that a presumption of culpability 
resulting from the categorisation of a restriction of competition by object is acceptable, so long as it 
is confined within very strict limits.   
36
 (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013), p156. 
37
 See (Hawk, 1995).  This is coupled with the question whether cost benefits should trump the 
burden of proof.  Given the tendency for a per se system to generate false positives, how this can 
then be reconciled with basic civil rights to property and contract requires reflection. 
38
 See (Gerard, 2013), p20 for an explanation of the meaning of ‘effect-based approach’ and pp33-
35.  The Nobel prize winning economist Jean Tirole argued, “The best regulation or competition 
policy should… be carefully adapted to every industry’s specific conditions.”    
http://www.globaleconomicsgroup.com/antitrustcompetition-policy/a-tribute-to-jean-tirole-
winner-of-the-2014-nobel-prize-in-economic-science/#sthash.WBoZJaxb.vNJ2lD67.dpuf 
39
 Regulation 1/2003.  
40
 See (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013); (Gerard, 2013). 
41
 (Gerard, 2013), pp13-14 
42
 (Gerard, 2013), p13. 
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The benefit of having a strictly enforced, narrowly defined object category is not in 
doubt, but it raises the prospect of whether it is at all workable in practice.  Legal 
certainty is not improved by anomalous case law or exceptions.  It is widely 
acknowledged that under specific market conditions even the most serious 
restrictions may be harmless.43  Therefore, looking to the experience in the US may 
provide a useful example of the operation of such a system in practice. 
3.1.1.  US per se offences: s.1 Sherman Act 
As previously stated, under the Sherman Act 1890, the American antitrust law 
system makes unequivocal use of presumptions in its set of ‘per se rules’.  These 
rules allow the US courts to rule on the illegality of certain practices, which prima 
facie satisfy the conditions required by such rules without recourse to a detailed 
examination of all the relevant facts.44  Moreover, where there is a per se 
infringement then the parties cannot argue that it does not restrict competition.  
This is because, US law has determined that a small, limited category of agreements 
automatically restrict competition and the parties cannot argue the contrary.45  As 
such, all that the plaintiff need prove is that the prohibited practice occurred.   
This system is not mirrored under EU law.46  Hence analogies between the US per 
se/rule of reason and the EU object/effect dichotomy are inappropriate and tend to 
breed confusion.47  What is perhaps more appropriate is the increasing recognition 
that the US has moved away from a bright line distinction between per se and rule 
of reason infringements toward one which is tailored to the suspect conduct in 
each case.48  The Supreme Court held in California Dental Association that both 
                                                     
43
 (Waelbroeck & Slater, 2013), p146. 
44
 (Svetlicinii, 2008), pp117-134, 122(C). 
45
 (Bailey, 2010), p363, II, 2. 
46
 Restrictions by object may be exempted under Article 101(3) TFEU and the analysis of an 
agreement’s legal and economic context can rebut any presumptions of anti-competitiveness.  
Marquis argues that “the competition law systems in the EU and US may circle each other in their 
orbits, but they remain separate worlds”, (Marquis, 2007), p46. 
47
 See (Goyder, 2011), p7. 
48
 Citing California Dental Association, Andeangeli also acknowledges that the US Supreme Court has 
moved away from a stark distinction between ‘per se’ and ‘rule of reason’ infringements to that of a 
continuum whereby the inquiry for a particular practice is determined in light of its nature and 
seriousness, (Andreangeli, 2011), p243.  Jones reaches a similar conclusion, (Jones, 2010), ‘Left 
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elements consisted of the same type of appraisal focusing on the “competitive 
significance of the restraint” and how each case was assessed depended on the 
case itself:49   
“The truth is that our categories of analysis of anticompetitive effect 
are less fixed than terms like ‘per se’, ‘quick look’ and ‘rule of reason’ 
tend to make them appear.  We have recognized, for example, that 
‘there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule of Reason 
analysis,’ since ‘considerable enquiry into market conditions’ may be 
required before the application of any so-called ‘per se’ 
condemnation is justified.  (...) As the circumstances here 
demonstrate, there is generally no categorical line to be drawn 
between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious inference 
of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed 
treatment.  What is required, rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, 
looking to the circumstances, details and logic of a restraint.”50 
As with the development of the case law in the EU, in the US an agreement’s 
context plays an important role.  The developments in the US thus highlight how a 
system specifically devised to support per se infringements may still invoke 
considerable analysis of an agreement, not least when restraints considered to be 
condemned per se are in fact determined under the rule of reason.51  Therefore the 
cost benefit arguments are questionable.52   
It has been suggested that the traditional dichotomy of per se rules versus rule of 
reason is outdated and “a continuum of intermediate solutions” which are rules 
that limit the extent of case analysis, but are not as basic as per se rules is more 
desirable.53  A model for the optimal degree of rule differentiation is when decision 
errors (Type I and II) and the costs of regulation are minimised.  Consequently 
                                                                                                                                                      
Behind by Modernisation’, p660 citing Polygram Holding, Inc v FTC 416 F3d 29, 33-34 (DC Cir 2005).  
In the 1960’s Commissioner Loevinger of the US Supreme Court noted that the distinction between 
the two concepts was not particularly clear cut, (Loevinger, 1964), pp23-35.  Also, (Kolstad, 2009), 
p51. 
49
 (Andreangeli, 2011), pp237, 243.   
50
 California Dental Association v FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 779, 780, 781 (1999).  See NCAA v Board of 
Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 468 US 85 at 104. 
51
 See Leegin, 551 US 887 (2007) and FTC v Actavis, 570 US 756 (2013). 
52
 See (Christiansen & Kerber, 2006), pp215-244. 
53
 Ibid, section I. 
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competition rules are likely to be different for different types of business 
behaviour.54   
The experience in the US shows, similarly to the EU, that the theory behind a 
narrow category of agreements does not necessarily reflect the actuality.  Whether 
the hybrid approach is an efficient compromise of resources, despite its drawbacks 
from a legal perspective, is an interesting question.55     
4. Conclusion 
That the object criterion should respect calls for legal certainty, predictability, ease 
of administrative burden and resources is not in doubt.  The system currently in 
operation falls short on a number of these fronts given the tension between the 
Article 81(3) Guidelines and the jurisprudence.  The normative answer may 
nominally point towards a narrow category of agreements in terms of enforcement, 
but the experience in the US legitimately questions whether this is the correct 
solution for the EU’s particular legal system given the development of the case law.  
This thesis has clarified the law and opened it nuances up to scrutiny: the outcome 
of the analysis is that the law on the object concept is far from straightforward.  
Despite the Commission endeavouring to pursue the orthodox approach in its 
Article 81(3) Guidelines, the reality is that this has proved impossible to enforce in 
practice and has the propensity to be abused.56  In response to criticisms, the 
Commission has acknowledged the significance of an agreement’s legal and 
economic context and noted that particular restrictions may be objectively 
necessary or have a legitimate goal, which may then fall outside Article 101(1) 
                                                     
54
 Ibid. 
55
 Using a crude estimation, the orthodox and hybrid approaches share similar costs of enforcement: 
the claimant in both cases can rely on a presumption of harm.  The defendant then incurs the 
expense of rebuttal.  If the claimant accepts the rebuttal there are three outcomes, (i) it declares the 
agreement lawful, (ii) conducts an ‘effects’ analysis, or (iii) decides not to proceed.  Therefore the 
hybrid approach could be seen to have an administrable benefit in line with the orthodox approach.  
This must be viewed against the Commission’s decisional practice: often it undertakes a 
comprehensive assessment of the market and an agreement’s effects in any event.  Whether the 
MAAP involves far higher costs of enforcement needs to be modelled. 
56
 Gerard considers that by widening the object category the Commission has avoided the effects-
based approach, (Gerard, 2013), pp 38-40. 
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TFEU.57  In parallel to this, however, it has also attempted to re-simplify the object 
concept by following the unsatisfactory judgment in Expedia.  It may yet regret this 
choice in light of judgments such as Cartes Bancaires.      
An alternative solution is needed that is able to recognise both the parameters of 
the law and the need for effective enforcement which is administrable.  A 
suggestion would be more clearly to delineate the functions of the Commission’s 
policy approach versus its understanding of the jurisprudence.  The words ‘policy’ 
and ‘law’ are at times used interchangeably, which is unhelpful as the European 
Courts will often cede to the Commission’s policy-devising role as the executive, 
though will not always do so in respect of the Commission’s interpretation of the 
law.58  It is axiomatic that businesses require guidance on the types of prohibited 
collusion and have knowledge of a coherent strategy for the application of EU 
competition law across the Member States.  It is also self-evident why the 
Commission should set out its enforcement priorities and its interpretation of the 
law in its Guidelines, guidance, Notices and BERs.  That said, it is concerning that 
the Commission’s policy approach sometimes masquerades as law.  The strongest 
example of this is the link made between its categorisation of ‘hardcore’ restraints 
and the object concept.  The Commission’s policy approach must be applied within 
the legal framework as interpreted by the European Courts.  Hence, the link 
between hardcore restrictions, those which are black listed and the object concept 
is not as clear cut as the Commission professes.  This distinction between the law 
and policy is rarely highlighted, and has played a major role in the confusion 
surrounding the interpretation and function of the object criterion.59  Separating 
the functions of law and policy would help ensure that businesses know the law, 
but also understand how the Commission interprets it and when it will pursue 
particular types of behaviour.60  It would allow businesses sensibly to make their 
                                                     
57
 Gerber noted the Commission has made substantive changes under the radar during the 
modernisation process; (Gerber, 2008).  This trend continues; see eg De Minimis Guidance, 1. 
58
 (Townley, 2011), pp442-443. Also, (Conway, 2014), pp517-518. 
59
 See (Townley, 2011), p443; for an interesting discussion on the Commission and ‘myth-making’ 
see (Akman & Kassim, 2010).  See (King, 2011), p296. 
60
 This envisages, eg, the Article 81(3) Guidelines are recast to reflect the law more accurately and its 
actual application, which largely follows the hybrid approach.  Therefore the requirement that an 
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own judgment calls in respect of their commercial decisions through recourse to 
the case law. 
Further research into the function of the object criterion is needed, particularly as 
effective enforcement is not the only parameter upon which good law is made.61  
The orthodox approach, despite having normative support, does not accurately 
reflect the law.  This thesis supports the notion that the object criterion is a 
powerful tool that has the propensity to be more effectively utilised in accordance 
with an effects-based system.  Its potential remains unfulfilled.  The meaning and 
application of the object concept have been revealed. The debate over its function 
is set to continue. 
                                                                                                                                                      
agreement is assessed within its legal and economic context would draw attention to the fact that 
presumptions of harm are technically rebuttable under Article 101(1) TFEU. 
61
 See (Odudu, 2006), pp1-8.  Further research into several areas arising as a result of the findings of 
this thesis would be of benefit.  Such as the practical implications for the NCA’s and NC’s in view of 
the discord between the case law and the Commission’s guidelines (given their obligations under 
Regulation 1/2003); the relationship between the object concept and the level of fines, human rights 
implications and the standard of proof; the role of soft law and its impact on the object concept; the 
purpose of competition policy and its relationship with the law, and how economics may provide an 
alternative view of the law.  Recommendations as to how the Commission should amend its Article 
81(3) Guidelines are also required.   
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Glossary/Abbreviations 
AG – Advocate General 
All ER - All England Law Reports 
ATP – absolute territorial protection 
BER – Block Exemption Regulation 
CAT - Competition Appeal Tribunal (UK) 
CJEU – Court of Justice of the European Union (formerly the European Court of 
Justice) 
CMA – Competition Markets Authority 
CMLRev - Common Market Law Review 
CMLR - Common Market Law Reports 
Commission - European Commission 
Community Courts – the General Court and Court of Justice 
CompAR - Competition Appeal Reports 
DG COMP - Directorate General for Competition 
DoJ - Department of Justice (United States) 
ECHR – European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
ECLR - European Competition Law Review 
ECN - European Competition Network 
ECR - European Court Reports 
ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community 
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EEA – European Economic Area 
EEC – European Economic Community 
EL Rev - European Law Review 
EU – European Union 
European Courts – The General Court and Court of Justice 
EWCA - England and Wales Court of Appeal 
EWHC - England and Wales High Court 
Fordham – Fordham Competition Law Institute 
FTC – Federal Trade Commission (US) 
GC – General Court (formerly the Court of First Instance) 
Harv. LR - Harvard Law Review 
ILCQ - International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
IP - Intellectual Property 
IPRs - Intellectual Property Rights 
KB - Kings Bench 
MAAP – the more analytical approach 
MIF – Multilateral Interchange Fee 
NCA – National Competition Authority 
NC – National Court 
OECD – Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OFT - Office of Fair Trading 
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OJ - Official Journal 
OJLS - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
Para - paragraph 
QB - Queens Bench 
RPM – resale price maintenance 
SI - Statutory Instrument 
TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UKCLR - United Kingdom Competition Law Reports 
US – United States  
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